IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING:
LESSONS FROM 12 AGENCIES

COPS
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING:
Lessons from 12 Agencies

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Contents

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We assembled a team with formidable expertise to carry out the research and write the chapters contained in this volume. Each researcher partnered with an active or retired police practitioner to conduct each site visit. We are grateful to the team members for their individual contributions. Members of the research team were:

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Upon contacting each agency, we requested that the chief executive (police chief, superintendent, commissioner, or sheriff) appoint a liaison from the department to coordinate our site visit. During the site visits, we stole much of their time, shared meals with them, requested piles of documentation, asked many difficult questions, and generally interfered with the normal course of their duties. All of our liaisons came through, and we thank them for taking the time to participate in our research. Our liaisons for the project were:

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Hillsborough County (Florida) Sheriff's Office

Sergeant Jerry Jones
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Little can be accomplished during a site visit to a police or sheriff's department without the support of the chief executive. These chief executives made our visits possible by permitting their agency staff to provide our research team with the information we requested. We thank the police chiefs, the sheriff, and superintendent who participated in this project, some of whom have since moved on to other pursuits, for allowing us unfettered access to their agencies.

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INTRODUCTION: Making Sense of Community Policing

William Wells and Edward Maguire

Over time, the community policing reform movement has come to mean many different things to different people. For reformers, community policing is a new paradigm of policing, an entire guiding philosophy, albeit one that is hard to precisely define and measure. Others think of it as a set of community oriented programs and practices such as D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), crime-prevention units, and bicycle patrols. The community policing movement has wrestled with this tension between philosophical ambiguity and programmatic specificity for years. So what is community policing? What does it look like? *What does it mean when a police agency says that it practices community policing*? This volume explores these questions.

From the beginning of this project, we assumed that police agency leaders throughout the United States had been busy translating their own visions of community policing into organizational structures and practices. If we were right, then we as researchers could hope to observe, measure, and draw conclusions from tangible and visible phenomena about what "community policing" meant to the agencies claiming to practice it. With that in mind, we set out to explore the implementation of community policing in 12 local police agencies across the nation.

This is an exciting time to be studying police organizations. New technologies are being introduced to law enforcement at a rapid pace. Police agencies are more open to research and evaluation than ever before.[1] Community policing offers potential for changing the way police identify, define, and address problems; engage and interact with members of their communities; and organize and manage their agencies. Qualified researchers are studying community policing for different purposes, using different methods. Some spend years studying single police organizations in great depth.[2] Others are using mail or telephone surveys to study large numbers of police agencies from a distance.[3] Many, fortunately, are focusing on the outcomes of community policing and how to improve it.

The research that served as the basis for this volume was designed to examine how the actual practice of community policing has been developing in U.S. law enforcement agencies. What does it look like in the field? How has it evolved? What is its future? Research by Alexander Weiss, Director of the Center for Public Safety at Northwestern University (formerly the Northwestern Traffic Institute), suggests that policing innovations spread as individuals who work in police agencies talk with one another, even during informal conversations.[4] Weiss concludes that "the dissemination of research findings might best be accomplished by tapping into the police information grapevine."[5]

We and our colleagues at the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) hope that this work becomes part of that information grapevine, shedding light on the above questions and facilitating the sharing of such knowledge among police organizations. The COPS Office has played a prominent role in disseminating cutting-edge information about community policing to police agencies across the nation, and we are delighted to add this volume to the growing body of knowledge. Our goal is to share with the law enforcement community our observations and findings as we examine what police organizations are doing to implement effective community policing throughout the United States.

When initiating change, each police agency faces unique contingencies; there is no one-size-fits-all approach to implementing community policing or any other innovation. Regardless of their circumstantial differences, however, we would like for police officials at all levels, from patrol officers to police chiefs, to find in this work ideas that can be used in their own organizations. Also, this work is written with a broad, diverse audience in mind—for people who work in police agencies, of course, but also for those interested in local, state, or national police policy, and for those who study the police and policing.

This introduction describes the genesis of the research project, the research team and its methods, and the framework adopted to characterize community policing. The following chapters will describe and analyze the experiences of local law enforcement agencies and the lessons learned as they worked to define, make sense of, and implement community policing. We have organized the information so that readers can set aside ideas of no immediate value to them, while allowing ideas suited to their circumstances to ignite sparks. We trust that nearly everyone will find something new and useful in the experiences of the 12 agencies represented here.

The research project

Long before conceiving of this project, the authors had been immersed in studying and writing about community policing from a variety of perspectives. Then one of us (Maguire) started hearing from police departments asking for something—anything!—that he had published on the topic. He quickly realized that his entire body of work was infused with academic jargon, scholarly theories, and complex statistical methods. Nothing he had written to date clearly addressed law enforcement practitioners' immediate concerns about implementing community policing.

Information generated by the process of producing peer-reviewed scholarship provides a solid foundation for practitioners; it is an important contribution of the academic profession. Still, Maguire was struck by how research that spoke only to other academicians and not to police professionals would be for naught. From that insight, this project emerged: We would examine community policing *as it had been implemented* in 12 police and sheriffs' agencies, and we would describe and discuss our findings in a volume written expressly for law enforcement professionals. Fortunately the idea appealed to the COPS Office, which agreed to fund the project.

From the beginning, we understood that each police organization implementing community policing would be doing so in a setting of unique local circumstances, opportunities, and obstacles. Those details were important to document, but would have been difficult to capture with mail or telephone surveys administered from a distance. For this research, we needed a qualitative approach rather than a quantitative analysis of survey data. We decided to make on-site visits to a sample of police organizations, observing their operations and speaking face-to-face with those most knowledgeable about local implementation of community policing.

We expected this approach to provide a clearer view of the complexities associated with implementing community policing. We believed from the outset that we would find police organizations responding in highly individualized ways to similar challenges and opportunities. We expected variations both in the contexts in which community policing had been implemented and in the ways that police organizations were adapting community policing to local conditions. We wanted to observe firsthand the various ways that police organizations had overcome their particular obstacles and were taking advantage of their opportunities.

The research team

We often have been asked how academicians, lacking substantial real-life experience as police officers, can legitimately teach and conduct research on policing. There are a number of answers to this question, some rooted in the philosophy of social science, but the most direct is simply that well-trained outside observers can bring a significantly fresh perspective to the issues they study.

Consider the following observation by Arthur Golden, author of *Memoirs of a Geisha*:

> *Autobiography, if there really is such a thing, is like asking a rabbit to tell us what he looks like leaping through the grasses of the field. How would he know? If we want to hear about the field, on the other hand, no one is in a better circumstance to tell us— so long as we keep in mind that we are missing all those things the rabbit was in no position to observe.*[6]

Academicians' insights differ from, but often complement, those offered by practitioners. Police officers have the frontline expertise in conditions in their own jurisdictions and agencies; their knowledge is essential to the learning of nonpracticing experts. In turn, officers can learn from those who observe their circumstances from a different vantage point, one that includes expertise in policing practices in other agencies around the nation or even the world.

For this project, we wanted a research team of individuals whose vantage points would enable them to observe police practices and report their observations in a way that would be educational for others. Our observers would need to represent both the expertise of those who were working (or had worked) in policing in different parts of the nation and of those who studied the police. In fact, several of our contributors met both conditions.

Teams of two individuals (an academic researcher and a current or retired police practitioner) visited 12 local police organizations.[7] Each visit lasted approximately 3 to 5 days. The teams were to observe the implementation of practices defined locally as "community policing." We were under no illusion that such a short visit would result in a deep understanding of the agency's history or culture. Rather, our goal was to take an accurate snapshot of community policing as defined and implemented by each agency.

Our academic researchers were criminologists who specialized in studying police organizations and who worked directly with police on a regular basis. They were accustomed to making site visits to police departments and to conducting research using well-established methods of interviewing, observing, and recording. Our practitioners were current or retired professionals ranging in rank from patrol officer to deputy chief. We believed that the practitioners would broaden the perspectives of the academicians and give agency personnel colleagues with whom to share their perspectives, and this occurred. We also saw an opportunity for the teams' active police practitioners to take innovative practices that they had observed back to their own agencies. The combination of expert researchers and seasoned practitioners resulted in a well-rounded research team that possessed a wealth of knowledge about police practice, relevant theories, and research methods.

A framework for recognizing and discussing community policing

At first, the research team thought to adopt a working definition of community policing to determine which agency practices to observe—which to classify as "community policing." We soon realized that imposing our own definition would be counterproductive, given that our purpose was to learn how police agencies themselves were interpreting and making sense of the concept. We compromised, therefore, adopting a fairly flexible description of community policing as a "multidimensional policing reform movement."

The three dimensions most characteristic of community policing are *problem solving*, *community engagement*, and *organizational adaptation*. Reformers envisioned that community policing would incorporate all three dimensions, and that they would become well-developed and integrated within each agency. For practical reasons, we set aside that ideal. Instead, we decided that in each agency, those programs and practices that fell within any one of the three dimensions would qualify for our purposes as community policing. We would not disqualify programs and practices in agencies that had not achieved the reformers' ideal; we would simply note whether one, two, or all three dimensions were represented and whether they were well-integrated or independent. This was the right decision. In the field, we found that some agencies had implemented a number of community policing activities or practices within one dimension while doing nothing much within the others. The following is a brief introduction to each of the three dimensions of community policing as generally defined:

1. Problem solving. This dimension is considered a central aspect of community policing. The concept was introduced in Herman Goldstein's 1990 publication, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, describing what were then radically new ways of thinking about the police function,

police effectiveness, and the use of police authority. Goldstein was dissatisfied with the amount of attention that police were focusing on their internal operations, while neglecting day-to-day effectiveness and end results.[8] His new concept was adopted in various forms in police agencies throughout the United States and abroad.

Problem solving requires innovation, using tools other than those traditionally employed by police. Generally police respond when called, rarely questioning whether and how several apparently unrelated incidents might possibly arise from a common problem. The idea behind problem solving is straightforward: Police could be more effective if they attended systematically to underlying conditions that might be contributing to those incidents. Problem solving represents a change in the way police think about their work, and it calls upon local communities to contribute their insights and ideas.

Successful community policing agencies rely on problem solving as a guiding principle. They spread the problem-solving philosophy and practice through all levels of their organizations. Police have long attempted to solve substantive community problems. Community policing offers them a framework for doing this that includes a systematic process; it characterizes what police generally do and involves the efforts of many officers.[9] In a successful community policing agency, problem solving becomes the way that police think about all of their functions, and all agency members engage in problem solving as the fundamental approach to their daily routines.

Community policing allows police to use their knowledge of the nature of a given situation and to use a systematic process for identifying, understanding, and responding to problems. The best known problem-solving method is the SARA model: police scan for problems that require their attention, analyze the situation for a detailed understanding of the problem, respond with an approach directly linked to the problem, and assess the outcomes. Assessment, the most often neglected element in the process, is necessary so that responses that prove ineffective can be reworked or replaced, or the problem can be redefined.[10] The process is complete only when the problem has been resolved to an acceptable level.

2. Community partnerships. Systematic problem solving is a flexible process for addressing a variety of problems, criminal and noncriminal, in different settings; police craft responses or interventions that fit the particular characteristics of each problem. They can harness a host of powerful resources for this purpose simply by engaging various local communities as partners in identifying, understanding, and responding to problems. Interested communities might include local businesses, criminal justice agencies, social service providers, or neighborhood residents.

To fully realize the potential of community engagement in the problem-solving dimension, police agencies must involve those communities in meaningful way—for example, in helping to identify problems or in developing and implementing responses or interventions. Police organizations have always sought community support and assistance, but community policing changes the nature of the partnership. Traditionally, decision-making power has remained

firmly in the hands of the police. Community policing, in contrast, asks that police and community members share information and certain kinds of decision-making responsibilities. For example, police and citizens might jointly determine which problems to prioritize and how to address them, even when police remain in a leadership role.

One common goal of community policing is to support communities in creating and maintaining social structures that promote local safety and order. Citizen empowerment is based on the notion that communities are not helpless—they can exert various forms of control and authority over their children, adult residents, and neighborhoods. Informal resident associations built on mutual trust and respect enable citizens to rely more on themselves and one another to maintain a safe and orderly environment, and less on police intervention. Police can play a pivotal role in harnessing the ability of communities to facilitate that order.

Local partnerships can work on narrower objectives, as well. Problem-solving partnerships give police a way to learn about underlying social conditions and offending patterns from sources with vantage points different than their own. Police could enlist this powerful resource—working with citizens, residents, business owners, and other key stakeholders—to help identify and respond to community problems. The community, in turn, strengthens its voice and influence in determining which problems get police attention and in crafting and implementing solutions.

The idea that people are members of multiple local "communities," each of which has an explicit stake in partnering with police, is central to the community partnership dimension. The common thread that defines membership in such a community might be geographical proximity, ethnicity or race, faith or religion, sexual orientation, profession—any factor that binds people together. Police organizations can look beyond obvious resident and community groups to identify further formal and informal common interest groups of individuals who might make good citizen partners. Organizational problem-solving partners can also be recruited; police agencies have developed effective working relationships with criminal justice system agencies, social service providers, and other government agencies such as city planning offices in such efforts.

Police can initiate or expand the utility of partnerships beyond simple decision-making by including functions such as complex problem solving, crime investigation, and intelligence gathering. Community policing thinks of police-community partnerships not as giving up power and control, but as forming alliances with other groups that can bring distinct resources to bear on diverse problems. Community policing does not encourage partnership as an end in itself; rather, it considers partnerships to be a means of achieving mutually desired ends.

3. Organizational adaptation. Organizational change managers agree that for reformed programs and practices to succeed, the parent organization from the top down needs to embrace and support them. Worthwhile "orphan" programs may survive for a while, but they rarely remain healthy and stable for long. Consistent with that line of thought, policing reformers have insisted that for community policing to thrive, agencies must be fully invested in the philosophy; they must be deeply committed and willing to change.

Changes in organizational management, structure, and culture are necessary and inevitable. An agency that supports community policing will look quite different from one designed to support traditional policing. For the *external* dimensions of community policing—that is, problem solving and community partnerships—to do well, the agency must adapt itself *internally* in several ways.[11] Reformers offer two reasons why such organizational change is necessary. The agency's first challenge is to equip and encourage community policing among its officers: to train and motivate them.[12] The second challenge is to remove unintended obstacles to make the organization flexible and amenable to new demands imposed by problem solving and community partnerships.[13]

Equipping and motivating officers to practice community policing. To motivate officer compliance with community policing principles, several strategies have been attempted:

- Incorporating the benefits of community policing into training

- Modifying performance measures to reflect community policing activities and to reward officers for participating

- Giving officers the autonomy needed to design solutions to persistent problems

- Exempting community policing officers from responding to calls-for-service, to give them enough quality time to focus on problem solving

- Implementing techniques for advancing the policing culture from a law enforcement focus to problem solving and community partnerships.[14]

Structuring the organization so that community policing can thrive. To promote and support problem solving and community-partnership activities, police agencies must replace traditional hierarchical and authoritarian organizational structures with democratic management styles, at least in part. Such a change, according to reformers, is an essential internal step toward improving external service delivery. The goal: a flexible, nonbureaucratic organization in which individual officers and supervisors are able to use initiative and creativity to design custom solutions to unique local problems.[15]

Cultural change doesn't come easily. Traditional police management has been described by some as rigid, paramilitary in character, uncreative, and mechanistic. Prior research has suggested that midlevel managers are particularly resistant to the flexible, more democratic styles of management that reformers promote.[16] Police managers frequently start their jobs with little formal management education or training; some police agencies are providing training in supervisory and managerial skills. They are experimenting with management reform concepts that have proven popular in the private sector, such as total quality management and reengineering.[17] Institutionalizing participatory team-oriented management, those agencies hope, will improve employee morale and encourage autonomy. The implicit premise is that more satisfied workers will produce more satisfied consumers.

In addition to changing management styles, police agencies have been asked to modify their organizational structures. Throughout the 20th century, police organizations became increasingly complex, generating rules and policies, highly centralized decision-making, numerous specialized bureaus and employees, tall hierarchies, and large administrative units.[18] Recently, reformers have been telling police leaders that if they really want to implement community policing, they need to decentralize, both territorially and administratively.

Agencies are advised to become less authoritarian and formal, eliminating unnecessary rules and policies;[19] to pull back from narrow specialization, developing a front line of "uniformed generalists;"[20] to flatten their rank structures;[21] and to use civilians for a variety of clerical, technical, and professional duties.[22] Research suggests that community policing reformers have achieved mixed success with implementing their structural reform agendas in large municipal police organizations.[23] Even when officers are trained and motivated to practice community policing, if other training, performance measures, promotion standards, managerial practices, and organizational structures[24] fail to reinforce and reward (or if they inadvertently punish) community policing practices, the practices will not be sustained. Internal organizational features shape organizational behavior.

Reformers believe that police agencies cannot practice problem solving and community partnerships effectively without adapting internal features, signaling to personnel and the community that community policing is being taken seriously.[25] The number of potential internal adaptations a police organization might make while transitioning to community policing is nearly infinite. Yet many police executives are dipping their toes into those waters rather than diving in. In practice, structural configurations used by police organizations to implement community policing have varied widely. Police executives often have chosen partial approaches, initiating community policing with a limited group of employees (specialized officers or units), in limited locations (certain areas of the community), and/or at limited times (during certain shifts). This variation in organizational adaptation to community policing is partly responsible for making the movement appear fragmented.

As community policing matures, however, the inclusion and integration of the three major dimensions—problem solving, partnerships, and organizational adaptation—can be expected to improve.

This volume

We hope that we have portrayed community policing as we have come to see it—as a journey, not a destination. Community policing is adaptable and responsive to developments in the internal and external environments of police agencies.

This volume is organized into two sections:

1. First, we cover eight significant issues in community policing: community partnerships, problem solving, decentralization and geographic accountability, specialist and generalist models of community policing, information systems, deployment of civilians,

performance appraisal systems, and internal and external communication. We describe each issue and analyze the related practices of some of the agencies that we visited. When possible, we also draw from other data sources to convey what is known about these issues.

2. Each chapter in the second section is a case study of one of the 12 police organizations that participated in our research. We describe how community policing first came to each agency, how it evolved there, and where it is likely headed. Each chapter features a discussion of the three community policing dimensions as we observed them at that agency: problem solving, community partnerships, and organizational adaptation. We also describe relevant changes occurring at the agency.

We conclude in the final chapter with a summary of what has been learned. We discuss our central themes and findings, and offer guidance for agencies that are considering or in the midst of implementing community policing.

As with all journeys, the implementation of community policing in the 12 agencies that shared their experiences with us provided numerous opportunities for learning and reflection for those working within and with the agencies and for our research team members. We hope that their rich experiences will provide inspiration and meaningful help with selecting the best path for other agencies' community policing journeys.

Community Partnerships Problem Solving
Decentralization & Geographic Accountability
Specialist & Generalist Models Information &
Analysis Civilianization Performance Appraisal
Systems Internal & External Communications

Part One:
Issues and Themes in
Community Policing

CHAPTER 1. Community Partnerships

William Wells

Building effective partnerships with constituent groups and other agencies is a crucial dimension of community policing. Researchers believe that community partnerships increase police problem-solving capabilities and effectiveness, especially when addressing the most important problems faced by the public—problems believed to be too big and complex for any single group alone to address and reduce effectively.[26] In several of the 12 agencies we visited, community policing partnerships had been established for this explicit purpose.

When an agency decides to focus on results and outcomes, partnerships can become invaluable. Partners coordinate to address substantive community problems with mutual effort, and they bring a wide range of resources to the table. Partners might be found among other government agencies, social service providers, and naturally developing neighborhood groups such as the faith community. The possibilities are not limited to such conventional organizations or groupings; however, almost any formal or informal bond that exists among residents could be the foundation for a productive police-community partnership.

Partnerships strengthen the ability of individuals who have organized around nearly any common interest to maintain order and safety where they live and work. The goal of police-community partnerships is to develop communities with the capacity to use informal social controls to maintain safety and order independently, securing outside resources only when needed.[27] Successful partnerships find ways to reduce over-reliance on police for safety and order. Reformers encourage community policing agencies to build and maintain working partnerships for precisely that reason. In addition to their inherent value, working relationships with the different communities within police jurisdictions produce practical results.[28]

The term *community* as we use it here refers to a natural collection of individuals, businesses, and service providers in a common physical space and/or with other common interests. The idea that towns, cities, or other areas making up police jurisdictions are homogenous—that everyone within them is essentially alike—is simplistic, misleading, and outdated. Instead, we find that the human environment in which police agencies operate is composed of a variety of individuals and organized groups, each with particular interests. The communities we are concerned with form within jurisdictions when individuals share either a common geographic space or a common interest having little to do with geography. These are the groups that have much to offer and much to gain from police-community partnerships.

The nature of community partnerships

Characterizing the contributions that external groups have been invited to make in police-community partnerships, Roehl and colleagues distinguish between community *involvement* and community *collaboration*.[29] Partnerships structured only for involvement are narrower in scope. They reflect longstanding traditional relationships—police are experts, citizens are passive service recipients; police define community problems and determine solutions, communicating with public "partners." Police agencies that are serious about community policing should be moving beyond this sense of partnership; that is, beyond the tendency to view citizens as simply an extra set of eyes and ears in the neighborhood.[30]

In contrast, community policing partnerships structured for *collaboration* encourage two-way communication, more fully engaging community members and groups. Collaborative partners are invited to contribute to significant decision-making processes, identifying problems that deserve police attention and assessing the effectiveness of police responses to those problems.[31] Collaborative police agencies value their external partners' expertise, assigning it a significant role in problem-solving processes. Partnerships built in the spirit of collaboration can be recognized by the variability of the parties engaged in police decision-making.

Some of the agencies we visited were using multiagency collaborative partnerships to combat domestic violence. They were taking advantage of the fact that service providers and victim advocates usually have different views of domestic violence than the police.[32] Drawing upon community perspectives, police were able to gain a broader understanding of related problems and were better positioned to craft effective responses.

This approach required police to relinquish some control to outside individuals and groups, and sometimes to accept ideas that challenged their former assumptions.[33] The external groups and individuals had to be willing to do the same. Considerable work goes into building consensus in police-community partnerships, and in the process both police agencies and community groups can anticipate some level of conflict.[34]

Findings

In the 12 community policing agencies that we visited, the research teams observed several variations in the structure and operation of police-community partnerships. Our intent was to learn more about those who were forming partnerships, their purposes, and factors that might help or hinder their success.

Types of individuals and groups. Nearly everyone we encountered recognized that his or her agency served not one homogenous population, but a multitude of populations or communities that coexisted within jurisdictions. This was made clear by the variety of individuals and groups that agencies had chosen as partners. Most fell within one of two broad categories: 1. residents and businesses—constituents, or 2. government agencies and other service providers.

Constituents. The constituent category included homeowner and business associations as well as individual residents and small-business owners. Where resident groups already existed, having previously organized around a particular neighborhood or substantive issue, partnerships were relatively easy to initiate. Most (but not all) of our agencies had done this.

- In Portland, Oregon, resident members of more than 90 established neighborhood associations had been engaged by police officers.

- In Billings, Montana, police had connected with task forces that were organized independently for other purposes.

- In some cities, partnerships had been established with city-funded community groups originally formed for other reasons. Greenville, South Carolina, police, for instance, were collaborating with Within Reach, an organization that coordinated neighborhood service providers.

Some police agencies had organized new groups with a particular focus in mind. Often, that intention was to improve relations between police and minority communities. The Portland agency, for example, was working with advisory groups representing the city's African-American, Latino, and Asian communities. In Lowell, Massachusetts, police formed a race relations council to help build rapport with the city's ethnic communities. Productive police-community relationships are possible with almost any identifiable community. One of the more creative approaches used by some agencies had been to partner with groups of individuals who had been contributing to local problems.

An agency that creates or approaches an advisory board with the intent of relating better with its constituents needs to be prepared to listen well and to offer tangible, meaningful responses to concerns raised. Otherwise, the "partnership" will quickly come to be viewed as a toothless tiger. To be effective, partnerships with citizen advisory groups must offer genuine authority; the partnership will be less effective if police fail to respond to the concerns they raise.[35]

Apartment and public housing complexes are examples of cohesive residential communities that might be approached. Several agencies we visited were attempting to partner with housing managers and residents.

- In Knoxville, Tennessee, police officers and public housing staff were meeting monthly with a public housing tenant council to discuss issues of mutual concern.

- In Colorado Springs, Colorado and Naperville, Illinois, police departments had initiated Crime Free Multi-Housing programs, fostering working relationships with apartment complex managers and residents.

Similar approaches could be an effective response wherever significant problems are connected with housing and apartment complexes. Programs such as these encourage community-building, giving residents a reason to interact and establish bonds. Partnerships with residential complexes support the community policing goal of helping residents establish informal social controls to promote order.

Several agencies that we visited were partnering with businesses and business associations. The partnerships varied in scale. Informally, in Hillsborough County, Florida, a deputy was working on a modest project with local department stores, while the Naperville police department had formally created a dedicated downtown officer assignment that was already helping solve area problems—a move reported to be one of the best the department had ever made. Other agencies had made similar formal and informal efforts to collaborate with business organizations to solve major problems.

Government agencies and other service providers. Apart from resident and business groups, we found police partnering with local government agencies, social services, and criminal justice agencies, all of which offered potential for productive collaboration. Nearly all of the agencies we studied had solid relationships established with departments of transportation and traffic engineers, public works, fire departments, zoning offices, and city councils. As the police agencies broadened their definitions of their service role, they sought new partners to help solve problems more effectively. For the most part, those collaborations increased the number and variety of resources available to make positive changes and improve local quality of life.

Among the most frequent cooperative interagency relationships were those between police and local code enforcement offices.[36] Newport News, Virginia, was a leader in this respect. Newport News police had initiated collaboration with the Department of Codes Compliance in the early 1990s. Since then, the two agencies had been working together to identify, inspect, and impose sanctions on nuisance properties. Code enforcement inspectors worked from police precinct offices, facilitating coordination between the two agencies.

In Reno, Nevada, and Greenville, South Carolina, police departments and city service agencies were working together, as well. In Reno, personnel from the police and fire departments, the code enforcement office, the housing authority, and traffic engineers were collaborating to solve problems at a location generating a disproportionate number of calls for service. In Greenville, the city was helping to purchase and renovate deteriorated properties that were a source of trouble.

Until recently, most police agencies have worked in isolation to address law enforcement issues that are compounded by social problems. New partnerships between police and social service providers such as battered women's shelters, mental health professionals, and drug treatment facilities have been raising the effectiveness of all of those responsible for preventing and responding to crises in that client population. Community policing departments are becoming more aware of the benefits of working with organizations experienced in responding to complex social problems.

In the agencies that we visited, police-social services partnerships were initiated not simply to enforce the law, but to coordinate delivery of the particular array of services needed in individual cases.

- In Portland and Colorado Springs, partnerships among police, service providers, and district attorneys were serving victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse. The goal in both cities was to increase victim safety by coordinating appropriate service providers and linking them with victims. Colocation of representatives from partnering organizations in these cities further facilitated communication and service coordination.

- In Knoxville, a team of supervisors from different agencies was developing individualized release plans for parolees and connecting them with appropriate service providers. The Community Safety Collaborative, as it was known, was a formal partnership among the police agency, the probation and parole office, and numerous social service providers.

In the above cities, partnerships that engaged and drew on the resources of several service providers made it possible to tackle complex problems far more effectively than any could have done alone. Working relationships between community policing departments and other criminal justice system agencies were also quite common in our agencies. Most served at the least as vehicles for sharing information about crime, local problems, and suspects.

- The Newport News Police Department had joined a group of representatives from 10 jurisdictions that routinely met to exchange information. The Newport News Police Department also maintained a close relationship with the military because of its proximity to nearby bases and shipyards.

- In Portland, the Neighborhood District Attorney program placed a district attorney in each police precinct to facilitate contact with officers and community members. The effort enabled the three groups to collaborate regularly on issues of local concern.[37]

Despite tensions that often existed between local and federal law enforcement, our agencies reported good working relationships with entities such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the federal Drug Enforcement Administration. Most of those partnerships were focused on sharing information and coordinating traditional law enforcement operations.

As expected, most of the agencies had learned from and shared information about their partnering experiences with other police departments nationwide.[38] This occurred informally as departments sent officers to other agencies that were implementing community policing. Departments that were members of collectives exchanged information about community policing more formally. For example, the Billings Police Department had joined a group of several agencies in the Northwest, and the Concord Police Department had become a Community-Oriented Policing Demonstration Center to assist other departments.

General purposes of partnerships. Police-community partnerships serve a wide variety of purposes, most falling into either the category of enhancing communications or that of responding to problem situations.

Communications. Our interviews and observations revealed that enhanced communications were enabling the agencies to achieve several goals:

- To understand community concerns and identify problems

- To educate citizens and teach crime prevention techniques

- To build community support

- To share information with other agencies, particularly those in the criminal justice system.

In most cases, however, communication between police and citizens was largely one-way—one party would provide information to the other, with little dialog or true collaboration to follow. Still, that was a step in the right direction.

Communication was occurring in the form of surveys, knock-and-talks, and police attendance at community meetings. Some agencies had begun communicating directly with minority groups about their particular concerns, establishing new bonds. In all of these cases, police were finding opportunities to be responsive to the distinct communities embedded within their larger jurisdictions. Personnel from many of the agencies reported that the new relationships with community members were resulting in a clearer understanding of the issues of most concern to the public.

We also encountered police who still believed that the appropriate role for the public was to be an information source—the extra-eyes-and-ears perspective. This was not the concept that community policing reformers had in mind, and it was fundamentally limited in its usefulness. Still, even limited partnerships could serve as starting points from which more effective collaborative problem-solving partnerships might evolve.

One-way communication remained the norm when police provided information to the public. Some agencies viewed partnerships as opportunities to communicate police perspectives to others, usually in pursuit of greater community trust and support. Citizen police academies, for example, were developed for this purpose. In at least one agency, we heard that external pressure to create a citizen oversight body had been rechanneled into starting such an academy. The two entities serve quite different purposes, however. An oversight body would have offered greater opportunity for citizens to have had a voice in police processes and thus for the police agency to have made meaningful changes. Academies, on the other hand, normally cast attendees as fairly passive recipients of information about policing and the department.

Sometimes, one needs to probe beyond appearances to determine the depth of a partnership. An employee of one agency characterized a newly created downtown officer assignment, described above, as "a great marketing tool." The implication was that having a better relationship with the downtown community was intended primarily to generate more support for police in a period of budget cutbacks. In a few cases, we saw mechanisms such as citizen academies being used essentially to communicate a particular message to citizens, without offering real collaboration.

In other cases, however, we found police agencies truly offering to share their power to a certain degree, presenting citizens with honest opportunities to engage in decision-making processes.

- The Knoxville department held an annual crime-control planning event, inviting more than 200 citizens to help set annual priorities for the police department for the coming year. Also, a citizen oversight mechanism was giving the public a degree of power in matters that formerly had been the exclusive domain of internal police units.

- The Colorado Springs Police Department had sought public input on its new service standards; a crime analyst had conducted 10 focus groups for community members to comment on the draft standards before they were adopted.

Problem situations. Partnerships were allowing the departments we visited to respond better to community concerns as they coordinated service delivery and enhanced law enforcement efforts. The city of Concord, California, had instilled community oriented service throughout local government. Collaborative problem solving had become the means to achieve results and improve local quality of life. Liaison teams were working with residents, city agencies, and businesses to enhance communication and address public concerns, drawing upon a wide array of resources. Concord police joined in the wider effort to work productively with other service providers.

In Colorado Springs, we observed an example of a highly functional multiagency partnership: the Domestic Violence Enhanced Response Team (DVERT). DVERT partners worked to link victims of serious domestic violence with vital resources of several kinds, including law enforcement and shelters, to increase their safety. DVERT recognized that these victims were at greatest risk when attempting to end abusive relationships. They often needed a multitude of services such as emergency housing, child care services, and assistance in obtaining and enforcing protection orders; the DVERT team made it possible to coordinate such comprehensive assistance for each victim. In 1993, a similar police and community partnership was initiated in Portland.[39]

In Reno, we found an example of community partnerships in the form of neighborhood advisory boards. These were funded by the city to maintain and improve neighborhoods. The boards were independent of the police department, but police did participate in the boards' efforts to address community-based issues.

Within the context of community policing, community-building activities can produce healthier communities with more capacity to care for themselves, lowering their dependence on government agencies like the police. Police can help communities to accomplish this with informal, naturally occurring processes. Police involvement in directing community-building activities was rare in the agencies we visited, but not entirely absent. To be sure, community-building is not easy; research shows that instilling the self-protective and preventive behaviors that allow communities to take better care of themselves—especially in highly disadvantaged areas—is difficult.[40]

Addressing barriers to community engagement. Across the 12 police agencies that we were studying, we identified a number of factors that had potential either to hinder or to facilitate effective, healthy police-community partnerships.

Perhaps the most common obstacle to success was an absence of citizen participation, or participation by only a small, select community segment.[41] In the latter case, failing to achieve adequate representation of the community at large, police would forfeit the opportunity to hear perspectives genuinely reflecting the broader community. As a result, the police view of residents' concerns and their responses to solutions being (or about to be) implemented could be skewed. We observed this phenomenon frequently.

On the other hand, several agencies were working especially hard to connect with communities that initially had resisted collaboration. In Lowell, police had established a race relations council to help build mutual trust with minority communities. For lack of such trust, the Knoxville department's earlier efforts to engage minority citizens in annual crime-control planning meetings had been unsuccessful.[42] Certain kinds of communities have been broadly characterized as fearing or lacking trust in police and government; focused, aggressive outreach may be needed to develop partnerships with them.[43] It takes a diligent effort for police to build or restore good relationships with the very communities that are the most unwilling, the most disorganized, and the most troubled.[44]

Difficult as it may be to forge partnerships with unwilling participant groups, their resistance is not an excuse for dismissing their perspectives. It's easy to conclude that they are uninterested, but learning to understand the dynamics that can inhibit citizen involvement will be more productive than ignoring them. The obstacles might well not be lack of interest or motivation, but rather suspicion and mistrust. Poor citizen involvement is a cue to probe why individuals are excluding themselves. Only with a clear understanding of their perspectives can a police agency pursue effective measures to facilitate those communities' participation.

In place of traditional law enforcement tactics, some of the agencies we visited were truly trying to better understand the sources of local problems, then working with trouble-prone groups to craft mutually agreeable solutions. When considering possible partners for police, individuals and businesses identified as "part of the problem" might not immediately come to mind, but some agencies were establishing relationships with exactly those groups. In several cases, police were working with owners and managers of businesses such as bars and motels, finding ways together to reduce problems. Problem analysis is useful for revealing situations in which it makes sense to work with those responsible for problems before resorting to arresting them or building legal cases against them.

As a way of allowing partnerships, small and large, to develop spontaneously, most agencies had created neighborhood police substations. The substations established nonconfrontational settings where frequent informal or formal contact between police and residents could facilitate collaboration. In Naperville, Illinois, community connection offices were offering citizens one-stop access to several municipal services, including police. A Hillsborough County community

resource deputy told us that community substations provided nonthreatening places for citizens to interact with police; he also told us that he himself had never visited one.

Those and other agencies had established settings in which cooperative police-citizen problem solving easily could have developed. Unfortunately, police substations were not always living up to their potential. Engaging citizens and developing partnerships did not usually rank high on the list of the multiple purposes associated with the substations. More often, we heard them described as a convenience for officers and citizens who needed to file reports, or occasionally as a way for police to have a greater presence in the community. In some cases, officers seemed to be avoiding their substations rather than viewing them as venues for making community contacts. A few substations were not visitor-friendly. One officer described a precinct substation as "the dugout," a place where officers could complete paperwork without being bothered by the public.

Each agency's success in implementing community policing appeared to be linked to the extent to which its officers viewed community partnerships as a valid, meaningful, and important dimension of the philosophy. For example:

- In the Lowell department, a dramatic improvement in officers' attitudes apparently was pivotal in its achievements. Not everyone in the Lowell department supported the community policing effort, but the positive support of a critical mass of employees appeared to have been at the heart of the changes occurring there.

- In the Naperville Police Department, officers at all ranks reportedly were deeply involved in building community relationships, volunteering, and serving on the boards of community organizations. Some were volunteering personal time. Those we spoke with believed that personal connections with community members had enhanced their police-community partnerships. Commitments like these highlighted the importance of meeting with the community on a variety of levels, from simple police-citizen interactions to formal, large-scale collaborations.

In other places we found general unwillingness to develop partnerships or to work collaboratively with the community. In one department, the expectation that one would attend community meetings that fell occasionally on a day off was reported to be causing low morale. In another, a manager reported that some officers lacked "the mentality" to sit through meetings with citizens. A manager in a different agency told us that s/he "knew that community policing officers were successful when citizens complained," strongly implying that citizen input on tactics employed by police on the street was taken less than seriously.

We found one agency in which community policing officers explicitly were not expected to develop working partnerships, but had been directed to focus on locations with high numbers of calls for service, suggestive of an organizational failure to realize the importance of engaging the community in defining its own problems.

We were left with the overall impression that for the value of community partnerships to be fully realized in many of the community policing agencies, they first would need to recognize and confront their internal struggles with competing values and differing definitions of what constitutes "real" police work.[45]

Conclusions

The enormous potential of community partnerships motivates police agencies to tackle the inevitable obstacles. Several of our agencies had realized that to alleviate difficult community problems, resources and expertise beyond what the police alone could provide would be required. They were reaching out to several different stakeholders that shared their concern for residents and their problems—other city departments and agencies in the criminal justice system, nongovernmental organizations, various social service providers, and the residents themselves.

The agencies also understood that their communities were not one-dimensional and not easily defined. With that in mind, some were pursuing effective and lasting working partnerships with locally representative varieties of individuals and groups. Community policing partnerships were not an end in themselves, but rather a means to the ends of enhanced communications and more effective problem solving.

Community policing reformers characterize partnerships as having two-way communication and a degree of power-sharing between the partners. Communication in several of the partnerships that we observed was constrained in some way, undermining their potential value. In other instances, however, police agencies were providing citizens with new opportunities to truly collaborate in matters from which they previously had been excluded. Those departments had greatly increased their ability to solve complex problems.

Despite some encouraging results, significant barriers still were obstructing collaborative partnerships between police and communities. Intra-agency conflicts about appropriate roles for police continued to limit the formation of meaningful community partnerships.[46] This is likely to be an ongoing issue, one that will require the intense and persistent efforts of police leaders to resolve. Police agencies must also be persistent in their efforts to engage a cross-section of their communities in partnerships, offering meaningful work and influence if they are to generate and sustain community involvement.

This will be most challenging in the locations most in need of broad-based problem solving.[47] Meaningful police-community collaboration appears to be easier to accomplish in locations that are already stable and orderly, where one can work with community cheerleaders who already embody support and respect for law enforcement. The bigger challenge for police by far is to work with the communities that are the most disorganized and in need of attention. The biggest payoff also is to be found in those communities, where there is so much progress yet to be made.

CHAPTER 2. Problem Solving

William Wells

> *Community policing without problem solving would be merely expressive and ideological. Problem solving gives it a purpose with a practical payoff.*[48]

Problem solving is a fundamental element of community policing.[49] Community policing agencies routinely encourage officers to engage in problem-solving processes.[50] The following sections offer new evidence about how community policing agencies are practicing and facilitating problem solving.

This chapter explores strengths and weaknesses in the practice of problem solving as a component of community policing and readers will learn how it can be made more effective. We begin by reviewing several relevant themes and findings from previous studies. We then present findings from this study of 12 community policing agencies, organizing them by significant themes from existing research and related themes that emerged from our site visits. The results of this research lended support to some of the critiques of problem solving discussed consistently in the literature, including the under-use of problem analysis.

As a policing innovation, problem solving has potential to become a significant change in the way police define and do their jobs.[51] First, problem solving redirects attention from internal operations and the "means" of policing toward the results of what police do.[52] Second, problem solving implies a much broader role for police, well beyond that in traditional law enforcement. Goldstein advocates for the police role to be defined by the problems that police routinely are asked to address.[53] In other words, community demands for police services would determine the police role. If locked into a narrow set of response options, police cannot respond effectively to broad service demands. Because in addition to maintaining order police do respond to a wide range of demands. A police department that prioritizes only traditional law enforcement will inhibit its own effectiveness.

Third, problem solving represents a significant movement away from the traditional incident-driven approach.[54] Problem solving typically is envisioned as a comprehensive, systematic process in which many sources of information are scanned for problems; sets of problems are analyzed to understand them more deeply; several potential responses are considered and a few are specially crafted for the problem at hand; and the responses implemented and their results are assessed for effectiveness.

In community policing agencies, problem solving asks police, citizens, and community agencies and organizations to work together, to identify and improve conditions that underlie or generate incidents—some of which may initially appear unrelated—that have been coming to police attention. The community is expected to take a significant part in problem solving.

Institutionalization

The literature offers a number of ideas about what it means for a police practice to be *institutionalized*, or a recognized part of an agency's usual approach to work. For researchers Ritti and Mastrofski, a practice is considered institutionalized if it is uncritically accepted as the most appropriate one.[55] They studied to what extent the community policing ideology had become institutionalized by looking at how community policing had been portrayed in two professional publications for police.[56] They found that the "ideology of community policing became rapidly institutionalized" in the 1990s.[57]

Roehl and colleagues, in a national evaluation of community policing, found a "commitment to the term *problem solving*."[58] Their view of institutionalization centered on organizational acceptance, whether changes commonly associated with the strategy in question had produced the desired outcomes. Stating a commitment to community policing and problem solving, for instance, might institutionalize those concepts, even if they primarily served ceremonial purposes that allowed police to retain or enhance their legitimacy.[59]

Conceived a bit differently, institutionalization of a community policing concept or practice should translate into change in how an agency thinks about and conducts its work. Have structural changes actually altered the way work is done, or is it still "pretty much business as usual"[60] after such changes have been attempted? Researchers address this question and the notion of institutionalization by studying change in the organizational structure of police agencies and changes in how police work is accomplished.[61] Greene's summary of the research on community policing led him to conclude:

> …*evidence for institutional shift in policing is, at best, weak. Although agencies have adapted aspects of the rhetoric of community and problem-oriented policing, crime fighting and crime suppression remain mainstays of the police.*[62]

Evidence from our study of community policing agencies suggested that the practice of problem solving in particular had not become institutionalized. Even in the agencies with a national reputation for problem solving, it did not appear to be a normal or routine part of the way that police were conducting business.[63]

Hallmarks of problem solving. Practitioners and scholars believe that certain organizational and process elements tend more than others to encourage and enhance problem solving. First, problem solving in community policing is a formalized process for officers to follow.[64] A formal set of systematic procedures is likely to give officers the clearest guidance, increasing the probability that each critical step will be taken in developing and carrying out effective responses to problems and that none will be overlooked.

When critical steps are being overlooked, both process and results are likely to be flawed. Routine use of informal or incomplete problem-solving approaches increase the probability that the more challenging parts of the process—problem analysis and response assessment, for example—will be omitted or shortchanged. This diminishes the potential impact of

problem solving as conceived by reformers. It also leads agencies to perpetuate incompatible traditional responses under a thin guise of formal problem solving. Agencies with philosophical commitment to the problem-solving concept are distinguished by having incorporated all of the steps in a formal problem-solving process into routine practice.

The SARA model—scanning, analysis, response and assessment—is probably the most well-known formal approach to problem solving. SARA is a systematic method for identifying and understanding problems, and then developing effective responses.[65] Whether SARA is the method adopted, formal problem solving is evident when an agency has some complete and systematic process in place for officers to use in identifying problems and developing a thorough understanding of them, implementing appropriate solutions, and then determining the effectiveness of those solutions.[66]

Giving full time and attention to all four steps is important. The problem-oriented guidebook series published by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) emphasizes the need to more fully understand the nature of problems *before* crafting and implementing responses. The COPS Office series also establishes the importance of evaluating and assessing the effectiveness of problem responses[67] once they have had a chance to influence events. Incorporating problem analysis and response assessment into their problem-solving processes means a significant change for police agencies; they have not traditionally done this, so analysis and assessment need to be formally included in departmental procedures to not be overlooked.

In their national evaluation of the COPS Office program, Roehl and colleagues noted that greater commitment to problem solving was "demonstrated in those departments that create[d] a formal mechanism for recording problem-solving endeavors."[68] According to the research, in this respect community policing agencies still have a ways to go. In addition, if police were fully embracing the concept of problem solving, researchers should find them expanding their analytic capability to understand problems and assess results. Research evidence has not supported this expectation. Instead, problem analysis and response assessment seem to be neglected aspects of agencies' problem-solving processes.[69] For instance, Greene contended that police analysis, including crime mapping, was being used in limited instances of serious crime, and the analysis that was being done was suffering because police were not systematically taking advantage of many sources of relevant information.[70]

Second, extending the assignments of officers to specific geographic areas has been assumed to facilitate closer contact between them and the people who live and work there.[71] Among other things, closer contact was expected to bring to officers a more detailed understanding of the communities' concerns and problems, and an awareness of local resources that could become part of the response.

Third, of all law enforcement personnel, patrol officers have been thought to be in the best position to understand local problems, and therefore should not be inhibited from selecting and implementing responses that they believe will have the best chance of succeeding.[72] If this is true, line-level officers need enough discretion and authority to implement solutions that they think are likely to reduce problems. The idea of redistributing problem-solving authority from the top to those nearer the action is called *decentralization*.

Finally, problem solving in community policing agencies entails both police and community residents working in partnership. Community policing agencies have been encouraged to develop and improve working relationships with the many constituent and other groups and organizations that could bring resources to bear on substantive problems. The purpose is to enhance problem-solving efforts by gathering a variety of resources and encouraging creative responses grounded in sound problem analysis.[73] Such partnerships are a means rather than an end: The problems that police are asked to identify, understand, and solve are likely to require solutions broader in scope and more complex than police alone are equipped to handle.

Problem solving involves community residents in identifying problems and selecting and implementing solutions. Police can serve as "catalysts to this process, partly as collaborators, and partly [as] advisers."[74] Problem solving that lacks community input "is likely to remain focused on conventionally defined crime, identified by intensive analysis of police data."[75] Evaluations of problem-solving activity have revealed that lack of meaningful partnerships and community input has been an area of weakness in the way that problem solving has been practiced.[76]

Specialization. To understand institutionalization, start by considering what the differences between specialist and generalist models mean to the practice of formal problem solving. Briefly, a specialist model will assign responsibility for problem solving to a select group, while the rest of the agency continues as before. Problem-solving practices remain insulated in the organization, without changing how the agency as a whole conducts business. Problem-solving practices in a generalist model are expected to become the norm for nearly all employees— the practice is expected to become institutionalized.

Organizational scholars call this an issue of *functional differentiation*—how and where activities or tasks are separated and assigned within an agency. To determine an agency's level of specialization or generalization, one asks the question:

> *To what extent does the responsibility for solving substantive problems belong to specialized officers, and to what extent does it belong to nearly all employees, across organizational divisions and ranks?*

Many community policing reformers have advocated that to receive the full benefit of problem solving, agencies should adopt a problem-solving model that is to be practiced by functional generalists rather than by specialized officers.[77] Some have also advocated using dedicated problem analysts to generate information needed for in-depth understandings of problems and

their underlying conditions—a skilled specialist who would be supporting the problem-solving activities of members throughout the agency, thus serving a generalized model.[78]

When an agency adopts a specialist model, its problem-solving processes are more likely to be viewed internally as an alternative practice, and less likely to become accepted as effective mainstream policing. Therefore, the processes are unlikely to be fully implemented and practiced,[79] and problem solving has little chance of becoming institutionalized. Insulating the practice of problem solving from an agency's normal police work makes it more difficult for specialized problem solvers to tap resources department-wide. Specialist problem solvers, who often do not specialize in specific types of crimes or problems, tend to be overlooked as a source of knowledge, and their potential for being players in developing and implementing effective responses in such cases is likely to go unrecognized.

Specialization inhibits widespread adoption of problem solving throughout an agency.[80] Specialized units responsible for community policing and problem solving often become marginalized, and their tactics are perceived as less worthwhile than traditional policing responses by others in the agency.[81] Isolating problem solvers within an agency sends the signal that formal problem solving is not a cultural expectation of all members of the organization, but a limited-purpose, specialized activity.

To measure the institutionalization of problem solving in policing agencies, Moore et al. assessed the degree to which problem-solving responsibility was "spread throughout the organization."[82] Moore considered changes that were "organizational wide [sic] [generalist model] rather than specific to a particular structural unit [specialist model]" to be an indicator of greater institutionalization.[83]

Some evidence exists that police agencies have become more specialized, not less, in the era of community policing,[84] and that police agencies commonly have been incorporating problem solving by assigning it to specialist officers.[85] If institutionalization is defined by an agency's reliance for problem solving on functional generalists, then the trend toward specialization suggests that problem solving has not yet been widely institutionalized. Perhaps adoption of a specialist model could be viewed as a step in the direction of institutionalization, with the practice of problem solving expected eventually to spread throughout the organization.[86]

Findings

Lack of systematic problem solving. In at least 4 of the 12 agencies that we studied, officers were not following a formal, systematic problem-solving process, but were practicing some less-formal, incomplete version. In brief, they were not consistently engaging in systematic analysis of groups of incidents, generating a variety of possible responses and implementing the most promising, and evaluating response outcomes for effectiveness. When any step in the formal problem-solving process is lost or superficially undertaken, responses are far less likely to deliver the desired results, which can be costly. The most frequent steps being shortchanged or omitted in our agencies were problem analysis and response assessment.

Problem analysis. In many of the agencies that we studied, in-depth problem analysis, a critical early step in problem solving, was being neglected. That oversight lowered the chance that officers were fully grasping the underlying problems and their causes, and therefore, making it less likely that they were responding effectively to reduce community problems. Limited problem analysis is bound to create "considerable variance in what police *think* they are addressing."[87] Eck argues that limitations commonly attributed to problem solving actually have been the "consequences of a lack of understanding problems."[88]

Officer experience generates crucial information, but it does not substitute for careful, thoughtful analysis.[89] To be sure, most officers knew what was happening in their assigned areas during their shifts and were picking up the subtle nuances of problems occurring there, but with formal analysis they could have been doing more with that knowledge. To what is experientially known, analysis adds new kinds of information and sheds light on connections that bring problems into sharper focus. Without the resources and encouragement to engage in formal problem analysis themselves or to partner with crime analysts, drawing from sources such as incident reports, victims, community residents, offenders, and other police personnel, officers will miss new and relevant information along with its potential significance.[90]

Even the agencies claiming to use formal problem-solving processes seemed to be neglecting problem analysis, other than crime mapping and timely incident reporting. In Reno, a department employee reported that some viewed problem analysis as "just another bells-and-whistles project."

Crime mapping as it was being practiced was producing mediocre results, suffering from what Greene describes as reliance only on serious crime data and a tendency not to integrate multiple sources of potentially relevant information.[91] *Crime* analysis, although important, is not a substitute for *problem* analysis.[92] Crime analysis tends to be a process used for serious crimes, and not for gaining a better understanding of problems such as disorder, traffic hazards, or fear among residents.

In Newport News, we heard concerns that lacking formal problem analysis, officers were defining problems narrowly, focusing on areas generating the most calls for service. In Green Bay, similarly, some department personnel framed a significant problem-solving project as a need to reduce calls for service. Calls-for-service data help to identify problems, but other data sources are equally valuable. Using problem analysis, one could focus on reducing the number of calls for service with the strategy of detecting and improving some underlying condition that is generating calls that are not obviously related.

Crime analysis typically focuses on the distribution of serious reported crimes over time (when) and space (where). Knowing this is only the beginning; crime analysis alone may not detect the conditions and causes responsible for generating those calls.[93] An effective problem-solving process would call for problem analysis to detect underlying patterns that are not immediately apparent.

We did see the impact of problem analysis in some of the agencies we visited. A Portland auto-theft task force had engaged in problem analysis to better understand the problem. In Reno, a survey conducted in a problem motel had revealed more about the situation there. The Colorado Springs Police Department had determined through problem analysis that making the distinction between drug dealers and users was important while they were identifying potential solutions to a problem.

Response assessment. The other element of formal problem solving that is most likely to be ignored in agencies using informal processes is response assessment: What are the short- and long-term results of the response that was implemented? Did it solve the right problem and solve it well? Were the improvements sustainable? Was the problem merely displaced? Could adjustments be made to improve response? What could they have learned from this experience that would raise the performance level of future responses?

In part, neglecting this step is due to outcome assessment being an unfamiliar concept, one that is poorly understood in most public agencies. Some that we studied had not kept records of their problem-solving projects. This made it difficult to reconstruct how they had defined problem situations, what responses had been tried, and what the results had been. Not only did the absence of problem-solving documentation complicate our study, but it essentially assured that those organizations had seriously diminished the opportunity to learn from their experiences.[94]

With respect to assessment, to our knowledge none of our agencies had used a systematic method to track and follow up outcomes for projects in which they had used problem-solving methods.[95] Even agencies that had the capability to track project details (Naperville, Reno, Colorado Springs) had not tapped that potential to support quality assessments.[96] In Colorado Springs, department personnel from across ranks recognized this. Although they had systematically tracked the necessary data, they had not adequately assessed the outcomes of their problem-solving projects. As a result, they told us, some initially successful problem-solving outcomes had been gradually deteriorating. The department was responding by emphasizing what it termed a maintenance concept: Officers were to monitor outcomes and take the actions needed to preserve or sustain positive results. This was a step in the right direction.

The earliest stages of project planning should include defining the measurable indicators of success and planning for outcome assessment.[97] Neglecting these steps will leave departments uncertain of the impact of their actions, whether they can observe changes. Goldstein has suggested that problem solving should seek to reduce both the extent of a problem and its recurrences.[98] This realistic point of view implies that expecting to eliminate a problem completely might be asking too much. To assess problem-solving results, the agency's objectives must be well-defined and achievable, with clearly articulated, meaningful outcome measures—obviously a big challenge.

The key to successful assessment lies in the agency's ability to determine whether a particular response accounts for observed results.[99] Overall, we did not find much evidence that our agencies had adopted the processes that could give them that ability. In many instances, officers were relying on anecdotal evidence—stories that sometimes may have been inherently satisfying, but with outcomes only distantly related to the problems they had set out to address.

- In the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, monthly reports documenting police activities were used for assessment, but the measures were indicators of *outputs* (officer activities), not *outcomes* (the results of those actions).

- The Concord department was using traditional indicators of success: reductions in calls for service, citizen complaints, and evidence that local problems had been displaced to locations outside its jurisdiction.

- Portland officers told us that they knew they were doing a good job when the local kids seemed to like them.

- A Green Bay police supervisor commented that any increase in citizen complaints could be interpreted to mean that officers were active, and therefore that complaints were "evidence of success."

We consistently found traditional or broad generic outcome measures such as those above used in a variety of problem situations. Reduced calls for service, problem displacement, and officer activities (outputs) were among the most common. The agencies were stopping short of identifying and measuring desired outcomes specific to the particular and unique problems they were attempting to reduce.

Even during strategic CompStat-style meetings held by some agencies, the focus seemed to be on *how* officers responded to problems and *what* they were doing—not on whether their responses were reducing local problems. In general, we found that the agencies were maintaining an inward focus on what police were doing, rather than turning outward and using their abilities and resources to learn more about community problems and about the impact of their own attempts at helping to solve them.

Other limiting factors. Three additional observations about how systematic problem solving was limited in the agencies are worth mentioning. First, Skogan and colleagues had found in Chicago that limitations in problem solving had been related to disdain for its associated paperwork.[100] Personnel in at least three of the agencies we visited indicated that officers were avoiding formal problem solving for a similar reason. This suggested that obstacles were still preventing officers from grasping the logic of problem solving and the relationship between data-tracking and response effectiveness; perhaps the value of tracking problem-solving cases is not being effectively communicated.

Second, departmental efforts to encourage problem solving by incorporating it into performance appraisal systems were limited (see Chapter 7). Some of the agencies were missing this chance to encourage and improve the quality of problem solving. It seems

reasonable that using formal methods of problem solving could have facilitated the evaluation of the problem-solving efforts made by officers and other employees.

Finally, most of the agencies were training personnel for problem solving, but not all were training effectively, and a few were neglecting it entirely. In some agencies, such as the Lowell, Colorado Springs, and Reno police departments, recruit training for new officers included solving actual community problems. At the time of this study, Reno and Colorado Springs were experimenting across their entire range of training with innovative instruction methods that emphasized problem solving. In Billings, problem-solving training for recruits was more limited; the state-wide academy did not offer it. Effective training in formal, systematic problem solving in every agency might well produce more motivated, better prepared community policing officers.

Specialization. The police agencies in this study were facilitating and practicing problem solving using a variety of means, formal and informal. Seven agencies had attempted to do this using a generalist model in which problem solving was expected of all patrol officers, sometimes including those of higher rank.

- Concord lieutenants were being asked to work on special problems.

- In Lowell, department personnel told us that they had abandoned their specialized problem-solving model in favor of a generalist approach. The change was intended to correct an earlier organizational decision to specialize that apparently had produced animosity between specialized and nonspecialized officers.

- Billings also had exchanged its specialized approach to problem solving for a generalist approach. Some personnel believed, however, that the move was motivated by a desire to return officers to more traditional policing rather than to support problem solving.

Even in agencies attempting to implement a generalist approach, we found problem-solving activities unevenly distributed. For example, the Newport News department had asked all officers to solve substantive problems, but a specialized high intensity patrol unit was thought by most to be doing the majority of that work. The situation appeared similar in Naperville.

Three agencies had assigned problem solving directly to specialized officers:

1. In the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, problem solving was the responsibility of community resource deputies (CRD). They covered designated geographic areas and also worked across divisions such as patrol, investigations, and inspection services.

2. Greenville community policing officers worked from the Community Services Bureau; they were assigned only to high-crime areas.

3. Similarly, in Green Bay, community policing officers tended to concentrate problem-solving efforts in particular areas, but they hoped eventually to practice problem solving throughout the city.

The above agencies exhibited some of the limitations commonly associated with specialized approaches to problem solving. In Hillsborough County, people referred to the tasks associated with responding to recurring, substantive community problems as "CRD-type work." This signaled a clear distinction between problem solving and ordinary police work and implied that the former might not be as valued around the agency. In Hillsborough County and Green Bay, functional relationships between patrol officers and community policing officers were said to be strained. Here, the implication was that poor working relationships might undermine problem-solving efforts—that information might not be shared and responses might be only partially implemented. In fact, in Green Bay, one community policing officer reported experiencing greater animosity from other patrol officers than from citizens.

Such issues were not specific to the agencies we were visiting. Reformers have long cautioned about the limits of specialized problem-solving models, drawing from the experiences of agencies around the country.[101] Regardless of the manner in which they had implemented problem solving, many of our agencies seemed perfectly aware of the problems associated with specialist models. In spite of that awareness, we found little evidence to suggest that either Hillsborough County or Green Bay planned to extend responsibility for problem solving throughout their organizations.

Two of the departments that we visited had employed approaches that could best be described as hybrids, drawing from both generalist and specialist models. In Portland and Colorado Springs, patrol officers had been asked to engage in problem solving, but most problem-solving responsibility still fell to special units. Other patrol officers were involved, but neighborhood response teams (NRT) in Portland and neighborhood resource officers (NRO) in Colorado Springs served as project leaders. Personnel in both agencies noted that the specialized officers were responsible for bigger or longer-term problem-solving efforts, while patrol officers were expected to provide support. Neighborhood officer assignments were similar in the two agencies; Portland NRTs were assigned to each police precinct and Colorado Springs NROs were assigned to each geographic police division. Portland's NRT officers responded to some calls for service, however, while Colorado Springs' NROs did not—a significant difference.

Distinguishing between generalist and specialist problem-solving models is a useful tactic when trying to understand the ways in which problem solving can be implemented. Nevertheless, too much focus on this distinction may mask variations along other dimensions of problem solving as it is being implemented; these are also important to recognize.

Problem identification. The agencies that we studied had implemented several changes that had increased their ability to draw information from multiple sources to identify community problems. They had recognized the role of citizens in this respect, and they were making opportunities to call on them for this purpose. In SARA terms, these departments had broadened their scanning opportunities.

Many of them had established neighborhood ministations, substations, or precinct stations to create new community ties that could facilitate contact between officers and citizens. Most of the agencies also had stabilized geographic assignments somewhat, leaving officers assigned in

place for longer periods. The assumption was that if officers could maintain closer contact with those who lived and worked in their areas, they would come to understand local problems better. The Greenville Police Department explicitly encouraged officers to rely on citizens to identify area problems. Greenville's designated community policing officers used daily log sheets, recording community concerns and problems and the actions they were taking to reduce or resolve them.

Several agencies, including Concord, Lowell, and Colorado Springs, used formal surveys to collect data from citizens about their concerns. They were also working with community groups in formal settings to identify community problems. Several agencies reported having police representatives who attended community and business group meetings for this purpose. The Knoxville public housing authority had created a tenant council, and representatives from the police department attended its meetings to hear and discuss tenant concerns. Neighborhood advisory boards in Reno and neighborhood action committees in Concord also shared concerns with the police at regularly scheduled meetings.

The responsibility for meeting with citizen groups was distributed differently across ranks. In Portland and Reno, sergeants and lieutenants attended community group meetings, while in Lowell, captains did this. In Colorado Springs, a community advisory committee was meeting with police commanders, and in Portland, several community groups were meeting directly with the police chief.

The decision about who within an agency is responsible for scanning can have implications for problem solving. Clear channels of internal communication are essential for information to be accurately transmitted and used for effective problem solving.[102] In the Lowell Police Department, critical information had to rise from patrol officers up the chain of command to captains, who had the primary responsibility for problem identification.

A potential advantage of placing scanning responsibility higher in the organization is that trends—similar problems confronting many officers—can be recognized and managed from a management or supervisory perspective.[103] A potential disadvantage is that information may be lost if officers are not consulted in the scanning process; if supervisors or managers are attending community meetings, but officers are responsible for crafting and implementing responses to problems, relevant information must flow quickly and accurately down the chain of command. If anything limits the flow of communication, the information most critical for timely, effective problem solving may not reach those individuals who need it.

As a strategy for bringing more problems to the agencies' attention, some had moved crime analysts from centralized command locations into divisions or precincts. The Reno Police Department had assigned crime analysts to work with lieutenants, who were serving as area commanders. Similarly, crime analysts were working from districts in Hillsborough County and from precincts in Newport News. In Newport News, a police supervisor reported that problem solving had benefited from analysts working daily with officers, sharing relevant information about trends in their areas.

A few agencies had forged partnerships with external organizations to help identify significant community problems.

- The Colorado Springs and Naperville police departments were participants in the Crime-Free Multi-Housing Program, which facilitated communication between police and apartment complex managers. This connection increased the likelihood that problem situations would be identified early and dealt with appropriately.

- Similarly, Reno Police Department personnel regularly met with motel owners to learn about problematic situations and to collaborate on mutually acceptable responses.

- In Concord, the police department was maintaining strong partnerships with other government agencies, routinely meeting to discuss a variety of issues that included problem situations.

All of the agencies that we studied were maintaining some kinds of formal and informal partnerships to help them communicate better with their constituents and to learn about community problems. Despite the initiatives that encouraged external relationships and communication, however, the agencies still were relying most heavily on *internal* sources of information, especially data on calls for service and criminal incidents, and they had a rather limited concept of what constituted a problem.

- In Green Bay, community policing officers reported that incident reports and calls for service were their primary sources of information for locating problems. In agencies where mobile data terminals and laptop computers in patrol cars were used to give officers access to timely data, that information still typically consisted of incident reports and calls for service.

- In Hillsborough County, the primary task assigned to community resource deputies was responding to call-for-service locations, and the call for service became the definition of the problem.

- Concord officers were given lists of the top five call-for-service locations in their sub-beats; little discussion of the nature of problems in the high-call locations occurred.

The agencies all, in some way, had improved the capacity to identify community concerns. The application of the information they were receiving, however, was less than it could have been—they commonly stopped short of using it for problem analysis or for understanding the conditions underlying their problems. For example, Greenville's use of daily log sheets showed a willingness to learn from the community about its concerns, but the information collected was not being systematically used to identify trends or to analyze potential relationships among issues or incidents. In the absence of routine problem analysis, police departments were missing opportunities to benefit from the information they were collecting. In addition, some agencies' outreach activities seemed to represent superficial forms of community engagement, limiting their usefulness in problem solving.

After successfully making opportunities to gather more information about their concerns from various communities in their jurisdictions, police are ready to take the next step—to create systems that use that information, analyzing and studying it to understand the problems and their causes better, before responding. Problem-solving experts advocate the use of trained analysts, dedicated to organizing and analyzing data that are gathered from comprehensive sets of information sources. This move would more fully realize the value that otherwise would remain buried in the data, regardless of how much of it is collected.

Nature of responses. During our site visits, more than any other aspect of problem solving, people wanted to talk about the response component of the problem-solving process. They were occasionally interested in describing how they were using problem analysis, but most often they wanted us to hear how they were responding to the problems they had identified.

Consistent with what had been uncovered in other research, their responses frequently appeared to be drawn from traditional police policing methods.[104] In fact, the form of problem solving that we observed most commonly might be best characterized as a "law enforcement" approach to solving problems.[105] This raised the question of whether formal problem-solving processes were being implemented or traditional practices were simply being relabeled. Police might have been incorporating traditional responses into their problem-solving efforts to avoid the criticism that problem solving is soft on crime.[106]

Quality problem analysis increases the probability that responses will adequately address the nuances of a particular problem situation. In describing problem responses, Goldstein says that "much will depend on the results of analysis."[107] If police were not devoting enough energy to problem analysis, and substandard outcomes were reflecting that, then skepticism about the fit between problems and responses would make sense. The following examples illustrate traditional police responses that were mentioned to us as being part of problem-solving processes that clearly would have benefited from more analysis.

- Hillsborough County, faced with significant traffic-related problems, chose stationary traffic enforcement, or running radar, as its primary solution. When an apartment complex faced a rash of thefts from autos, the response was to increase patrols. Both of these were standard traditional responses.

- In Billings, whenever problem locations were identified, the department responded generically with focused patrols.

- In Greenville, when panhandling by homeless individuals in front of businesses was identified as a problem, bicycle patrol officers initially responded by asking business owners to contact them when the panhandling was in progress. When this tactic did not lead to resolution, officers first determined that resulting charges would hold up in court and then conducted a sting operation. Stings were discussed or observed as responses in many of the departments that we visited.

Personnel in some agencies reported the enactment of new ordinances or enforcement of existing ordinances as the response to disorder-related problems. This approach is advocated because it gives officers the authority to become involved with problems such as loitering and disorderly conduct.[108] In addition, ordinance enforcement gives officers alternatives to criminal law-enforcement responses;[109] violators do not necessarily incur criminal records, and physical detention is not a legal requirement.[110] In Portland, citizen demands had resulted in the enactment of drug- and prostitution-free zone ordinances. First violations earned offenders an "exclusion card," prohibiting them from returning to particular locations. Second violations could result in arrest. Unfortunately, the chances of this kind of response being effective are not high.[111]

Greenville officers were enforcing a no-cruising ordinance by observing locations, recording license plate numbers, and ticketing vehicles seen driving through the area more than a certain number of times. The Billings Police Department adopted a similar response to cruising. The Colorado Springs Police Department was responding to downtown problems by working with businesses to pass a new loitering and aggressive panhandling ordinance.

One can question whether enacting and enforcing ordinances constitutes problem solving, especially when problems are poorly understood and enforcement consists of threats and minor sanctions. Reformers recommend that officers rely more on responses that are well-grounded in a clear understanding of the nature of the problems being addressed. Without this focus, enacting and enforcing ordinances is unlikely to be an effective problem-solving strategy. Ordinance enforcement may actually be more consistent with zero-tolerance policing than with community policing, because the community's role in the former is mostly passive.[112]

The examples above demonstrate that what some agencies were calling problem solving instead were examples of traditional policing. Many of those responses appeared to have limited potential for improving community conditions, especially without the community's active involvement, and they were not grounded in the results of problem analysis. We found examples of these kinds of responses in every agency visited. Nevertheless, those same departments had implemented creative responses to problems on occasion, mobilizing a host of resources and seeking to increase the responsibility of their communities for preventing and resolving problems.

A few departments had attempted to reduce certain kinds of problems by making strategic changes in the surrounding physical environment. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is based on the notion that certain environmental or physical conditions will facilitate problems, and that altering those conditions will reduce them.[113] Such tactics were not new, but they did represent attempts to address persistent problems without invoking criminal law enforcement. The Knoxville Police Department had implemented CPTED responses in several problem locations, including public housing and apartment complexes. As an example, the department worked to have fencing erected in a public housing complex where suspects had sometimes been successful in evading police officers.

There were other examples of departments finding environmental responses to policing problems.

- A Hillsborough County community resource deputy was able to have a pay phone frequently used for drug transactions moved to a more visible location, reducing the number of drug deals and associated problems.

- The Concord Police Department had arranged for the use of sprinklers in a park to discourage homeless individuals from sleeping there.

- Portland police also worked with the parks department, using sprinklers to prevent groups of juveniles from congregating.

- In Green Bay, hand rails were installed on park benches to deter individuals from lying or sleeping on them.

- Some agencies, such as the Reno Police Department, worked with businesses and architects during the design and construction of buildings to identify potentially problematic environmental design features.

Environmental responses were subjected to the same kinds of inquiry as other problem-solving responses that we had observed. Had the relevant traditional and nontraditional data been analyzed, and was the nature of the problem well understood? Had the underlying problem been correctly identified and defined? Did community members have a role in determining potential responses? Was the response likely to reduce the problem, or simply to displace it and generate additional sets of concerns? For instance, if homeless persons were displaced from sleeping on park benches, did they relocate to places where their risk of being victimized was greater?

A clear problem description is essential for determining what outcomes might represent success. In the above cases, success might have been defined by the agencies as a reduction in the number of calls for service. To the displaced homeless persons or residents of other parts of these cities, some of those "successes" probably looked more like a new set of problems to resolve. Portland's use of sprinklers to deter loitering youth lacked something crucial as a problem-solving response. The problem as initially identified (youth loitering) did not appear to have been reframed in terms of its effects on others in the area or on the property; the loitering seemed to have been accepted as a problem in itself, however vaguely defined. Was the underlying problem youth loitering, or could it have been that the gatherings were engendering anxiety in other park users? Differences in problem definitions would seem to imply distinctly different interventions.[114]

All of the police agencies had entered into external partnerships with other formal organizations to help solve problems. Such partnerships appeared to be more common than working relationships between police and local residents—in fact, distinct efforts to help build the capacity of neighborhoods to prevent and solve problems independently were rare.

All of the agencies were cultivating working partnerships with other local government agencies. The Concord Police Department maintained strong working relationships with other government agencies that could contribute various kinds of expertise and authority to community problem solving. The Reno Police Department was working closely with the city parks and planning departments on environmental design (CPTED) issues.

The Portland Police Department was engaged in a partnership agreement among city agencies that was defining strategies and responsibilities for responding to problem situations. In Colorado Springs, DVERT (Domestic Violence Enhanced Response Team) was a multiagency partnership linking victims with a network of protective and support services; the partnership included police and a variety of social service providers. Personnel in several agencies cited working with code enforcement officers and city planning agencies to clean up run-down locations such as abandoned or poorly maintained houses and vacant lots. In Colorado Springs and Naperville, police had formed partnerships with apartment complexes to prevent and solve problems; both programs were working to build community ties among apartment residents to strengthen informal social control mechanisms within the complexes.

During our visits, we also observed some exceptional examples of innovative problem solving in response to substantive problems.

- Green Bay community policing officers had received the 1999 Herman Goldstein Award for the significant changes they helped bring to a one-block area that had been suffering from a host of problems, including an active drug trade and violent crime. Green Bay officers had actively sought citizen involvement in the solution; they had encouraged public participation and helped arrange transportation to city council meetings. Afterward, the officers had anchored their results by working to attract new businesses to the revitalized area.

- The Portland Police Department had implemented a crisis intervention team (CIT) to help meet the needs of persons with mental illnesses. CIT is often cited as a model for appropriate alternative responses for officers handling such problems.[115] At the time of our site visit, more than 80 officers had been trained in appropriate interventions. Portland adopted CIT in response to demands from the mental health community following two police shootings of afflicted persons.

- In Reno, the Homeless Evaluation Liaison Program (HELP), a partnership between police and Greyhound Corporation, had assisted homeless individuals frequenting the area. Problem analysis revealed that many had come to Reno to find work, but had been unsuccessful. Some were repeatedly being arrested. HELP officers contacted family members; when the family was willing, HELP would purchase the individual a bus ticket home. In 1999, 451 persons were able to travel to rejoin family members. Demand at homeless shelters was reported to have been lowered.

- On a smaller scale, a Greenville officer had observed that many illegal immigrants were unaware of local driving rules. In response, the officer obtained a translation of the driver's manual and distributed it at a migrant worker camp.

We observed similar examples of successful problem-solving initiatives, large and small, in most of the agencies that we visited. The responses employed in these initiatives were creative and extended well beyond traditional law enforcement solutions.

Decentralization. Problem-solving advocates tell us that officers need decision-making autonomy to work with a variety of individuals and organizations such as residents, city agencies, and local businesses to design and carry out creative, effective solutions to problems.[116] Decentralization would move authority from the top levels of organizations to those who are on the front lines of problem solving.

The agencies that we studied were trying to capitalize on decentralization, encouraging officers to take personal responsibility for solving problems. For instance, in Green Bay and Greenville, specialized community policing officers had been authorized to respond to problems without waiting for supervisory approval. When a Greenville community policing officer was asked what he would need to do to have junk cars towed, for example, he replied that he would simply request that the city tow the cars.

Personnel in some agencies that had decentralized noted that officers were not necessarily taking that message to heart.

- In Colorado Springs, the department's leadership had been attempting for several years to push decision-making authority down to patrol officers, but leaders still needed to remind officers to be proactive and to make certain decisions on their own.

- In Billings, we were told that department leaders should make it clearer that they understood that not all attempted solutions would work, presumably removing some of the perceived risk to officers of problem-solving creativity.

- In Concord, we heard that officers actually were more empowered than they seemed to think that they were.

Individuals in all agencies noted that regardless of having decision-making authority, some officers were continuing to wait for calls for service to guide their efforts, a reactive stance that inhibited active problem solving. In one agency, we observed officers returning to the same neighborhood dispute again and again, several times during one evening. One of them predicted that the dispute would likely lead to a homicide. Asked how police might prevent that escalation, the officer replied that nothing could be done—the police would just come back when called.

While some agencies struggled to make decentralization work, others remained centralized, giving little or no problem-solving authority to patrol officers.

- In Portland, where some believed that officers had been empowered, one officer described the department as rule-bound, noting that they could be disciplined for not adhering to general orders. We observed conflicting perceptions like this regularly, implying that officers either were receiving inconsistent messages from above or were interpreting the messages they received differently.

- The Lowell Police Department clearly had centralized the decision-making authority for problem solving; upper command positions retained the primary responsibility for this.

- In Reno, officers were reported to act only after decisions were made and communicated by upper command staff.

We found that departments using a specialist model of problem solving were more decentralized than those using a generalist model, giving community policing officers more authority to make decisions.

- Green Bay's specialized officers had wide latitude to make decisions about how to do their jobs; for example, they could set their schedules, to a certain degree, to focus on problems requiring attention at particular times of day.

- A Hillsborough County community resource deputy indicated that he had more discretionary time than other deputies, enabling him to attend to problem solving.

- The Greenville Police Department seemed to have done an exceptional job of empowering officers to identify and respond to problems without waiting for supervisory approval.

All of those agencies had been able to exempt their specialized officers from responsibility for responding to calls for service, helping to make clear that they should be making independent, proactive decisions about how to use their time to reduce community problems.

We discovered an interesting tension between the specialist and generalist approaches. The specialist model facilitated decentralized problem solving, but only for a small number of community policing officers. Agencies following a generalist model were making the ambitious attempt to empower more officers to solve substantive problems. Generalist departments such as Naperville, Concord, Knoxville, and Colorado Springs were trying to give their officers the authority to make decisions and to be innovative in implementing responses, but those officers also were bound by the need to respond to calls for service and to work established shifts. Possibly because of such complications, evidence of successful decentralization was less apparent in generalist agencies.

When an agency decentralizes problem-solving authority, leaders need to consider carefully the ways in which officers can be encouraged and supported as they assume new responsibilities and implement creative responses to problems. As one would expect, line-level supervisors were influencing how well this worked. In subtle and unsubtle ways, supervisors encourage or discourage problem solving.[117] Supervisory commitment and enthusiasm for problem solving may help to advance its practice; supervisory ambivalence or resistance may undermine it. This may partially explain variations in problem-solving activity found within departments.[118]

Differences in how seriously supervisors take problem solving can produce unevenness in its practice across districts, precincts, or even shifts. Research shows that in the Chicago Police Department, sergeants played a critical role both in facilitating and inhibiting problem solving,

and that their influence partially explained variations in its practice across portions of that city.[119] Evidence from the agencies in our study suggested that they, also, experienced the impact of differences among supervisors in terms of their problem-solving expectations.

- A Reno deputy chief indicated that sergeants had raised an obstacle to community policing; they determined the amount of time officers had available to spend on problem-solving efforts, and that affected problem solving throughout the department. One Reno manager reported that his officers had transcended the need for formal problem solving, and he had directed them not to be concerned with scanning, analysis, and response processes.

- In Newport News, which was taking a generalist approach, we saw indications that problem solving varied in accord with differing expectations placed on officers across precincts.

- Hillsborough County community resource deputies appeared to receive little problem-solving direction from superiors.

- In Billings, acknowledging his power to help or hinder problem solving, one sergeant noted that he was giving officers a "tremendous amount of freedom" to make decisions.

- Concord corporals were responsible for problem solving, yet there was some indication that they had little authority to direct patrol officers' activities, limiting their ability to encourage certain responses.

- An officer in the Green Bay Police Department, when asked about decision-making authority, said that "it depended on who you asked," implying that standards were inconsistent.

- A Naperville officer who was particularly active in problem solving had received a poor supervisory evaluation; some department personnel thought that problem-solving activity was simply not included in officers' evaluations.

Apparent disparities such as those above would seem to discourage rather than encourage problem solving. We also had reason to wonder whether police supervisors and managers had the necessary knowledge and skills to distinguish between high- and low-quality problem-solving efforts.[120] The evidence from this and previous studies made clear that the role of immediate supervisors in facilitating problem solving should be more carefully examined.

For officers to use whatever expanded decision-making authority they have been given to engage in problem solving, they must have the necessary time, and this is especially important in agencies that adopt a generalist model. Officers in generalist agencies typically are responsible for responding to calls for service and practicing preventive patrol in addition to engaging in problem solving. The agencies that we studied acknowledged that officers were experiencing time conflicts, and that they might perceive themselves as too busy meeting other demands to solve substantive problems. To address that concern, the agencies had implemented some changes.

The Newport News Police Department had allocated 20 percent of officers' time for problem solving and making community contacts. By incorporating it into officers' job requirements, the department was holding them accountable for problem-solving activity. One individual indicated, however, that Newport News officers still perceived themselves as too busy responding to calls for service to develop community contacts or solve problems. Whether the officers in fact lacked the necessary time was open to question. Police departments concerned about this issue should consider collecting and examining data on officers' time use. Analysis can reveal when scheduling and time allocation adjustments are needed, and it will produce real data to use when responding to officer concerns about time constraints.

Agencies also assigned civilian employees to handle certain tasks that otherwise might have occupied officers' time (see Chapter 6). The Knoxville department had implemented a program called Teleserve, in which civilians received police reports by phone. The department indicated that Teleserve received about 40 percent of all police reports. The Concord Police Department employed civilians in this manner, as well, again with civilians processing about 40 percent of all reports. Civilians working in storefront offices for the Reno Police Department completed about 65 percent of all noninvestigative reports. Billings was not employing this tactic; an employee reported that in Billings, the public expected police officers to respond to all calls.

This use of civilians in roles that conserved officer time had the potential to free officers for problem solving. Agencies had taken similar advantage of technologies, giving officers more time to spend in the field, requiring less in an office. Mobile data terminals in police vehicles linked officers with police information on events in their assigned geographic areas. Newport News, Naperville, and Knoxville officers could obtain relevant data, such as calls for service trends, on terminals in their vehicles wherever they were. The burning question for police administrators is whether increasing time and authority for officers to engage in problem solving actually results in changes in their work patterns.

Conclusions

> *"The institutional struggle continues."*[121]

In a statement that perhaps most accurately characterizes problem solving at the turn of the 21st century, an individual from the Newport News Police Department called problem solving "more image than substance"—not lived everyday. In advocating for problem solving, Goldstein tried to redirect police attention from the *means* of policing to the *end results*.[122] Yet problem solving as practiced in the community policing agencies that we studied continued to focus on traditional police responses.[123]

We found that police had made certain changes in internal operations to support problem solving—they had decentralized decision-making authority, employed civilians, and upgraded technology to save officers time and to support more comprehensive analysis. However, they had not taken other steps critical for supporting and encouraging the practice. Other police departments that were committing to problem solving would need to understand the ways in which it had been limited within those agencies.

With few exceptions, the police agencies we studied were not conducting problem analysis in ways that would give them insight into underlying contributing conditions. Discussions of potential solutions often lacked any serious reference to problem analysis. The problem-solving literature is clear on this point—problem analysis is the most limited aspect of problem solving as it is practiced in policing today.[124] This finding is particularly troubling because when problem analysis is neglected, there are good reasons to doubt the effectiveness of everything that follows under the guise of "problem solving."

Experts have established what problem analysis entails and what kinds of things do not constitute problem analysis.[125] A police agency that is serious about problem solving can distinguish genuine problem analysis from crime analysis and from superficial scanning passing as problem analysis. The lack of serious problem analysis that we found might be attributed to the informal problem-solving methods in common use.

The use of formal problem-solving methods does not guarantee effectiveness, but it is necessary, at least in the early stages of implementation. Experts have concluded that "problem analysis will not be adopted quickly or easily, and that a collective, concerted effort by various institutions with vested interests is necessary."[126] It would be easy for community policing officers to fall back into reacting to problems rather than analyzing and developing broader solutions to them without frequent reinforcement. Hiring specially trained analysts can help advance problem solving, as well.

We found other ways that police agencies were or could have been enhancing problem solving. Supervisors could and did facilitate or inhibit problem-solving behaviors. Our evidence suggested that the agencies we visited had not paid enough attention to the supervisory role when implementing problem solving. Supervisors directly influenced how officers spent discretionary time and their use of problem-solving processes. Supervisors must be capable of coaching their officers and evaluating problem-solving projects. Police departments interested in facilitating problem solving might consider assessing supervisory commitment, as well as supervisors' willingness and ability to guide and encourage front-line officers.

Police agencies could also take steps to emphasize the importance of the outcomes of problem-solving efforts, enhancing the ways that they assess the result of their actions. With few exceptions, the agencies we studied needed to improve their ability in this regard. By dedicating resources and attention to assessing outcomes instead of measuring outputs—what officers are doing—the agencies would send a clear message about which is more valued.

Strategic planning efforts similar to CompStat could have advanced outcome assessment, but those meetings and discussions we observed tended to focus on what police were *doing* rather than what they were *accomplishing*. Emphasizing rapid responses can undermine thorough problem analysis.[127] Demands for immediate results can actually lead to unintended negative outcomes and may encourage quick, traditional responses not grounded in a broad understanding of problems. In some cases, the meetings needed to strike a better balance between the need for accountability and that for analysis based on comprehensive sources of information about local incidents and concerns.

Departments that want to encourage the problem-solving process might consider creating a performance measurement system that includes problem-solving processes and outcomes as a critical dimension.[128] This might improve their ability to measure outcomes and ultimately to learn more about the kinds of problem responses that have the best chance of succeeding. In addition, agencies can improve problem solving by creating new performance appraisal instruments and using them to coach officers in productive problem analysis.

Zhao reported in 1996 that it "may take another 30 years for the COP model to be finalized with respect to organizational domain, technical core, and task environment."[129] As agencies grow in their understanding of the nature of problem solving, they can identify and attend to factors that are limiting their success. Evidence from research and practice has begun identifying those that require more attention for problem solving to become routine for doing police work. Asking whether police agencies have changed the way that they do their work within the past 20 years may imply too great an expectation.

CHAPTER 3. Decentralization and Geographic Accountability

Edward Maguire and Megan Gantley

Decentralization is a hallmark of community policing. A decentralized police agency distributes decision-making power at different organizational levels, moving it closer to those carrying out the decisions, rather than centralizing it at the top. Centralization—the concentration of decision-making power and authority—has long been the traditional structure of police organizations.

Experts in policing view decentralization as the second most important administrative innovation of the early 1990s, after the improvement of police officer education and training.[130] Organizational reformers hailed the benefits of decentralization for business firms and public agencies, and police reformers soon followed suit. The community policing rhetoric began to embrace concepts such as participatory management, shared decision-making, and empowerment of lower-level administrators, supervisors, and employees. Reformers are still urging police organizations to become more decentralized.

The term *decentralization* has a precise meaning among organizational scholars. In the community policing literature, however, decentralization is often confused with *spatial differentiation*.[131] The term is accurate when used with modifiers like *spatial* or *geographic* e.g., *spatial decentralization*) to refer to geographic dispersion such as expanding the number of beats or opening ministations, substations, or district stations. Without modifiers, however—and throughout this volume—decentralization means the dispersion of decision-making authority throughout an organization.

Although adding new geographic entities (e.g., beats, substations, and precinct stations) within an agency's jurisdiction does not automatically constitute decentralization, certain decentralization strategies do have geographic components. *Geographic accountability* is a form of decentralization closely tied to physical space or geography. This term refers to administrative arrangements in which one officer is fully responsible for the police-related conditions (e.g., crime, fear, victimization, disorder, quality of life) within a single geographic area. It has two defining characteristics: *responsibility* for a distinct area, and the *autonomy* to design solutions to problems in that area. As we will show, the best decentralization strategies include both elements.

Geographic accountability can exist at different levels. For example, a precinct commander may be responsible for all crime and disorder within a jurisdiction, as in the famed New York Police Department CompStat model, or an individual officer may be responsible for these conditions in an assigned beat or sub-beat.

Recent research examined shifts in centralization and decentralization in police agencies during the community policing era. Maguire and colleagues developed a quantitative measure of centralization during three different years (1993, 1996, and 1998) for several hundred of the largest police agencies in the United States.[132] Scores on their centralization indices had a possible range of 20 (complete decentralization, with decision-making authority at the lowest level) to 80 (complete centralization, all decisions made by the chief executive). For all three periods (1993–96, 1996–98, and 1993–98), decreases in centralization were statistically significant. The researchers found that those decreases were accounted for by the decentralization occurring at two places within the organizational structure: Administrators were delegating decision-making power to midmanagers, and midmanagers were delegating decision-making to supervisors. (Research has not yet examined the extent to which supervisors are decentralizing to officers.)

As we visited the police organizations studied for this volume, we found that they appeared to be following the advice of community policing reformers to decentralize.

Examples of decentralization

Many agencies that we visited were exhibiting at least a few elements of decentralization. Some were experimenting with entry-level strategies such as increasing the autonomy of district commanders, while others had adopted aggressive strategies giving decision-making authority to supervisors or even patrol officers. The following are examples of what we found:

- Colorado Springs' three police districts each were led by a commander. The commanders met weekly to discuss operations within their respective districts. The department assigned officers to particular districts and shifts using a software program, and commanders occasionally exercised their discretion to adjust those assignments. The department also assigned responsibility for geographic areas to neighborhood resource officers.

- The Green Bay Police Department had divided its jurisdiction into 10 zones, each headed by a lieutenant who coordinated the duties of regular patrol and community policing officers. The zone design made lieutenants more aware of what was happening in their areas of responsibility, and community policing officers and patrol officers were communicating directly. Community policing and patrol officers were being supervised less tightly, and they were encouraged to use their autonomy to make independent decisions.

Other departments were even more clearly decentralized:

- The Billings Police Department reported having given patrol officers a great deal of autonomy. Officers cleared operational plans with a sergeant only when officer safety was at stake. The Billings department was working toward evaluating the decision-making abilities of the officers.

- The Reno Police Department was holding monthly meetings for sergeants and officers to discuss community problems along with their possible solutions.

- A patrol officer with the Concord Police Department had developed a solution to that city's problem with abandoned homes. The officer independently sought out the property owners, explained the problem, and negotiated a deal between the owners and the city to have the buildings demolished.

- Bicycle patrol officers with the Greenville Police Department had formulated a solution to the local transient problem. On their own, they developed a sting operation, consulting a judge to assure that their charges would stick, and they carried out the plan successfully. This would have been nearly impossible in a centralized agency.

In each of the cases above, lower-ranking employees had been granted more autonomy than would have been possible in a traditional centralized environment.

Examples of centralization

Several agencies still centralize decision-making authority, although a few were attempting to take steps toward decentralization. Hillsborough County was experiencing tensions typical in agencies trying to make the shift. The department's four districts were led by majors with differing philosophies. Some encouraged all officers to participate in community policing; others limited such activities to community resource deputies (CRD). Even though CRDs had been assigned to facilitate community policing efforts, one Hillsborough County administrator told us that as staffing needs changed, he would be returning the specialized deputies to regular patrol duties. Only those who could demonstrate that their actions had directly reduced neighborhood crime would retain community policing positions.

One could say that we were witnessing decentralization in action in Hillsborough County— each major was allowed to exercise his own policing philosophy. But those same majors were closely controlling the work of their deputies, which was more characteristic of a centralized approach. We saw other examples of agencies falling short of decentralizing decision-making to officers:

- In Colorado Springs, lieutenants made specific problem-solving assignments in their geographical areas to supervisors, who in turn directed officers to work on them.

- In Lowell, a patrol officer told us that hot spots were identified during CompStat meetings; the captains decided what to do about them, and the decisions were passed down the chain of command to patrol officers. Officers waited for their supervisors to tell them how to handle repeat calls for service.

Administrators and immediate supervisors were not always the force behind officers' lack of autonomy. Colorado Springs officers cited mandatory arrest laws as having eroded their discretion whether or not to make an arrest. As problem-oriented policing advocates point out, arrest does not always represent the best solution to a given problem.

Requiring rigid adherence to general orders places another constraint on patrol officers' autonomy. As one officer noted, not only were officers in his department required to follow general orders, but taking any action outside those orders was cause for disciplinary action. This particular officer was upset when the chief insisted that he comply with appearance standards prohibiting beards. The officer viewed the order not simply as a matter of enforcing departmental rules, but as a symptom in a system that inhibited autonomy by promoting the fear of violating them.

Benefits of decentralization

The agencies all recognized the potential benefits of decentralization, and some were already experiencing them. Lieutenants, sergeants, and officers in Billings, for example, were enjoying becoming more familiar with their assigned areas and forging bonds within the community, the result of longer-lasting assignments. Colorado Springs neighborhood resource officers were being assigned to locations for 2 years, again enabling closer ties with residents.

During a ride-along in a neighborhood formerly plagued by a host of problems that included drugs, drive-by shootings, and poor quality-of-life, we observed residents warmly welcoming the Colorado Springs neighborhood resource officers (NRO). The ability to strengthen connections within a neighborhood is enhanced when officers are free to pursue the variety of solutions that they believe are appropriate, rather than being forced into the one-size-fits-all approach common in policing. Back at the station, the Colorado Springs NRO showed us a binder filled with e-mail from residents. Several contained tips on suspected offenders and ongoing neighborhood problems.

The Concord Police Department was using sub-beats to give officers a sense of ownership in their assigned areas. Sergeants and officers worked together, identifying local sub-beat problems and finding solutions. As one district commander put it, Concord officers had been given the power to make decisions. Some officers would embrace such opportunities. Others might fear the accountability that comes with expanded responsibility.

For many officers, increased autonomy is the benefit of decentralization that they most appreciate. With fewer constraints and less restrictive supervision, they are motivated to identify problems within their districts and to develop unique solutions. In Naperville, officers were able to undertake community policing and problem-solving projects without requesting prior approval; they kept their supervisors informed of their work in activity reports. Their sergeants built officers' confidence by offering ideas and encouraging them to build on and develop those ideas. This strategy allowed officers to "organize [their] proactive efforts." This is only possible when officers do not risk disciplinary action when they stray outside the boundaries set by the traditional policing box.

Similarly, the Billings Police Department was encouraging all officers to participate in community policing efforts, requiring only that they document their tasks carefully. No permission was needed. The Newport News Police Department was training all officers for community oriented policing, and it expected them to think about problems and identify possible solutions on their own rather than turning to their lieutenants for direction.

Not only does decentralization establish an autonomous environment for police officers, but it fosters teamwork. The Portland Police Department assigned neighborhood resource teams (NRT) to carry out community policing projects in specific districts. Each district had a block captain who worked directly with the local team. NRTs provided patrol officers with vital data (e.g., calls for service) that helped them recognize problem areas and develop solutions.

The Colorado Springs Police Department used NROs in a similar way to facilitate community policing projects. According to one interviewee, NROs "serve[d] a mentoring role for patrol officers." They provided resources and specialized knowledge: NROs identified problems, worked to understand their nature, and then conveyed the information to patrol officers. In the Naperville Police Department, sergeants and officers worked together, establishing a culture of teamwork that increased their flexibility in problem solving and community policing efforts. Sergeants noted that ideas within the department were beginning to come from the bottom up.

Negative aspects of decentralization

Along with the benefits of decentralization come some clear drawbacks. For example, our agencies were having trouble finding an appropriate balance between supervision and autonomy. Some were still over-supervising, inhibiting their officers' development as independent decision-makers. Others had the opposite problem—they were leaving officers with too little accountability, and supervisors and administrators with too little information about what was happening in the field. For example:

- Billings' sergeants reported being "too busy putting out fires" to pay adequate attention to the problem-solving efforts of their officers.

- One administrator in Hillsborough County believed that the agency's community resource deputies had too much unassigned time, and not enough guidance and accountability. Moreover, unless an issue was likely to appear in the press, district commanders rarely reported their daily activities to the administrators above them.

- The Lowell Police Department faced a slightly different accountability problem. As the agency opened its chain of command, patrol officers began going around their sergeants, taking their problems and requests for approval for certain tasks directly to captains. Sergeants, now unaware of what their officers were doing, were having a hard time providing adequate supervision.

A few departments were offering decision-making power with one hand and inhibiting it with the other. Part of becoming autonomous is learning to prioritize issues and allocate one's time accordingly. Some agencies were still mandating how officers should divide their time between community policing and calls for service. This cost the officers the opportunity to learn to manage their own time appropriately, a much-needed skill in a decentralized agency.

- The Greenville Police Department required officers to make four community contacts during each shift, documenting them in proper report format; their evaluations reflected their adherence.

- Colorado Springs had a less stringent requirement; officers were required to make two community contacts per month.

- Officers in Newport News were told to devote 20 percent of each shift to community policing, but many found the press of calls for service and administrative requests prevented them from complying with the directive.

We saw considerable evidence in the ranks of confusion about decentralization. In many of the departments we visited, various individuals within chains of command understood and experienced the concept of autonomy differently. Lieutenants might believe that their officers had a great deal of autonomy, while the officers felt constrained from acting independently.

A Portland administrator told us that his department's aim was to increase officers' decision-making freedom. That sentiment was echoed by a sergeant, who said that "the police department has really empowered officers to solve problems." He added that his officers were expected to be problem solvers. For some reason, not all Portland officers were experiencing that freedom. "They really want you to take initiative and problem solve," one said, "but they are really into supervision." He went on to describe the department's strict enforcement of general orders, expressing his belief that the department was too militaristic for officers to be able to carry out problem-solving efforts. "If you are not shagging calls for service," he said, "you better have special approval from the commander."

In Concord, a lieutenant told us that officers were empowered to meet community policing responsibilities, but a Concord officer countered that before taking action, officers were expected to inform district commanders of problems and proposed solutions. In Lowell, two officers expressed contrasting views of their decision-making autonomy. According to one, hot spots were identified during CompStat meetings, captains decided on a plan of action and assigned tasks down the chain of command, and officers were instructed how to proceed. Another Lowell officer told us, however, that he enjoyed his freedom to "resolve any problem in any common-sense, lawful manner without interference from police management."

Ideally, officers in decentralized units would not need mandates; they would facilitate community policing and problem-solving efforts directly in response to needs and opportunities. In some departments, however, patrol officers were responding to problem solving and other community policing issues by referring them to specialized units. In Hillsborough County, patrol officers told us they were too busy with calls for service to engage

in long-term problem solving, and they directed inquiries to community resource deputies. In Colorado Springs, we observed officers handing local problems over to neighborhood resource officers without attempting first to solve them on their own.

Other agencies also reported having trouble getting their officers to undertake community policing and problem-solving projects independently. Officers with enough autonomy to solve problems on their own sometimes failed to do so, perhaps for lack of sufficient motivation or supervision. A Billings lieutenant noted that sergeants frequently had to be reminded to use their authority to conduct and facilitate creative problem solving. The Lowell Police Department also experienced this. Although Lowell officers had considerable problem-solving latitude, one captain noted that several were not coming through with initiatives. They were waiting for their supervisors to tell them how to handle the issues emerging from repeat calls for service.

Under some circumstances, decentralization can create confusion for budget and personnel administrators. For example, the Billings Police Department gave district lieutenants substantial decision-making autonomy, but withheld budget authority. Decentralization strategies that convey operational autonomy without budgetary autonomy inhibit operational choices. In Portland, an administrator stated that "the more officers were split up and decentralized, the less productive [they became] because they did not have [the] resources to be proactive." Decentralization can spread resources too thin, expanding coverage while reducing the time officers have for solving substantive community problems. The Portland administrator blamed decentralization for the department's shortage of personnel.

Certain problems the agencies were having with decentralization resulted from a lack of uniform training, understandings, and expectations. The Portland agency, for example, believed its officers had been hindered in carrying out community policing by a training deficit. Portland detectives as a group had been decentralized, but they were available to work only with day shift officers. Night shift officers were expected to assume community policing duties as well, but without the detectives' help and, making matters worse, without having had the relevant training. Expecting officers to practice community policing independently without appropriate training will virtually assure confusion, rebellion, and inadequate service.

For all of its benefits, decentralization makes the policing environment more complex. The empowerment inherent in decentralization causes conflicting organizational philosophies to rise to the surface. We found a clear example of this in Hillsborough County, where the district commanders had differing expectations—some required all officers to participate in community policing efforts, while others delegated the responsibility to specialized units. Intra-agency discrepancies such as this are normal with decentralization, but without careful attention, they can easily lead to confusion and misconceptions about officers' duties.

Supervision

The fact that decentralization lessens supervisory oversight concerns policing professionals. For decentralization to work, departments must grant officers enough autonomy to conceive and test innovative solutions to community problems without asking permission at every step. That discretion must be tempered with just enough supervisory oversight to ensure accountability. Some departments seemed to strike a comfortable balance; others did not.

The agencies that were using the SARA (scanning, analysis, response and assessment) model of problem solving usually required officers to document their efforts. In Newport News, where SARA was developed, officers formerly had been required to go before a committee each month to list their SARA steps—meetings that officers described as "comparable to the Spanish inquisition." As the department began to decentralize, that changed and officers began submitting monthly narratives of community policing and problem-solving activities instead.

Other decentralized agencies had created similar mechanisms for establishing officer accountability:

- Officers in Concord were required to document problems within their sub-beats, to enact plans for resolving the problems, and to assess the outcomes. Their documentation was forwarded to the district commander.

- The Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office required community resource deputies to provide sergeants with daily task updates and monthly activity reports. Sergeants would discuss problems that remained on monthly reports too long with the responsible officers.

- Colorado Springs developed the Police Accountability and Service Standards (PASS) model to address accountability, deployment decisions, and budgeting decisions. Their goal: to better match officer perceptions of service and crime with the perceptions of community members. The department hoped the system would improve officers' accountability for their time and service to the community.

- Colorado Springs also used the Enhanced Tactical Communications System, a department intranet on which all commanders could view real-time activity reports. The system improved information flow and allowed Colorado Springs supervisors to stay alert to activities in their districts.

These and other departments had instituted accountability and evaluation procedures while decentralizing, but some had failed to do so.

- In Portland, although all officers were expected to be problem solvers, their efforts were not evaluated. The lack of evaluation procedures made it impossible to identify and track problem officers, complaints, and nonproducers.

- In Reno, officers' community policing and problem-solving efforts were evaluated, but individual sergeants weighted the activities differently. Although officers had been given decision-making authority department-wide, for those whose sergeants were not supportive of the idea, their efforts were going largely unrecognized.

- In Green Bay, one commander told us that community policing officers were essentially allowed to "run wild." They had been given more decision-making autonomy than regular patrol officers; now some Green Bay supervisors were expressing a need for increased oversight.

Conclusions

In policing, decentralization generally is viewed in a positive light. The departments that we visited considered decentralization necessary to fully implement community policing. Many of the officers we met were delighted with the idea of having more autonomy and less rigid supervision. Done well, decentralization changes the working environment, fostering creative thinking, innovation, and strong commitment to solving problems.

At the same time, agencies were struggling to balance autonomy with responsible levels of supervision, training, and accountability. Older administrators sometimes had difficulty trusting younger officers to make good decisions without the boundaries set by the traditional hierarchy. That problem was exacerbated by officers who had been granted autonomy to pursue problem solving and community engagement, but chose not to use it. Indeed, the stakes can be high. According to people we interviewed, a former Newport News chief allegedly held excessive decentralization and inadequate command to blame in part for the deadly shooting of an officer during a sting operation.

Perhaps the most important lesson to be taken from the above experiences and insights is that decentralization is most likely to succeed when both officers and their supervisors are well-prepared and have the proper tools to make good decisions. As Hodge, Anthony, and Gales wrote:

> *Managers in decentralized organizations are assuming that lower-level employees have the information, knowledge, skills, and good judgment to solve problems as they encounter them.*[133]

The onus is on police administrators to prepare their workforces properly before embarking on the journey to agency decentralization.

CHAPTER 4. Specialist and Generalist Models

Edward Maguire and Megan Gantley

As organizations grow, they must decide how to allocate work. For example, in some restaurants, nearly everyone pitches in to take orders, cook, serve customers, and clean up. In others, each employee focuses on a distinct task. In the lingo of organizational theorists, the restaurants where everyone does whatever is needed to get the day's customers fed are functionally *generalized*. Those that break processes into tasks and assign them to specialists are considered to be functionally *specialized*.

In police organizations, work can be allocated by geography or location (precinct, beat, or block), by time (shift), and by function (unit, bureau, or division).[134] In Chapter 3, we mentioned decentralization and geographic accountability—allocation by location—in which police officers are given around-the-clock responsibility for all relevant conditions within their assigned areas. According to most policing reformers, the community policing ideal would place more emphasis on such geographic or spatial divisions of labor, and less emphasis on divisions by time and function.

We all have known the frustration of contacting a large corporation or government agency, only to be shuttled from person to person, no one willing to take responsibility for our problem. Proponents of a generalist model of community policing take this experience to heart. They recommend that patrol officers serve as policing generalists, referring clients elsewhere only when their needs require a higher level of specialization.

What is specialization?

Specialization is the division of work into defined tasks and the assignment of those tasks to functionally distinct organizational units. Police organizations became increasingly specialized throughout the 20th century, adding new bureaus, divisions, and units to perform discrete functions as needs—or perceived needs—arose.[135] Community policing organizations were expected to reverse that trend, and their officers were encouraged to become "uniformed generalists."[136] Reformers wanted community policing officers to take responsibility for customizing responses to the various situations they encountered, rather than referring citizens on to specialized organizational units or niches. In spite of their urging, however, during the 1990s, American police organizations not only failed to fully embrace generalization, but they may have become even more specialized.

Tension between generalized and specialized models

Although community policing reformers steadfastly held to the merits of generalization, research suggests that their recommendations fell on deaf ears: American police departments became more, not less, specialized during the 1990s.[137] While interviewing individuals and observing operations in 12 community policing agencies across the country, we found that rather than falling somewhere along a continuum between generalization and specialization, the agencies had invented a host of hybrid models. In various combinations, some functions had been generalized—that is, performed by officers agencywide—while others had been specialized, assigned to particular units. At least 8 of the 12 agencies were using specialized community policing units either alone or in combination with some elements of generalization.

As with decentralization and centralization, generalization and specialization coexist in constant tension. As researchers in policing have known for decades, implementing community policing only within a special unit means that for most clients of police service, little will change.[138] On the other hand, agencies adopting a generalist model risk diluting community policing until it may be hard to recognize. The agencies in this study all demonstrated this tension—the interplay between competing demands—in a variety of interesting and informative ways. To understand why departments were making the choices they were, we had first to consider what was driving their decisions.

Forces driving specialization. Some agencies' decisions to generalize or specialize were fairly straightforward and self-explanatory. A few had simply adopted or adapted a model from another city. Some had made a choice that they thought would correct problems encountered with earlier strategies. Others had crafted unique approaches that they believed would best position their departments to serve their particular communities.

Three forces that we found to be influencing agencies' decisions to generalize or specialize deserve further discussion:

1. The perception of not having enough time to engage in community policing.

2. The perception of requirements or strong preferences attached to external resources (such as grant funds).

3. The symbolic value of special units as public evidence that community policing is being seriously implemented.

Time constraints as a driving force. Specialized agencies may elect to create segregated special units rather than generalizing because they believe this is a way to realize some benefits from community policing while still managing call loads. In virtually every department that we visited, whether predominantly specialized or generalized, patrol officers agreed that that they were too busy with calls for service to practice community oriented policing. Early on, Hillsborough County officials had noted that "street deputies could devote themselves to problem solving, but their perceived role as call handlers impedes this."

Agencies frequently responded to the internal perception that regular officers were too busy for problem solving with specialized community policing units with less (or no) responsibility for responding to calls for service. This seemed to appeal most to police departments that faced some internal resistance to generalization, where officers would have needed to be strongly encouraged or even compelled to engage in community oriented policing strategies and activities.

The perception of officers that they are too busy to problem solve with community members is interesting. Policing is the only profession we know that considers spending productive time with clients as being "out of service." In several agencies, we observed patrol officers deliberately not acting to solve or mitigate problems, even when solutions seemed fairly quick and easy, because they viewed their jobs as handling calls and getting "back into service." In these instances, they chose instead to issue warnings and commands, sometimes referring problems to a specialized unit, before resuming patrol.

External funding as a driving force. All 12 agencies had received federal money to facilitate community policing. Grants were not generally a major factor driving specialization, but at least one agency, characterizing itself as generalized, believed that federal funding decisions favored specialized models. Agency officials explained that the agency had been denied early federal funding because of the decision not to create a specialized unit. They believed that the COPS Office lacked confidence in their ability to generalize community policing strategies successfully:

> *[The agency] did not receive any federal funding at first because the police department did not want to use specialized units. Then the feds saw that agency-wide implementation was a success so [it] started to receive funding.*

Not until the department demonstrated success did it begin receiving federal funds. Since then, officials said, the department had received about $1 million in federal funding each year.

Personnel from another agency had received funding initially for its specialized approach to community policing. As the agency expanded the community policing unit, other officers became envious. Several senior officers were encouraged to retire when it became clear that they would be unwilling to accommodate the chief's community policing philosophy, and they were replaced with younger officers who were more amenable to those views. The department established new precincts and began shifting toward a generalized model until all officers were designated as community policing officers. Toward the end of the transition, federal grant funding for community policing began to decline. According to the agency, "the full monetary obligation to pay the officers hired with COPS funding now belongs to [the agency]."

Other specialized police departments, including Billings, Green Bay, and Hillsborough County, received federal funding without encountering problems. As Green Bay's community policing unit gained in popularity, for example, more grant money became available. Officials in some of those agencies appeared to believe that agencies adopting specialized community oriented policing units and similar specialized approaches were favored.

Since we visited only 12 agencies, we were unable to determine how widespread the perception was that grants were given more often to specialized agencies. We are certain, however, that the misconception was frustrating to COPS Office officials, whose actual preference was for generalized approaches.

Symbolism as a driving force. Organizations sometimes adopt specific structures for their symbolic value rather than for more substantive reasons.[139] Specialized community policing units serve a symbolic purpose, demonstrating to the outside world that the agency cares about community policing.[140] Although community policing purists favor generalized implementation, specialized units undeniably provided more visibility, clearly signaling the public of the department's intentions. The popularity of the specialized approach to community policing could in great part be attributable to its high symbolic value.

Problems associated with specialization

The problems associated with implementing community policing using specialized units have been apparent for decades. Team policing, a precursor to community policing, was implemented in several agencies in the 1970s; the concept appeared suddenly and then died off just as quickly.[141] Why did team policing fail? An evaluation identified two primary problems. First, specialized teams were relieved of responsibility for responding to calls, and this bred resentment among regular officers who were expected to pick up the slack. Second, the majority of agency personnel were exempt from attending to community issues with problem-solving efforts, and small, specialized squads alone could not accomplish enough to repair fractured relationships between police and the community. Those two shortcomings of a model relying on specialization laid the groundwork for thinking about a generalist approach to community policing.

Supervision. Agencies we visited that had adopted a specialized approach were struggling to achieve the right balance of supervision and autonomy in their community policing units. Over-supervision eroded officers' autonomy and ability to problem solve effectively; under-supervision led to insufficiencies in their accountability. Regular officers in specialized agencies expressed animosity arising from apparent inequities in supervisory levels. An employee in the Green Bay Police Department noted that community policing officers in that agency were allowed to "run wild."

All of the agencies using specialized approaches had identified those to whom community policing officers were expected to report. In Hillsborough County, corporals were in charge of the community policing unit; the corporal reviewed weekly summaries of unit activities and held monthly meetings with all specialized officers to discuss problems and solutions. In Greenville, a lieutenant commanded the specialized unit. In these and all specialized departments, however, it was unclear just how much supervision was actually occurring. Strict or rigid supervision is frowned on, but community policing officers ought to be documenting their actions for review by supervisors, managers, and administrators. Departments without mechanisms that assure accountability in place were putting a great deal of power into the hands of their specialized officers.

Evaluation processes. The agencies that we visited were struggling to develop and institute measurable community policing performance objectives. One member of the Lowell Police Department emphasized that lacking a clear and relevant system of performance evaluation, the organization had created an abundance of community policing officers with little respect for commanders.

Even in departments that did have an evaluation process, problems were evident. The most prevalent appeared to be a lack of comprehension about the definition of community policing. Employees from several departments told us that officers were unclear about what activities constituted community oriented policing. As one lieutenant from the Billings Police Department described it, "People are doing a great deal of problem solving, but they don't see it as problem solving, so they are not reporting it." The police chief in Newport News suggested that community oriented policing had become so routine that his officers were failing to recognize that they were doing it.

To hold officers accountable for community policing efforts, they first must know what it is and how to do it. Until that happens, evaluation systems will continue to suffer. Unlike easy-to-quantify measures such as numbers of citations and arrests, community policing work defies a bean-counting approach to evaluation. Methods for measuring community policing performance still have significant room for improvement.

Tensions between specialized and generalized officers. Given the agencies' problems with supervision and evaluation, perhaps it should have surprised no one that the toughest issue facing specialized units was the frequent animosity directed toward them by regular officers. The specialized officers' autonomy in particular seemed to generate widespread hostility. At the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, where a specialized unit of community resource deputies known as CRDs had been established, one regular deputy told us that CRD stood for "can't respond to dispatch." Regular officers speculated about how specialized officers spent time; because CRDs did not respond to calls, others perceived them as "not really working." In the Lowell Police Department, similar hostilities had surfaced; the specialized unit was referred to as the "grin-and-wave" squad. Recognizing the growing stigma and internal conflict, the chief dropped the specialized approach and began shifting to a generalized model.

In Green Bay, on the other hand, community policing officers had earned credibility with detectives, patrol officers, and probation officers by regularly sharing information with them. Keeping all members of the department up to date on what specialized units are doing may help decrease misconceptions, rumors, jealousies, and hostilities that otherwise could escalate and divide the agency.

Community interaction and engagement. Perhaps the biggest drawback to specialization is that all other members of the agency may consider themselves exempt from the work of building or repairing and nurturing community relationships because community policing is "someone else's job." Numerous times in such agencies we observed regular patrol officers taking actions likely to harm police-community relations; they were convinced that they had neither the responsibility nor the time to be concerned with the quality of police-community relationships. During one visit, we watched as a patrol sergeant pulled up next to a man beeping his horn and told the driver to "get the f*** out of the car and go knock on the door." Another officer stopped a speeding teenager, while yelling at and belittling him. In Hillsborough County, a deputy told us in no uncertain terms that the agency did not expect him to forge partnerships with the community.

Police officers in agencies with specialized units appeared to have gotten the impression that community policing was a concern only for special-unit officers. Many agencies that initially had segregated community policing officers and responsibilities now wished to evolve to a generalized model. Some of these were having transition problems; after-the-fact attempts to encourage regular officers to engage in community policing were sometimes met with resentment and resistance.

Training. In most of the specialized agencies we visited, only specialized officers were being exposed to training for community policing. In Green Bay, community policing officers had daily roll-calls during which relevant training sometimes occurred, along with question-and-answer sessions. Some agencies were taking steps to bridge knowledge gaps. In Hillsborough County, deputies attended two community policing training sessions before they became community resource deputies. Even in specialized agencies that trained all officers in community policing, that training was delivered to specialized officers more frequently, and the content was more in-depth.

With little exposure to the training, it was no surprise that regular patrol officers were often unclear or misinformed about the philosophies, responsibilities, and tasks associated with community policing. This could have been a reason for much of the animosity we found between regular and specialized officers. The Lowell agency acknowledged and had addressed this. Its hybrid model called for all officers to receive identical training on community policing. The result was a department-wide understanding of community policing's methods, value, and importance.

What is generalization?

Generalization in community policing is the practice of a set of problem-solving responsibilities, behaviors, and activities expected of most or all front-line personnel, agency-wide. Community policing reformers consider the generalized model to be the ideal. Books, magazines, journal articles, and training curricula all treat the generalized model as the "one true way" to implement community policing.

Even so, the research suggests that most of the nation's police departments have chosen not to implement generalized community policing. As discussed above, for various reasons most of our agencies had taken the specialized path. We viewed this pattern as both important and instructive.

Agencies that had employed a generalized model appeared to have initially encountered a number of common roadblocks. Apart from the normal organizational resistance to change and innovation, officers in these agencies seemed to hold the persistent belief that community policing was "extra work" instead of understanding it as a different, possibly more effective way to approach solving problems they were already confronting. Most believed that they didn't have enough time for the effort.

Meanwhile other organizational forces were championing adoption of the agency-wide generalized approach. Among our agencies, a handful had implemented community policing with a generalized model.

- In Concord, a sergeant explained that weighing the relative costs and benefits of generalization and specialization, the department had concluded that the risk of generating friction between specialized and regular officers was unacceptably high. Consequently, Concord elected to include all officers in its community policing efforts.

- The Knoxville Police Department had also recognized that having specialized and regular units with differing work conditions could generate (as some called it) "in-fighting." The agency thought that a generalized approach would engage the entire city in community policing—a goal they valued—while specialization had greater potential to create divisiveness.

- The Newport News Police Department had adopted a generalized approach during one of many transitions in its long evolution. A former chief had embraced agency-wide community policing, and all officers were trained and expected to perform community policing and problem-solving duties. Following a sting operation during which an officer died, a new chief tightened the reins, recentralizing authority and "pocketing" community policing within certain districts. Community policing did not end altogether, but it was pulled back substantially.

- The chief leading the Newport News agency during our visit viewed his community as a potential terrorism target. The city had a large military population, it was accessible by water, and shipyards were located there. He believed that a generalized approach would most effectively address those and other local issues. Having been a generalized department before made this transition achievable; the chief felt that community policing had become fully institutionalized in the agency.

- Naperville's police chief had introduced and formalized community policing throughout his agency, training all officers in community policing and problem solving. He used the Community Policing Demonstration Center sponsored by another generalized department to generate ideas for agency-wide implementation.

Problems associated with generalized models. Although reformers prefer the generalized approach, it has some drawbacks to weigh against its advantages. First, responsible for both, officers have to find a way to strike a balance between community policing work and more traditional policing functions. Second, without adequate training, officers will have trouble understanding—never mind embracing—community policing.

These challenges are real. In generalized agencies, community policing can easily become so diluted that it becomes little more than a mirage—talked about frequently, but absent to the touch. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein (1937), "There is no *there* there." In some generalized agencies that we visited, the officers were unable to recall participating in a single problem-oriented or community policing project.

Do officers have time for community policing? Everywhere we went during this project, we met and heard about police officers who thought that community policing duties fell outside their own job descriptions. For them, community policing was not "real" police work; it was an added responsibility that had been tacked onto an already busy agenda. Concord's police officers were so convinced that community policing constituted extra work that they had demanded overtime pay for participating in community policing projects.

The myopic focus on responding to calls for service among the patrol officers whom we observed represented a significant challenge to those implementing community policing. In Concord, a sergeant noted that "many of the officers think community policing is not why they were hired and the philosophy is bull****." This frame of mind was common among other officers who felt that if specialized units were not responding to calls, they were not doing "real police work."

Where these mentalities prevailed, resentment was extended beyond the idea of community policing to those who endorsed it. That resentment intensified whenever officers were asked to add community policing to their regular duties. In Concord, one patrol officer insisted that 70 percent of the officers in his department felt that community policing duties were hampering their ability to follow through with all of their other work. Newport News was requiring officers to commit only 20 percent of their time to community policing, but still officers complained that their responsibility for answering calls prevented them from undertaking community policing projects.

The perception that lack of time prevented officers from doing both kinds of police work ran deep and wide among the officers we met. We lost count of how many told us that they could not problem solve or engage the community because their entire shifts were consumed with racing from call to call. Yet nearly every time we rode with an officer, we saw differently; we were told that these were "slow" nights. "You should have been here last night," we heard again and again. To be fair, we occasionally did observe busier shifts, but we simply did not find convincing evidence that patrol officers have no time for community policing activities.

Training. Training that exposes officers to the reasons and methods for doing problem-oriented policing could help them better understand what community policing is and how it could be integrated into their other work. Whether or not responsibility for community policing is distributed agency-wide, everyone needs to be knowledgeable about the community policing philosophy and its associated duties.

For the agencies that were implementing generalized community policing, adequately training large numbers of officers was proving challenging. Each department had developed a unique way to manage this.

- Concord became a Community Policing Demonstration Center, training its own officers and assisting others. The Center was facilitating exchanges of ideas among departments and site visits for officers to view community policing in action. Neighborhood patrol officers were receiving 40 hours of community policing training, and Concord corporals were serving as contacts for patrol officers needing assistance.

- Knoxville had established a Regional Community Policing Institute (RCPI) with federal funding from the COPS Office under Chief Phil Keith in 1997. The institute had provided training, education, and technical services covering a wide variety of community policing topics, increasing the understanding of community policing throughout the entire department.

- Knoxville was concentrating in-service training on officers who had had no prior exposure—whose police academy experience had left them unfamiliar with the community policing philosophy. The department appeared to be making a sound effort to assure that all members were comfortable with their community policing responsibilities. As a result, Knoxville was experiencing less internal resistance than some during its transition.

Absent adequate training, police administrators can expect dissent, confusion, and aggravation because officers do not understand community policing or its benefits. Lack of or poor training in some of the agencies was hindering the development of effective and fair personnel evaluation systems. Supervisors unfamiliar with community policing resorted to familiar performance metrics like numbers of arrests, citations, and field interrogations. In some cases, officers were not getting enough information even to recognize their qualifying efforts as community policing and problem solving.

What is a hybrid model?

Often, the police agencies we studied could not be categorized as either completely generalized or completely specialized in their implementation of community policing. They had incorporated elements of both, creating hybrid models that were distinctly their own. For instance, a department might assign problem solving to a specialized unit while encouraging all officers to participate in community policing as time permitted. Some specialized agencies were training all of their officers in community policing.

We most often saw hybrid models emerging when specialized agencies were starting to become more generalized. The agencies tended to move in that direction by integrating a few generalized elements on the way to department-wide implementation.

- The Reno Police Department initially assigned problem-oriented projects to specialized officers. When the chief called for a more generalized approach, the department looked to San Diego's problem-oriented policing strategy for ideas about documenting problem-solving efforts throughout the department.

- Colorado Springs had begun community policing with specialized problem-solving units, but wanted to spread community policing throughout its department, encouraging free thinking among all officers. Among other things, the agency hoped to improve its community engagement. This was an agency operating with a specialized unit, but we could foresee that a department-wide approach would eventually supersede that unit's monopoly on community policing.

- The Lowell Police Department was another agency in transition. Animosity between specialist and generalist officers had fueled this agency's decision to move toward a generalized approach. Lowell was influenced by community groups, police, the city manager, and the infusion of federal grant funds to adopt certain components of each model.

Although our sample was small, we found reason to believe that hybrid approaches might be typical of agencies' transitions along the way to generalization.

Conclusions

At first glance, it might seem advantageous for departments to assign community policing to specialized units. History teaches us, however, that specialization isolates community policing functions and the institutional knowledge and attitudes that support them. When specialized officers are focusing on these new tasks, other officers are relieved of the "burden" of integrating them into their own work. Generalization, not specialization, changes agencies.

When an agency has sound reasons for choosing a specialized approach, specialized and generalized officers need motivation to work closely together. The Green Bay Police Department is an example of how this can work. The agency had created a special unit of community policing officers (CPO) whose primary responsibility was to discover neighborhood problems and develop successful solutions. CPOs were not dispatched to calls; they existed solely to address community concerns. Unlike some specialized agencies, however, Green Bay made certain that its CPOs met routinely to discuss their activities with patrol officers, detectives, and probation officers. As a result, the department as a whole stayed up-to-date on the CPOs' efforts, so they were not subject to the common misperception that community policing officers did not do "real" police work. In other agencies, specialized officers seemed more isolated; some seemed almost secretive about their work. Survival for those units was in question.

Logistically, training an entire workforce in enough depth to change officers' fundamental approach to work is challenging. Forces supporting familiar traditional methods are strong, and brief or shallow training is unlikely to make a lasting difference. The principal force powerful enough to effectively resist or motivate change appears to be the police culture itself. Even in agencies considered national leaders in community policing, we observed a clear lack of comprehension about and resistance to the philosophy and its benefits. For example, in one generalized agency, after responding repeatedly to a series of calls from a single address, an officer told us that he expected a homicide there before the night was over. Fortunately no homicide occurred, but we were struck by how little consideration that officer gave to preventing it.

To institute community policing using a generalized model is a lofty goal. The generalist approach preferred by reformers raises numerous problems that seem to have been overlooked in the literature to date. The agencies we visited were locked in a struggle with a dominant police culture bent on responding to calls for service and getting back on the road to receive the next one, resistant to any other way of doing business. Perhaps it will take an entirely new generation of officers, trained for community policing, to overcome the more enduring aspects of the current culture. Meanwhile, considering the relative strengths and weaknesses of both generalized and specialized approaches, it should come as no surprise that American police agencies are experimenting with hybrid models.

CHAPTER 5. Information and Analysis

Jeffrey Snipes and Charles Katz

Information, analysis, and communication are central to virtually every aspect of community policing. Certainly, it is essential for a department that intends to succeed in community policing to amplify the quality, kind, and flow of information.

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) published a report exploring the relationship between information technology and community policing, focusing on the San Diego, Reno, Charlotte-Mecklenberg, Tempe, and Hartford police agencies.[142] The report presented a conceptual framework for the role of information technology in community policing and used that framework to structure the field research. The report identified the following information domains within policing agencies for which information technologies might be particularly effective: community interfaces, interorganizational linkages, work-group facilitation, environmental scanning, problem orientation, area accountability, and strategic management.[143]

Analysis led researchers to conclude that in the five departments they examined, information capacities in those domains were "unevenly developed, if developed at all."[144] We strongly recommend reading the COPS Office report, both for its critique of police agencies' use of information technology and for its vision of future needs.

Our analysis of information use

In this study, we have taken a slightly different approach to examining information in community policing agencies. First, we wanted our subjects to reflect diversity; we selected police agencies from small towns, medium-sized cities, and one large county. Second, we set aside the COPS Office categories and our own preconceived categories to develop a new typology of information domains, drawn directly from our field research. To grasp the actual types of information in use, we examined the data, sifting through exhaustive field notes taken by our researchers during site visits to 12 agencies. Our objective was to reframe the information domain categories.

We wanted to offer categories that were simple yet meaningful, without excessive overlap. After developing our classification scheme, we categorized each instance of information use that we had observed. From this exercise, we were able to produce an organized summary of how the 12 agencies were using information. Each of the following six sections pertains to one of those categories or dimensions of information technology, and each is relevant to police agencies practicing community policing today.

1. Information-sharing.

2. Crime analysis.

3. Problem solving.

4. Resource liberation.

5. Management.

6. Public oversight.

Information-sharing

Police agencies that intend to practice community policing usually discover a need to improve information flow between the many entities that are their stakeholders or that are otherwise involved in quality policing. First and most important, information flow must occur between police and the community they serve. Skogan and Roth have referred to this as "community engagement."[145] Successful community policing requires considerable sharing of information in both directions—from the public to police and from police to the public.

In the agencies that we studied, other types of information-sharing were also noted, although to a smaller degree, between police jurisdictions and between police and other government agencies within the jurisdiction.

Information flow between police and community. The most basic and prevalent mode of information flow that we observed between police and the community was the department web site. Most agencies had established web sites by the time of our visit, although some (e.g., Knoxville[146]) were better developed than others. Good web sites offer residents quick, easy access to clear, timely, accurate information about crime and police activity in each local neighborhood. They also allow the public to communicate concerns and ask questions, exchanging e-mail with police liaisons. Nearly all of the agencies had enabled citizens to send e-mail to individual officers and had publicized those e-mail addresses on their web sites and at community meetings.

In Colorado Springs, a group e-mail feature of the department's web site served as a forum for discussion between police and the local retail association; after the launch of this initiative, according to a project evaluation, shoplifting decreased by 20 percent. Police departments such as Green Bay were using web sites to distribute newsletters (e.g., E-CAP), updating citizens on police responses to community concerns.[147]

Posting information on web sites is far more efficient than distributing print newsletters, as long as an adequate number and cross-section of residents have web access. The smaller agencies we visited were in various stages of accomplishing this. Naperville was planning to do so, but the site was not yet up when we visited the agency. (The department has now established a presence on the city web site.) Even in large departments, allocating resources to maintain a web site—essential for keeping information current and accurate—can be a problem. In Reno, one official noted that on that department's web site, even basic crime information was not being posted.

In addition to web sites, community meetings are a good medium for police and the public to share crime-related and other information.[148] Neighborhood watch groups, for example, can report local concerns to police at regularly scheduled meetings, in addition to reporting more urgent issues, such as crimes in progress. Police participation in community meetings varied among our 12 departments. In Knoxville, more than 70 neighborhood watch groups were meeting with police. In Greenville, police were giving their pager numbers to residents at community meetings, but a Greenville community officer reported having met with community members only four times during the year. The optimal number of police-community meetings will vary by community, and numerous other information-sharing strategies exist.

Some agencies had conducted citizen surveys to learn about the problems that citizens were experiencing and the public level of satisfaction with community policing initiatives.[149] Reno and Concord conducted recurring surveys; Billings had conducted ad hoc surveys at community policing workshops. Naperville had surveyed the public to see what percentage of citizens knew their beat officers. Hillsborough County made it possible for the public to complete surveys online.[150]

Conducting a survey is just one step in learning what the public is thinking and in responding effectively. Survey data, once collected, needs to be analyzed, reported, and used in actual decision-making. In Portland, one official told us that recent survey results there had not been made available, even to officers. In Colorado Springs, on the other hand, a pilot program called PASS (Police Accountability and Service Standards) was linking community priorities with officer recognition of priorities and department resources, and the agency was formulating policy based on the results. In Concord, not only had survey results been disseminated, but they were influencing policy; when citizens expressed concern with youth crime, the department promptly organized a special investigation and intervention squad.

Police agencies were using television and telephones to share information with community members, as well. In Portland, the police chief was appearing weekly on evening network television to spotlight particular types of crime, using crime-mapping information. Similarly, Concord was hosting a crime-prevention show, *Street Smart*, on the local public access channel. Knoxville's City Watch program was using automated bulk telephone calls to update citizens on immediate problems in their neighborhoods.

Other information-sharing types. Community policing agencies usually extended information-sharing beyond what was typical for traditional departments. Intranets (internal communication systems) and e-mail groups were allowing officers at different levels and in different units to exchange information, most often for management purposes. Externally, departments shared information with one another, as well. Sometimes that information was abstract and philosophical, exemplified by Portland's Holland-Portland Officer Study Program in which officers learned how strategies in different cultures could enhance their policing. Sometimes the exchange involved crime and suspect data; examples included Newport News' regional crime information-sharing program and Hillsborough County's five-jurisdiction intranet.

Police were also sharing information with other governmental agencies. In Green Bay, probation agents were communicating information about probationers with the police department. This was an advantage for police in several ways, most important by giving them access to certain results from an administrative search technique broadly available to the probation officers, but not generally to police officers.

Crime analysis

In community policing, agencies' crime-fighting strategies are directly tied to their use of comprehensive data analysis, particularly by problem type and by geographical region. For officers to problem solve effectively, they need data patterns that are oriented around geography.[151] Just as information-sharing relates to scanning, in the language of the SARA problem-solving model, crime analysis relates to analysis.[152]

All instances of crime analysis occurring in the jurisdictions that we studied were similar in their reliance on traditional data—such as calls for service, arrests, and criminal complaints —to identify problems occurring in specific geographic areas. Knoxville's crime analysis unit was one of the more sophisticated that we observed. In addition to having honored more than 1,000 requests from agency employees and citizens, the unit had participated in developing short- and long-term crime-reduction strategies, and it was delivering dozens of crime-analysis training courses to police employees and Knoxville citizens.

The sophistication of crime analysis techniques varied widely among the agencies. In Lowell and Billings, crime analysis was fairly basic, if effective; analysts manually plotted events on maps and searched for patterns. In Newport News, crime analysis was more advanced; each precinct had its own civilian crime analyst, and IT staff were being paid at the industry rate. Precincts had their own plotters so that officers, assisted by crime analysts, could create Power Point presentations showing their GIS (geographic information system) analyses. While Newport News' crime analysts were identifying crime patterns, they were also using their skills and technologies to provide officer deployment analyses and to project future crime trends.

The agencies' resource commitments were closely related to the sophistication of their crime analysis capabilities. In Reno, a crime analyst told us that their program had been "moving along like a slug," and that it was perceived by many as "bells and whistles"—that crime analysis there was "lack[ing] analysis."

Problem solving

Despite critiques of the police's ability to solve problems, problem solving has remained one of the most important components of community policing, as interpreted and executed by modern departments.[153] Crime analysis units can feed problem-solving efforts, as we have seen, but how do patrol officers get timely information when attempting to solve more immediate problems?

Officers' problem-solving capability in the field is determined in great part by their access—or lack of it—to relevant information when and where it is needed. When officers can check trends from a mobile computer terminal, for example, they can more readily solve problems. In Hillsborough County, a deputy had developed a software program, Cool Ice, for officers to search for and download information by crime type using the computers in their cars. In Naperville, officers were using vehicle-based laptops to research similar information.

The future of police problem solving almost certainly includes the use of databases for tracking problems. With a database, a problem can be assigned a unique project code; then all kinds of information about the nature of the problem, actions taken by officers, and outcomes can be recorded and associated with that problem. If data are complete and timely, progress in solving any problem can be easily monitored. Naperville was using such a system.

Some departments reported difficulties, however. Their officers were becoming disenchanted with the systems. In Reno, an official reported that their software was not working well, and officers had come to hate the electronic component of the problem-solving process. Officers in many agencies seemed to resist entering large quantities of data by computer, especially when tracking large numbers of problems.

In Reno, some people we talked with reflected that "everything becomes POP," even relatively minor incidents—meaning that the electronic data-entry load, in their opinions, had become too cumbersome. Agencies attempting to use problem-tracking software need to be clear about what constitutes a real problem, and what may be merely a collection of loosely related incidents.

Ultimately, police departments may need to collaborate to standardize problem-tracking databases used for analysis, targeting the most effective problem-solving approaches for given types of problems.

Resource liberation

Indirectly related to community policing, "resource liberation" refers to the use of information technology in ways that free department resources to be reallocated to other priorities—in these agencies' cases, for community policing and problem-solving efforts. We noted a number of examples of efficiencies that had resulted in resource liberation in the departments that we studied.

In Knoxville, 300 cameras had been installed in patrol cars to increase officer accountability. As a side effect, it turned out that the video documentation could sometimes substitute for in-person officer testimony at trials, saving time. Also in Knoxville, the police department had been considering streaming real-time video from high-crime areas to in-car computers to reduce the time that officers spent cruising in those areas to spot trouble. These measures conserved time formerly spent in traditional crime-fighting activities, thus increasing the time available for community policing projects.

The Reno department had adopted a "paperless system" goal. As information was increasingly computerized, officers whose paperwork load had been reduced could redirect some of that time to problem solving. In Hillsborough, roll call had been replaced with direct deployment and daily messaging through a CAD system, 6 days a week. Also, the agency was acquiring in-car laptops so that officers could directly enter their field notes from their vehicles. Previously, they had taken notes by hand in the field, later entering them into the department information management system on office computers. Finally, to free officers' time for more professional policing duties, Knoxville was using a telephone reporting system for property crimes, and in Newport News, civilians at information desks were taking 40 percent of all reports. These efforts were intended to reduce the time spent by officers responding to nonurgent calls for service.

Management

Commander accountability and rank-and-file performance evaluation are two dominant issues for police management with information technology and community policing. The CompStat model, designed to hold commanders accountable for area problems, originated in New York City and then spread to police departments across the nation.[154] Many of the agencies that we visited were engaging in CompStat meetings; these included Knoxville, Lowell, Reno, and Hillsborough. The information required for holding commanders accountable for performance includes time-series data on crime patterns and quality-of-life issues. Commanders who are made aware of problems in their districts, but do not respond with effective problem-solving tactics, usually will face organizational sanctions.

At CompStat meetings, we found that crime and quality-of-life information was being compared across agency districts. Most of the agencies considered their meetings to be "nonconfrontational" (Lowell) and "civilized" (Reno). In Hillsborough, however, an SCISS (Sheriff's Criminal Information Strategy System) meeting was reported to have resulted in embarrassment for one commander that was severe enough to have possibly motivated his subsequent retirement.

CompStat is a tool for handling midlevel manager accountability; it does not address the performance quality of patrol officers and other rank-and-file personnel. Since good community policing is, in part, measured differently than good traditional policing, midlevel managers need to change performance criteria for the rank-and-file accordingly.[155] This would dictate a shift in the type of performance information to be collected.

In Hillsborough, community resource officers were being required to submit monthly reports on problem solving. If reported problems recurred too often, the officers were confronted by their supervisors. In Colorado Springs, problem-oriented policing had been incorporated into officers' electronic activity logs, giving managers a better view of how much time was being devoted to problem solving. Concord officers were required to identify and document sub-beat problems; their lieutenants evaluated them based on timely handling of those problems. Also in Concord, officers were being given problem-solving exercises during conferences, and their evaluations reflected their performance. According to one Concord official, the agency was holding officers accountable for community policing because of the amount of time and resources that had been invested in their training.

Public oversight

Community policing and new modes of information-gathering and flow could affect how civilians might hold departments accountable for abuse, including racial profiling, at the hands of officers. One response of legislators and departments to allegations of racial profiling has been to initiate collection of traffic stops data[156] on factors such as race, gender, incident disposition, and searches. This information is analyzed and used to determine whether the department has a profiling problem. Naperville, for one, was engaging in traffic stops data collection when we visited.

Early warning systems are another way that information is used to monitor office behavior. Departments collect information about individual officers including complaints, traffic accidents, use-of-force incidents, and resisting-arrest charges. When an officer is in the danger zone, intervention occurs.[157] The structure of civilian review is a major way in which information and public oversight are related. Departments practicing community policing should be amenable to sharing information with civilian agencies responsible for reviewing allegations of police misconduct.[158]

In San Francisco, the tension between the need to share such information and the department's resistance to opening its records to outsiders caused considerable controversy.[159] Similarly, a Reno official told us that the agency would not implement civilian review because it didn't want citizens having access to classified information. The conflict between the need to protect classified information and the need to disseminate information to outsiders was unlikely to end soon.

Conclusions

The diverse uses of information and information technology are directly relevant to community policing and problem solving. Like earlier researchers in the community policing era, we found a great deal of variation in how agencies were developing in this domain. For community policing to transform police work, agencies need to learn from each other how and where to increase the amount and quality of information and analysis, as well as the application of the results to problem solving—all of which is crucial to organizational progress.

CHAPTER 6. Civilianization

William King

This chapter describes the use of civilian employees and volunteers in local law enforcement agencies in the United States. In particular, it describes the extent of civilianization, the assignments given to civilian employees, and some of the issues that those civilians face.

Civilian police employees and volunteers

Civilians are nonsworn employees and volunteers who work for police agencies, performing duties at the will of the administration. Unpaid citizen volunteers perform a wide range of tasks; they sometimes wear uniforms and patrol in marked cars. Some, such as animal control officers, may be armed with a weapon. In police agencies, both the nonsworn employees and the volunteers are referred to as "civilians."[160] Neither group has powers of arrest.

The first civilian employees were hired by police agencies as far back as the 1840s, around the inception of the first formal police agencies in the United States. In the early days of vocational policing, civilians composed a small proportion of the workforce, performing tasks such as cleaning and maintaining facilities, record-keeping, and serving as jail stewards. Since then, the number of civilians working in U.S. police agencies has increased gradually along with the size of the agencies. The average percentage of full-time civilian employees in large agencies rose from 4.1 percent in 1937 to 26.6 percent in 1999. Exhibit 1 illustrates the increase in the use of police civilians between 1955 and 1998.

Exhibit 1. Median percentage of full-time civilian employees in large U.S. police agencies (1955–98), adapted from King and Maguire (2000).[161]

* Number of Departments varies between 683 (in 1970) and 1,379. All years (except 1970) have more than 980 cases.

Police agencies use civilian employees for three reasons. First, it saves money. Civilians cost less to train, equip, and pay. They replace sworn officers in assignments such as dispatch and records; the sworn officers can then be redeployed to policing tasks such as patrol and investigations. Second, some contend that using civilian employees improves police-community relations as the employees become, in effect, agency ambassadors in the community.[162] They also bring the community perspective into their agencies. Third, civilian employees give the organizational structure more flexibility. In several states, civilian employees are exempt from civil service requirements, and civilian police employees are rarely unionized; therefore they are more easily hired, transferred, promoted and demoted, and fired than sworn staff.[163]

Since the 1980s, civilian employees have become an important part of the U.S. community policing movement. Not only have civilian employees increasingly been used in lower level administrative positions, freeing sworn officers for reassignment to street duties, but they are being employed in some agencies as crime scene technicians and responders to nonemergency calls. Civilian employees are being widely accepted in many police agencies as crime analysts, dispatchers, community service officers, and grant writers. In a few agencies, civilians have assumed command positions.

Agencies' use of civilian positions

Site visitors to the 12 study agencies found significant variations in the proportion and deployment of civilian employees. In the first section of this chapter, we describe those differences and the numbers of civilians employed. Second, we explore the responsibilities that had been assigned to civilian employees and their geographical deployment. Third, we discuss how agencies were using unpaid civilian volunteers. We conclude with our observations about the use of civilians and the problems encountered by agencies and civilian employees during a period of increasing civilianization.

Variations and changes in the use of civilian employees. The 12 agencies were using civilian employees at differing rates, ranging from 18 percent in Greenville to 38 percent in Naperville, with an average of 26.2 percent (see Exhibit 2). That figure was consistent with the national average (26.6 percent) of civilians employed in large U.S. law enforcement agencies during the same period.[164]

Several agencies reported recent changes in the number of civilian employees. In the Lowell police department, that number had doubled in the late 1990s; some interviewees described the agency as "infused" with civilians. In Naperville, the police department had steadily increased its use of civilian employees as it implemented community policing. Other agencies, including Hillsborough, were planning future increases. In Knoxville, about 50 percent of crime scene technicians were civilians; the agency intended to civilianize them all over time.

The Portland Police Bureau had been hiring civilian employees since the early 1990s. Since 1992, civilians had been heading and staffing the agency's records division. In 1997, Portland had civilianized 42 desk clerks, using a COPS Office grant—a change not without controversy

Exhibit 2. Number and percentage of full-time civilian employees in 12 study agencies.

Agency	Full-Time Sworn Civilians (#)	Full-Time Civilians (#)	Percentage of Civilians
Billings, Montana	115	29	20.1
Colorado Springs, Colorado	482	232	32.5
Concord, California	156	61	28.1
Green Bay, Wisconsin	194	53	21.5
Greenville, South Carolina	176	41	18.9
Hillsborough County, Florida	1,889	929	33.0
Knoxville, Tennessee	389	93	19.3
Lowell, Massachusetts	258	70	21.3
Naperville, Illinois	162	100	38.2
Newport News, Virginia	371	128	25.7
Portland, Oregon	1,008	292	22.5
Reno, Nevada	320	160	33.3

Source: Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), 1999.

because desk-clerking was one of the few alternatives to street duty for officers. When we visited, Portland was hoping to place civilian crime analysts in each precinct.

Overall in the agencies that we studied, the trend appeared to be toward employing greater numbers of civilians. However, some departments had employed comparatively few. Greenville and Billings were the two least civilianized police agencies that we visited; not only did civilians account for a modest percentage of their employees at the time, but neither agency reported planning to increase their numbers in the future.

Civilian position allocation and assignments. The agencies differed in how they were allocating civilian positions. In some, civilians had been relegated to traditional assignments in records, clerical, and dispatch units. In others, they held leadership positions or had been assigned front-line street duties such as responding to nonemergency calls and processing crime scenes.

Five agencies were using civilian employees primarily in support positions. Colorado Springs had assigned them to human resources, recordkeeping, finance, planning, and information technology; they answered phones and worked in the lab and at the academy. Likewise, for the most part, Greenville, Green Bay, Newport News, and Portland were using civilian employees to fill clerical and dispatch positions. There were exceptions to that general trend, however. Greenville had employed a civilian to organize the agency's community sports activities such as its police-youth softball games. Still, on the whole, the five agencies were deploying civilian employees in traditional ways.

Other agencies were more innovative. A number had appointed civilians to command staff positions or assigned them leadership roles in areas of the organization such as training academies. The Knoxville agency had employed a team of 28 civilian public information officers to be the department's liaison with the media and the public. The team responded to incidents 24 hours a day, and the team leader was considered a member of the command staff. The team leader position reported directly to the chief and worked from an office in the police chief's suite. In addition, at the time of our visit, about 50 percent of all Knoxville crime-scene investigators were civilians, a percentage that the department was planning to increase. Similarly, in the Lowell department, the head of administrative services was a civilian; the person holding the position had formerly headed the training academy.

Some agencies were relying on civilians to fill other kinds of sensitive positions. Lowell had hired two full-time civilians as liaisons with the city's multiethnic populations, especially the sizable Southeast Asian community. The community liaison positions were particularly crucial because of language and cultural barriers that were complicating local law compliance and enforcement. Those civilian positions reported directly to the police superintendent.

A few agencies were relying on civilians to fill front-line positions such as taking reports and staffing neighborhood ministations.

- Naperville had employed 12 civilian service officers (CSO) to write parking tickets, assist officers with paper work, direct traffic, and staff reception areas.

- Reno employed CSOs to staff storefront ministations, handle basic traffic control, and take crime reports in the field; CSOs were handling up to 75 percent of that agency's cold reports.

- In Concord, from the office (but not in the field), CSOs were pursuing leads on cases that had no suspects; they were also operating three district offices and taking about 40 percent of all police reports.

Agencies' use of civilians as unpaid volunteers. Several agencies that we visited were using unpaid civilian volunteers in roles other than those associated with crime watch and neighborhood patrols. Some were operating fairly regimented volunteer programs.

- The Lowell department had employed a full-time volunteer coordinator, and volunteers were required to attend the police-citizen academy. Afterward, they could be assigned as needed to a number of positions, such as computer technical support and data entry or reception at police ministations.

- In Colorado Springs, 360 volunteers were donating about 38,000 service hours yearly in the chaplain corps, assisting officers with death notifications and other problems, and they were helping elderly crime victims. They also worked in the Espanol service program, providing police with trained interpreters. Colorado Springs volunteers were coordinated by a full-time department employee.

- In Concord, about 60 volunteers were producing the department's local television show, staffing district stations, and serving at departmental towing hearings where citizens could appeal parking violation tickets. Concord's more mature volunteers were handling nonemergency patrol work. Volunteers-on-patrol drove marked vehicles and handled low-risk tasks such as assisting motorists and checking unoccupied homes for vacationing residents. After some initial resistance, sworn officers came to appreciate having fewer nonemergency tasks that diverted their time from bigger problems, and the volunteers-on-patrol program became quite successful.

Conclusions and potential problems

Overall, civilianization was evident at all 12 study sites. We found differences in the degree to which the agencies had civilianized their workforces and in the nature of the tasks given to civilians. The agencies also differed in the size of their volunteer forces and the ways in which volunteers contributed. Overall, the agencies were projecting an optimistic vision of civilianization.

In a few agencies, civilian employees were holding command staff positions. In a number of them, civilians were charged with critical tasks such as processing crime scenes, following up investigations, and taking crime reports. In other departments, they were contributing specialized skills that enhanced the agencies' use of computers or improved their communication and relationships with the media or with ethnic communities. A number of agencies, but not all, were allowing civilians, including volunteers, considerable freedom to travel in their jurisdictions to take crime reports or to provide low-risk patrol services.

Police agencies should consider the benefits of innovative approaches to civilianization. Civilian employees are often less costly and more easily hired and assigned, and they bring specialized expertise and skills that complement those of sworn officers. For example, the Lowell Police Department was able to employ two well-connected civilians as effective community liaisons; if the department had insisted that only sworn officers could fill this role, the community would have missed an important opportunity to improve relations between the police and ethnic constituent groups.

In a number of agencies, civilians were performing crime analysis and crime mapping. In others, civilian employees and volunteers were receiving nonemergency crime reports by telephone, at ministations, and in the field. Such initiatives were freeing patrol officers to concentrate on community policing and problem solving.

The process of civilianizing an agency is not without its problems. The agencies mentioned two concerns in particular. First, they strongly recommended that civilian candidates for paid and unpaid positions be thoroughly screened before being assigned tasks, and that those accepted be trained well. Some agencies were using formal training programs to teach the agency's culture, operations and expectations, covering issues such as the chain of command and the importance of confidentiality. Only a handful of the agencies cited having hired a troublesome civilian employee as a problem.

Their second area of concern involved placement of civilian employees and sworn employees' perceptions of civilians. In some study sites, civilians told us that they occasionally were made to feel like second-class employees. One interviewee reported that she was generally well received, but "civilian employees were made to know their place." Other agencies noted that civilian employees were warmly received in some agency bureaus and avoided by others.

Whether or not the agency culture (especially the majority of sworn officers) accepted civilians, these employees could face obstacles. A number of agencies cited instances of civilianization being impeded by opposition from police unions or from strongly vocal sworn officers even when these were in the minority. The opposition to civilians in the workforce was typically attributed to concerns that the number or ratio of positions for sworn officers would decrease or that fewer nonstreet positions would be available for them.

This suggests that police executives who want to civilianize their agencies will have a better outcome if they enlist their unions and employee associations in the effort. Officers need to know from the outset what to expect and how they will benefit, and agencies need to ensure that increasing civilianization does not interfere with those officers' career options.

In the agencies that we visited, in most cases initial resistance had given way to acceptance once officers were able to see that civilian employees and volunteers were assuming tasks that they themselves often found tedious. Civilianization has the most potential to deliver benefits when police administrators take seriously the potential problems and pitfalls noted here and take the necessary steps to prevent them.

CHAPTER 7. Performance Appraisal Systems

William Wells

Performance appraisal systems play a critical role in the community policing reform movement, where they serve as powerful tools that work for—or against—an agency's intentions. If the oft-quoted phrase "what gets measured gets done" is true, and most experts believe that it is, then several of the agencies that we studied had a serious problem: either they were implementing community policing with no performance appraisal system to guide supervisors and officers, or they were using outdated systems that measured and reinforced the behaviors they were trying to reduce. Either way, they were missing the chance to use performance appraisal as a powerful tool to encourage the new behaviors and skills that department leaders wanted from their officers.

When implementing change, police leaders are responsible for clarifying the behavioral modifications they expect of their officers. A strong signal of the agency's values and expectations is sent through the structural features that are maintained or adopted. This is particularly true of the job performance measures and standards by which employees are evaluated.

Quantitative performance indicators can encourage activities that generate desired outcomes, and discourage others. The absence of performance indicators or the presence of outmoded ones signals a lack of institutional clarity and commitment. Developing performance measures for community policing officers has remained a challenge for reformers and practitioners alike, but it is a challenge that must be mastered for community policing to develop and mature.

For employees, performance appraisals present an opportunity to learn formally how well they are perceived to be meeting the agency's goals for them and where to focus on improvement and growth. According to Mathis and Jackson, performance appraisal is a "process of determining how well employees do their jobs compared with a set of standards, and communicating that information to those employees."[165] Performance appraisal systems serve two functions for individuals: training and learning, and motivation.[166]

Effective performance standards will communicate an agency's expectations for each job and offer a benchmark for measuring employee development and achievement. Policing scholars, describing the usefulness of performance measures designed especially for community policing, have suggested that those agencies need to (re)consider their appraisal systems.[167] The most useful standards will be established on a solid foundation of job descriptions that clearly identify the responsibilities, duties, and tasks associated with each position.[168] Descriptions often are based on position analyses that have revealed "the context and human requirements of jobs, and the context in which jobs are performed."[169] For appraisal systems to be meaningful, then, community policing agencies first must develop and define their expectations for each position, and then document them in clear, direct, and complete job descriptions.

If this has been accomplished as a police organization is changing, the appraisal process will guide employees in developing new skills, knowledge, and behaviors. Supervisors can use evaluation criteria to identify specific abilities that officers need to develop—for instance, the ability to identify recurring problems in particular locations. The appraisal process identifies when employees are performing up to expectation, and when training and coaching is needed to help individuals or groups to do better.

The notion that "what gets measured gets done" is particularly relevant to community policing agencies. They may find that a quality performance appraisal system that includes appropriate performance standards strengthens employee motivation, especially during periods of change. Without appraisal systems to reflect new position expectations and responsibilities, agencies are unlikely to realize the full potential of their employees.

Performance feedback must be rooted in clear performance goals and standards to be motivating.[170] For community policing, those standards might relate to activity levels in community engagement and in scanning productively for persistent neighborhood problems.[171] With measurable standards, supervisory feedback can communicate the distance and difference, if any, between what an employee has achieved and performance standards.

Employees generally enjoy learning that they have exceeded expectations and will work to sustain success. The central assumption behind performance appraisal as a motivational tool, therefore, is that most people will want to close any proficiency gaps.[172] That doesn't motivate everyone, and exceptions may respond to having deficiencies pointed out by altering or abandoning the goal or rejecting the supervisor's appraisal.[173] In spite of such exceptions, however, experts agree that goal-setting is critical to realizing the potential of performance appraisal to motivate employee achievement.

Police performance appraisal systems

In the professional model of employee appraisal systems used in policing circles today, performance measures consist of easily quantified, bottom-line performance indicators. Commonly, performance is evaluated by looking at an officer's number of arrests and issued tickets, technical knowledge, investigative outcomes, and—subjectively—relationships with other officers.[174] These kinds of measures represent a narrow set of expectations that inherently encourages a narrow and limited set of behaviors.[175] They are of limited value in that they fail to capture the nature or quality of more desirable community policing behaviors.[176]

The role advocated for officers in community policing is broader and more versatile, requiring more complex behaviors—seeking information about community problems from diverse internal and external sources, and analyzing and reducing a variety of local problems, all of which require sustained focus and nontraditional methods. To facilitate community policing behaviors, performance measures need to match community policing principles. For example, performance measures might track an officer's efforts to organize and attend community meetings, to solicit community input on local problems, to improve citizen satisfaction, and

to mobilize community crime-prevention efforts.[177] If performance measures do not include these and other fundamental activities and abilities, the effort to implement community policing almost certainly will suffer.

Agencies send conflicting signals to officers when performance feedback is based on outmoded performance standards; the cues and information that officers need to develop and prioritize new job responsibilities are misleading or even absent. Police departments that want officers to build relationships with the communities they serve and to solve substantive problems, for example, will want to institute appraisal systems with performance measures that reflect those expectations and acknowledge success.

Early in this study, we found that appraisal systems and their role in community policing reform had never before been systematically documented. We set out to find and record the ways in which the agencies we were studying had modified performance appraisals to reflect new behavioral expectations. The evidence suggested to us that the agencies were under-using performance appraisal as an implementation tool.

Across agencies we found considerable variation in the amount of attention paid to the issue. Although they recognized the importance of reworking their appraisal systems to reflect community policing, few had actually made modifications. Several reported being "in the process" of doing so. The Portland department acknowledged that the future direction of community policing would depend on the agency reworking its formal appraisal system. Other departments in our sample lagged far behind; some were providing no formal performance appraisals of any kind for their officers.

Whether they had acted accordingly, most agencies were aware of the potential impact of matching (or failing to match) appraisal systems with new expectations. A Portland police employee acknowledged that that agency's inability to evaluate officers' problem-solving activities may have been a constraining factor in their lack of progress. In Naperville, the appraisal system had not kept pace with major responsibility shifts that resulted from a change in administrative personnel; some of the ensuing confusion could have been avoided by updating performance measures to clarify the new leadership's expectations.

Without question, developing new performance standards and measures was proving challenging for everyone. Even agencies like the Chicago Police Department, which had worked for years to implement community policing, were struggling with this.[178] Part of the difficulty lay in knowing just what to encourage through measurement. Mastrofski, characterizing a style known as "policing for people," described six qualities that citizens associated with good police service: attentiveness, reliability, responsiveness, competence, manners, and fairness.[179] He advocated comprehensive recordkeeping to gather information for appraisal about officer behaviors in these areas across a variety of incidents. On the whole, however, researchers and police administrators lacked reliable theoretical standards by which to develop practical performance measures for community policing processes.

In spite of the difficulties, agencies that want to teach and motivate officers to practice community policing behaviors such as problem solving need to institutionalize performance appraisal systems that match their community policing goals. Some of the agencies we visited needed to rework their existing systems—older measures were still encouraging behaviors valued in the past while discouraging the community policing activities intended to replace them. Others were faced, perhaps for the first time, with building performance appraisal systems from the ground up to communicate what they valued, and to evaluate and reward officer performance in those areas.

Evaluating problem-solving activities. Problem solving, the hallmark of community policing, involves a significant shift in responsibility for officers, but many of the agencies we visited claimed still to be in the process of defining performance measures to evaluate officers' problem-solving activities. A few had implemented some changes that reflected problem-solving expectations. Performance appraisals help identify the specific problem-solving skills that individuals need to develop or improve.

A well-constructed performance evaluation can reveal, for example, whether an officer thoroughly understands the steps of the SARA problem-solving model, and is aware of community resources that can help address persistent problems. When the evaluation process sheds light on individual performance shortcomings, supervisors can devise individual development strategies. When a pattern of shortcomings across officers emerges, a broad training need is indicated.

The agencies' choice of community policing model seemed unrelated to their experiences with performance appraisal. All were encountering problems, whether they were using a generalized, specialized, or hybrid model. Billings, Naperville, Portland, and Reno, for instance, fell short of measuring problem-solving behaviors. Some were trying to work around the issue, with limited success. In Reno and Naperville, officers were not formally evaluated on problem solving, but it was expected informally if one wanted to be promoted. Naperville gave monetary awards to motivate problem solving; this approach encouraged effort, but provided officers with little of the kind of information they needed to build skills. The department was in the process of changing that, attempting to incorporate problem-solving behaviors into its performance appraisal system.

As discussed above, performance appraisal systems rely on valid and reliable measures for success. Valid performance indicators accurately measure what they are intended to measure, and they do so consistently for everyone across the organization. Finding satisfactory performance indicators for problem solving had challenged the agencies in part because problem-solving effectiveness is hard to quantify. A Billings administrator commented that guidance for reliably measuring all community policing behaviors was scarce, but particularly this was true for problem solving.

A Knoxville officer suggested that more progress might be made if supervisors would leave their offices to observe what their officers were actually doing in the field, rather than simply

quantifying outcomes. Counting arrests and citations is far easier than the recordkeeping needed to support assessment of community policing efforts, which takes time, effort, and thought. The relative ease of knowing when a job was well done by traditional standards was, in fact, an obstacle to implementing community policing. In all departments, we heard that the instant gratification experienced from making arrests strongly motivated officer behavior in that direction; problem solving and relationship-building, longer-term enterprises, delayed and possibly diffused their gratification.

Despite the challenges, several agencies had made some progress with changing their assessment systems. Most often in these cases, community policing officers were documenting their problem-solving activities on standardized forms that were included in their evaluation packages. In Green Bay, officers completed problem-solving forms for supervisory review, and in Colorado Springs, they turned in problem-solving project reports; in both cases, these were included in the agencies' performance appraisal processes. In Knoxville, officers recorded activities in what was referred to as a "problem-solving kit." We also observed some more innovative approaches.

- A Green Bay lieutenant, supervising specialized community policing officers, had them produce a monthly newsletter about activities on their beats. The publications served as an information source for both local residents and the lieutenant. Earlier, Green Bay officers had had little formal supervision.

- Hillsborough County community resource deputies produced monthly reports that helped with assessing their problem-solving activities.

- In Concord, commanders were evaluated on districtwide problem-solving projects, the logic being that commanders would in turn encourage problem-solving among sergeants and officers. Concord personnel told us that supervisors differed in their requirement in this regard; the department may have been inconsistent in its evaluation criteria.

A few departments had turned to internal and external performance appraisal experts for help with changing their systems.

- The Newport News Police Department worked with a professor from Old Dominion University to revise its system.

- The Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office partnered with University of South Florida researchers to develop assessment criteria, particularly for its community resource deputies.

- The Colorado Springs Police Department asked experts to conduct job analyses early in its implementation of community policing; the goal was to match testing and appraisal systems with the department's values.

Some agencies were hindered in implementing community policing by apparent inconsistencies in their performance appraisal systems.

- In Newport News, in spite of its efforts, we had the impression that officers were not being successfully evaluated on problem-solving.

- A Hillsborough County deputy told us that CRO supervisors failed to understand what officers were being expected to do or their activities.

- In Concord, an officer reported being evaluated rigorously on problem solving, but an agency administrator acknowledged that not all sergeants took community policing seriously nor recognized their officers' efforts. A Concord lieutenant told us that the agency's sergeants needed to be trained to recognize what constituted satisfactory community policing behavior.

Performance appraisal experts consider training critical for supervisors and raters.[180] Those who are rating employee performance ought to be well-versed in the appraisal process themselves. The most carefully designed system can fail because of implementation problems.[181] To realize the potential power of appraisal to help implement change, first-line supervisors in community policing agencies need to be committed to community policing-related behaviors, to know what is expected of officers, and to understand the measures by which officers are to be evaluated.

Evaluating departmental performance. Evaluating individual performance gives agencies a sense of how well employees are meeting goals; but to determine how individual achievements are translating into quality service agency-wide, another assessment tool comes into play. Organizational performance assessment is a process that has been gaining popularity both in the private and public sectors[182]; assessing police department performance in agencies implementing community policing has been receiving considerable attention in recent years.[183]

The organizational assessment process makes it possible to identify agency-wide challenges and opportunities for change. Police departments might use a number of criteria for gauging organizational performance—crime rates, degree of fear of crime, police integrity, and citizen satisfaction, among others. Just as with individual performance appraisal, organizational assessment of community policing agencies demands looking beyond the traditional performance indicators, e.g., clearance rates, arrests, and response times. Measuring police performance department-wide produces information necessary for "organizational learning," provided that organizations are capable of self-learning.[184] Collecting and processing agency-level performance data is the foundation of an organization's ability to learn from experience.

Collecting data that measures customer satisfaction is one method that has gained widespread popularity across various service sectors, and many U.S. police departments have attempted to do so.[185] Personnel in the Colorado Springs, Concord, Knoxville, and Naperville police departments all were interested in assessing organizational performance and had used citizen surveys for this purpose. An analyst in Colorado Springs used citizen survey data to better understand the factors that most affected citizens' opinions of the police, helping the department identify issues that mattered most to their constituents. The Concord Police Department used citizen survey results to establish goals for police districts.

It was not clear, however, that the agencies had realized the full potential of community survey data to improve functioning and outcomes. Colorado Springs seemed to have taken steps in that direction, using the data to help establish clear goals and assessing its progress toward achieving them. With input from police personnel and city council and community members, the department had identified service standards in seven performance categories: response time, officer deployment, traffic, clearance rates, drug and vice activity, neighborhood policing, and citizen satisfaction with police services. The agency planned to develop measures for each service goal. When we visited, the department was still prioritizing organizational values and translating them into measurable organizational outcomes. For example, it had set a neighborhood policing goal: that patrol officers would spend one-third of their time on proactive behaviors.

Colorado Springs was experimenting with an innovative approach to using outcome measurement to improve police performance. The PASS (Police Accountability and Service Standards) model supported departmental performance assessment, linking the outcomes from systematic data collection projects with individual service standards for neighborhood policing activities and citizen satisfaction. For instance, one PASS project had focused on officer accountability for work time. Officers entered shift activities into the data base, and sergeants used the logs to monitor officers' use of time. The aggregate time data could then be translated into a departmental service delivery measure. When we visited, the department was still in the process of developing its measurement approach.

Colorado Springs was an example of a police organization striving to learn where and how to perform better in its most valued service areas. One of the lessons Colorado Springs learned with this method was that some of the department's early problem-solving successes were beginning to deteriorate. This was interpreted to mean that officers needed to work toward more sustainable positive outcomes. Officers referred to this idea as the "maintenance concept," and it was mentioned to us by personnel in all ranks throughout the organization. This indicated that the lessons learned from departmental assessment were permeating several layers of the organization—an indicator that with outcome assessment and communication of results, the organization could, indeed, learn from experience.

Conclusions

Performance appraisal is central to managing any organization's resources.[186] Appraisal systems improve employee performance by identifying opportunities for learning and enhancing motivation. In recent years, there has been a call for innovative ways to measure police performance. Implicit in this call is the need to match performance measurement both with what police *do* and with what they are *expected to do*.

A matching process is characteristic of quality performance appraisal systems. Community policing agencies are changing their expectations of their officers, sometimes shifting the entire organizational focus. For this to succeed, performance appraisal systems must be adapted accordingly. This process has not proved to be simple, but it holds the potential to advance implementation and improve police performance.

Several of our agencies had either changed or at least attempted to change their officer performance appraisal systems. Most commonly, they did this by including problem-solving behaviors in officer appraisals. This might seem obvious—expectations had changed, and officers now were being asked to solve substantive problems. Unfortunately, however, most departments were struggling to match their new expectations with performance measures. In too many agencies, officers were being asked to engage in new behaviors without benefit of appraisal systems that would guide, support, and reward change.

Agencies clearly were challenged by trying to identify which behaviors and outcomes to measure and how to measure them. Clear and precise job descriptions would have provided a good foundation, and professional job analysis is available to assist with this. Good performance standards are explicit about the level of performance expected for each job responsibility, and they articulate how the performance data will be measured and collected. A major performance appraisal challenge is to ensure that focus on the measures chosen leads directly to the behaviors that the organization intends.

Measuring what matters is not the only critical consideration, however. Police agencies must standardize the collection and use of measurement data to improve individual and organizational performance. Gathering information about problem-solving activities alone is unlikely to improve performance. The power lies in using that information to enhance officer learning and motivation. Police agencies and their employees need to be able to understand and learn from the information obtained from the appraisal process.

Experts acknowledge the pivotal role of supervisors, and policing research shows that first-line supervisors do indeed influence officer behavior. Police agencies must ensure that first-line supervisors, central to successfully implementing new appraisal systems, understand and are competent at conducting performance appraisals and using the results to benefit the department.

Police departments are certain to continue exploring different ways of changing their organizational structures to advance community policing. Performance appraisal systems, although somewhat neglected to date, might yet prove to be a catalyst for moving community policing reform forward. As long as police practitioners and scholars will share the lessons learned, the potential of performance appraisal systems still has an excellent chance of being understood and realized.

CHAPTER 8. Internal and External Communications

William Wells and Edward Maguire[187]

> *Community policing relies upon organizational decentralization and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate two-way communication between police and the public.*[188]

These words from Skogan and Hartnett outline a vision in which improved communication is one of the most important elements of community policing. The idea that police need to improve communication with the communities they serve is a central theme throughout the community policing movement. For instance, the Greenville Police Department's Community Services Bureau, in its 1998 annual report, emphasized the role of communication in developing partnerships and programs that increased the community's understanding of the role of the police, while addressing community perceptions or misconceptions of crime. Greenville's technique was to assign one or two officers to selected neighborhoods, business districts, and housing complexes, where they would meet monthly with the groups' representatives.

Community policing is implemented by focusing change efforts both externally (in the community) and internally (within the agency). Those efforts include elements such as building community partnerships and changing organizational structures. Shifting patterns of communication is an important element of external and internal change, one that can assist departments with community policing implementation.

Some changes can be implemented both externally and internally. Police communication is one of those. *External communications* occur between representatives of police departments and various communities outside the organization—for example, citizens, business owners, and other city agencies. *Internal communications* occur within the department, among officers, civilian employees, supervisors, midlevel managers, and administrators. Internal organizational change often includes the effort to develop or increase channels of communication between an agency's various individuals and groups.

In this chapter, we discuss the significance of external and internal communications for police departments and explain how communication issues were addressed in the 12 agencies that we studied.

The significance of external communications

The majority of police personnel spend a great deal of time interacting with clients outside their organizations. The nature of their communications differ in accord with position, but most police officials are expected to use communication and other behaviors to bridge the gap between their organizations and their environment. For instance, police chiefs communicate expressions of leadership internally, and they also communicate with constituents externally, outside the organization.

External communication is essential to implementing community policing. Quality communication is inherently a part of solving problems and of building and sustaining partnerships with various constituent groups, and it shapes how police agencies are viewed by those constituents. How the public perceives the police has direct bearing on its legitimacy in the community, which in turn affects the ability to carry out police functions.

Police organizations have a long history of attempts to improve communication with external groups, usually as part of a larger effort to improve police-community relations. In the 1960s, prominent commissions that investigated police conduct highlighted the need for police to reform external communications. Community policing departments responded by altering their operations and the expectations placed on officers, with the objective of improving police-constituent communications.

One of the community policing movement's most significant concerns affecting communication has been the spatial distribution of police operations. Reformers have pressed police departments to decentralize and to organize service delivery around social or natural community boundaries. In the past, police-imposed service boundaries divided otherwise cohesive neighborhoods. Recognizing existing boundaries is a step in the direction of improving internal communications among officers, investigators, and other personnel, and external communications between police personnel and citizens. Whether this change is producing the intended communication benefits has yet to be shown.

Communications are crucial for community policing agencies that want to establish and strengthen partnerships with external organizations. Partnerships among police, citizens, organized neighborhood groups, and other criminal justice and government agencies often set the explicit goal of increasing information flow. The intent is to increase and improve communication among all the partners about neighborhood conditions and multiagency strategic operations. Community policing reformers also have been asking police agencies to share power with community residents—to involve citizens in problem solving, asking the public to nominate problems for police attention, and to work with the police to craft and implement solutions.

The patterns of communication for community policing and traditional policing differ. Sharing power, a characteristic of community policing, demands that information be shared. Two-way, symmetric communication is an information exchange—a dialog—that opens opportunities for modifying relationships between police and external groups. The traditional police communication pattern has been one-way and asymmetric: The public passes (limited) information to the police.

The confluence of the goals of community policing with the potential outcomes of two-way, symmetric communication is striking. Communications scholars tell us that symmetric communication helps to build and enhance relationships because it entails

> *…creating a sense of openness, trust, and understanding between the organization and the key public, as well as a willingness to negotiate, collaborate, and mediate solutions to issues of concern to both the organization and critical publics.*[189]

Effective problem solving would seem to require two-way symmetric communication between police and constituents, including neighborhood residents, businesses, and service providers who could contribute resources to support responses. Such communication could enhance collaborative planning, problem identification, analysis, and prioritization. Information gained from two-way communication with a variety of audiences would give police a chance to hear a range of community perspectives and to gain a more comprehensive understanding of problems. This would position them far better to perform accurate analysis and to craft responses with a higher chance of success.

By involving community members early in the problem-solving process, police are more likely to accurately project how alternative problem responses might be perceived. When community members are uninformed and therefore apprehensive about aspects of a proposed response, that response may lose support or even generate opposition. When police anticipate community concerns, they can avoid such unintended consequences of problem solving.

External communication is not simply a means of improving one's public image. Public relations scholars focus on establishing and maintaining genuine, mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and the publics with whom they interact—not on manipulating public opinion. The facilitation of communication and cooperation between organizations and with individuals and groups external to the organization is a key element of public relations.[190] This concept is nearly synonymous with the partnership aspect of community policing. Thus, community policing agencies are encouraged to focus on public relations as a means of fostering communication and cooperation, not as a way to manipulate their public image.

The significance of internal communications

Community policing involves many organizational changes, including those aimed at improving internal communication. A host of formal organizational factors such as structures, rules, policies, and procedures will shape information flow. We will explore some of the more critical aspects of structures that are altered as police agencies implement community policing, especially those that affect the internal flow of information.

Community policing reformers claim that tall, rigid hierarchies impede organizational information flow. Police officers are like an army of information soldiers: Collectively, they are a vast reservoir of untapped information about the organization and its clients. Community policing reformers have argued that tapping into this information gold mine is crucial to becoming a more responsive organization, capable of self-learning.[191] They have urged police executives to reduce the depth of their hierarchies and to facilitate two-way communication.[192] As information moves up and down the agency, it is redefined, categorized, and otherwise modified; it rarely makes the journey from sender to receiver unaltered.

This is partly attributable to organizational structures. Police organizations typically are divided into functional divisions (e.g., patrol, investigations, and support services). Each division is further organized into smaller functional units. For instance, patrol is often divided into units responsible for particular time periods, functions (e.g., a specialized bicycle patrol squad), or areas. Specialized units tend to develop intensive internal communications systems, formal and informal, but they have problems with external communications. For that reason, reformers argue that community policing organizations need to become less specialized. They recommend that all officers become "uniformed generalists," prepared to respond to a wide array of problem types. In spite of reformers' urgings, however, evidence suggests that police agencies may actually have grown more specialized, not less, throughout the 1990s.[193]

The formal structure of an organization influences its pattern of communication, but informal structures such as police department cultures are equally influential. Police subcultures have been observed and discussed for decades.[194] Culture represents the interplay of elements in a community, including language, values, behaviors, stories, and legends.[195] Members of a community—for example, an organization, a gender, or a special-interest group—are often culturally similar. They may use a common language or jargon, share values, and rely on the same pool of stories and legends to guide their behaviors and outlooks. In turn, cultures are created largely through communication. Culture also has a profound effect on members' communication patterns; it establishes informal boundaries for the nature and duration of communications.

A primary aim of community policing is to reorient police culture away from the traditionally narrow focus on crime control, and toward a broader vision or mandate that includes service to the community. Internal communications both shape and are shaped by such a change.

Findings

Community policing reformers have anticipated that police organizations will change in ways that reflect the desire to improve communications, and that such changes will alter their communication patterns. We did not set out to assess communication patterns in police agencies, but this element emerged as an important focal point during our study. The evidence presented here cannot address all significant aspects of the role of communication in community policing. Compelling evidence of what, how, and why police agencies were communicating with the constituent groups that they worked with and served did, however, emerge from our data.

Community policing and external communications

Communication with citizens. For community policing agencies, establishing two-way, symmetric communications with neighborhood residents is perhaps the most important purpose of external communications. Community policing reformers advocate power-sharing between police and the community, with police and citizens collaborating to identify and solve problems. Quality communications are essential for this to succeed.

Community residents must have opportunities to voice concerns, and police must be available and attentive to receive their information. Communities must also comprehend the limits and ability of police to respond to the public's concerns. All of the agencies in our study were making efforts to communicate with neighborhood residents. Several had implemented strategies to facilitate communication with formal community groups.

- In Colorado Springs, police commanders were meeting regularly with a 20-member community advisory committee to hear its issues. (We did not assess whether committee members were in tune with the communities they represented.)

- In Portland, an advisory group for traditionally underserved (e.g., African-American and Hispanic) and other groups communicated directly with the chief, discussing their own issues and the directions being taken by the department.

- In Lowell, a police department civilian employee was attending meetings with a race relations council that had been established to build rapport with the nonwhite community.

- Similarly, the police chief in Naperville had established a minority citizens' advisory board comprised of minority residents employed by the area's major corporations.

Although we did not follow outcomes, the agencies showed by organizing formal advisory groups that they were making progress in breaking down communication barriers that had been isolating them from the communities that they served. Rather than delegating, several police chiefs were meeting personally with these groups.

For communication to lead to meaningful change, however, police leadership needed to use the information they received for strategic planning and analysis. This is far more likely to happen when those with authority to use information are receiving it directly. In the above cases, to the extent that constituents were accurately represented by advisory group members, chiefs were learning firsthand about their issues and concerns. The chiefs were also sending a strong message that community concerns were important to the department. That message might have been less credible had decision-makers delegated that responsibility down the chain of command.

The agencies expected employees to communicate with local groups such as homeowner associations and neighborhood watch chapters. Relying exclusively on established community groups has certain risks, however. A significant segment of the community may not participate and their concerns may not be represented by such groups. Police personnel must bear in mind that information obtained from organized sources may or may not accurately reflect the perspectives of the larger community. A detective in one agency astutely noted that community organizations represent select groups of residents; while they are good sources of information and assistance, drawing conclusions from those sources alone could point one in the wrong direction.

Some of the agencies had taken steps to improve information-sharing, but remained locked into a one-way communication pattern. Citizens were conventionally portrayed by some of them as "an additional set of eyes and ears" for police—certainly one benefit of improving police-citizen relationships, but not the only desired end. One-way approaches were limiting the ability of those agencies' to engage in dialog with citizens and to form meaningful, functional partnerships. In this way, those agencies were neglecting to encourage residents to take responsibility for events in their own neighborhoods. They were also failing to recognize and mobilize the variety of community resources that could be brought to bear on local problems.

The "eyes and ears" role for citizens may be important, but it is limiting. Personnel in one agency reported that its leadership had diverted external momentum to create a citizen oversight board toward establishing a citizens' police academy. The move transformed a potential platform for genuine police-citizen dialog into a venue for simple one-way communication, in which police informed citizens about how law enforcement works. That choice cost the agency an opportunity to learn from citizens and to become more responsive to their issues. This may have been an indication of minimal commitment in that agency to learning from constituents.

Although some agencies were establishing direct communications between leadership and constituent communities, we observed many others relying on designated employees as intermediaries. In Green Bay, community policing officers filled that role; in Hillsborough County, the role was given to community resource deputies. In Reno, sergeants were responsible for attending community meetings. Neighborhood liaison officers attended community meetings in Portland, and specialized community policing officers did so in Greenville. In the Lowell Police Department, two community liaisons worked with business and community groups. Newport News police officers had allocated 20 percent of their time for community contacts and problem solving, but the specialized high-intensity patrol unit reportedly was still handling most external communications.

Using specialized employees to improve communication with citizens can be effective, but the approach has shortcomings.

- First, specialized personnel may not be able to disseminate information from the community effectively and efficiently throughout the police agency. This would be especially difficult if formal, widely used communication channels are not in place. Information can all too easily be distorted or lost before it reaches everyone who could put it to use.

- Second, designated liaisons may not be authorized or well-enough informed to engage in dynamic two-way external communication. They may have too little knowledge about the department's efforts on certain issues or what other officers are doing to address particular problems.

- Third, appointing a designated liaison can cause other officers to deflect the responsibility for engaging and communicating with residents, undermining efforts to improve communications department-wide. Many opportunities to engage in open communication are likely to be lost, and with them, chances to forge meaningful police-community partnerships.

Some police agencies, including the majority in our study, had conducted citizen surveys to learn about their constituents' desires and opinions. To understand how this form of external communication worked in community policing agencies, we explored the uses of survey data and the communication of results.

- In Reno, the results served as an early warning system, identifying problem officers who needed more training.[196]

- Newport News had surveyed citizens to assess satisfaction with the department's phone reporting system, in part to determine whether officers were responding to all citizen calls.

We found evidence in some locations that citizen surveys could have been used more effectively.

- In Portland, one individual noted that survey results were neither influencing decision-making processes nor being translated for police officers.

- In Greenville, a supervisor claimed never to have seen that department's citizen survey results.

We thought that citizen surveys had probably collected useful information, but we had no systematic way of tracking how the agencies were using the data. The same was true with respect to the precise nature and content of communications between police and external groups. The evidence suggested which agencies were more open and willing to engage in two-way communication, but the quality and content of those communications remained something of a mystery, as did the extent to which the agencies were responsive to the information they had obtained. In one agency, an officer reported doing "dog-and-pony shows" at two or three community meetings each year. The simple fact that officers were meeting with community groups may have lulled agency leadership into a false sense of accomplishment; a failure to probe the substance of those meetings may have undermined the potential for communications to advance community policing.

Communication with community organizations. Community policing reform asks that police departments communicate closely with established community organizations, some of which may be tangentially related to policing. With enhanced communication, agencies can share information about problems and the resources that each group can bring to bear on common issues. Relationships among law enforcement agencies with overlapping jurisdictions are not new and are not only characteristic of community policing agencies. However, many such relationships have been marked by conflict and tension historically, undermining their effectiveness.

As would be expected, many agencies in our study had established formal relationships with other criminal justice agencies that served the same or nearby jurisdictions, including sheriffs' departments, probation and parole departments, and prosecuting attorneys' offices. We observed that community policing principles seemed to guide those interagency communications and partnerships.

- In Newport News, multiagency problem-solving meetings at the precinct level brought together a host of resources for addressing local problems.

- In Colorado Springs, a formal partnership[197] was able to focus many different resources that may not have been as readily available with traditional police responses on combating domestic violence.

- In Portland, a multiagency working group concentrated on solving problems related to sexual assault.

- A multiagency partnership involving the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office coordinated communication for homeland emergencies.

Information-sharing is a common characteristic of multiagency partnerships. In fact, enhanced communications are an important result of such partnerships, which may open new channels of communication between police and a variety of government agencies. In Concord, monthly district meetings were affording police and other city agencies opportunities to learn about the many public services in the area and about problems in the community. The Concord meetings stressed interagency cooperation. We attended a meeting at which a local residential facility presented information about its services, and a homeowners' association was able to discuss concerns with the several city agencies that were in attendance. Thus, the meetings were an opportunity for police and city agencies to engage in dialog with concerned citizens.

In Newport News, the Code Enforcement Division and the police department had been communicating about common issues for about 10 years. For example, the division had educated police about how to recognize property violations, and code enforcement inspectors and police officers jointly conducted inspections. The department was experiencing communication problems with other city agencies, however. One department employee explained that other agencies "did not understand what the police were doing," implying that more or better communication might help develop more functional partnerships.

Many agencies that we visited had opened channels of communication with businesses and the groups that represented them.

- The Newport News, Naperville, and Colorado Springs police departments had entered into partnerships with the management of apartment complexes, increasing the two-way flow of information about problems within the complexes and about potential solutions.

- Officers in the Naperville Police Department attended annual auto dealers' meetings to understand the dealers' concerns and to share law enforcement information about auto theft and managing problem employees.

- Officers in Colorado Springs had helped organize a group of local retailers who then shared information about shoplifters with police investigators and with one another. This group used a private Internet site to communicate its concerns and current events. For their part, the officers claimed that improving communications had fostered stronger relationships between police and participating businesses.

Researchers have known for some time that police agencies routinely communicate with one another about policing innovations.[198] The data from our study reinforced this finding, as we heard about several instances of idea-sharing.

- The Green Bay Police Department had participated in regional meetings at which officers shared information about local problems and various problem-solving techniques.

- A Reno police lieutenant had visited five other police departments to learn about their use of area-based command structures.

- Newport News, as a member of the Community Policing Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, was receiving and sharing information about community policing through the association.

- Concord was serving as a community oriented policing demonstration center that assisted other agencies with community policing efforts.

- Billings was part of a regional group of community policing agencies that assisted other departments with change efforts.

These agencies' activities represented just a few of the ways in which information about policing innovations was being transferred.

Organizational adaptation and external communications. Our interviews and observations revealed that the police departments in our study had made structural changes in their organizations to facilitate the flow of information to and from their constituents. For example, some had begun assigning officers to geographic areas for extended periods to increase the quality of the officers' interaction and communication with local individuals and groups—a goal considered important by most managers, first-line supervisors, and patrol officers.

In Billings, Portland, Greenville, Naperville, and Concord, officers indicated that with district-based assignments, they were able to learn more about persistent local concerns. That approach had been adopted both in agencies using the specialized community policing approach (Green Bay) and in those using the generalist approach (Knoxville and Billings). In Concord, an employee indicated that the beat assignment system "was the best thing they had done," although one officer noted that being expected to attend community meetings on days off had resulted in a decline in morale.

Several agencies were establishing community substations, another popular innovation that presented opportunities for enhanced communication. The Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office considered community-based stations to be a major component of its community policing effort; the stations were viewed as a place where nonthreatening police-community interactions could occur. Employees in the Billings, Greenville, Naperville, Newport News, and Concord police departments all mentioned that police substations throughout their communities were providing new venues for police to communicate with citizens. (The nature of such communications has yet to be explored.)

Whether or not substations were intentionally being used to develop better two-way communications between police and constituents is open to question. We commonly observed citizens filing police reports at substations; no doubt, the locations were more convenient, but report-filing is a traditional communication strategy, not an innovative communication enhancement. Some agencies staffed substations with civilians and volunteers rather than with sworn officers. One agency was using its substation as a storage unit, although an officer there indicated that when a police car was parked in front, people did tend to stop and talk.

When police improve communication with external groups and citizens, do they learn and improve their functioning based on the feedback they receive, or do they react by isolating themselves even further from public input?[199] Some evidence suggested that the community policing agencies we visited tended to be more responsive than reactive. In Colorado Springs, police employees acknowledged that they had once considered external groups to be threatening, but no longer did. In Reno, employees also indicated that community relationships once had been poor, but police now genuinely wanted more community input. Those agencies appeared open to external suggestions for change, and they seemed willing to seek and use outside information for that purpose.

In Knoxville and Hillsborough, police leadership acknowledged the positive public response to community policing when making officer assignments; their awareness of and responsiveness to public feedback was a potential indicator of agency responsiveness. Evidence also suggested that communities had come to value the presence of specific officers in their midst. Commanders, aware of the strong, positive relationships, had become more reluctant to reassign those community resource deputies to different locations. That phenomenon was observed at several departments.

The Knoxville Police Department had made an effort to connect with the community by hosting an annual crime conference. Residents were invited to attend and discuss their needs and possible solutions; the department considered this information when it established goals. Knoxville also included citizens in police recruiting. While Colorado Springs was developing service standards, 10 citizen focus groups were convened to offer input and feedback; one department employee indicated that minority citizens were well-represented in the process.

The Lowell Police Department had probably evolved more than any other agency in the years immediately preceding our study. We observed that Lowell had become a more open agency, demonstrating a willingness to communicate with and listen to groups inside and outside the department. One Lowell employee acknowledged that the department now was truly listening to citizen complaints. The new channels of communication that had been opened appeared to be partially responsible for the changes.

Overall, we found encouraging evidence that the community policing departments were becoming more responsive. The definitive answer to this question was left open and deserves further investigation.

Community policing and internal communications

Many with whom we spoke during this study explained that organizational changes to facilitate communication were made specifically to advance community policing. Two findings were of particular note, since they shed light on the purpose of internal communications and helped us understand why community policing implementation and the effectiveness of problem solving so often seemed to fall short of its potential.

Information-sharing about community concerns and projects. In the agencies we visited, internal communications were geared toward sharing information about community concerns and problem-solving projects. The agencies had a host of sources for learning about community problems, including residents, police reports, calls for service and arrest data, other city agencies, and patrol officer insights. To address resident concerns and solve problems, however, that information had to reach the individuals responsible for responding, and it had to arrive at its destination relatively intact. Information loses its impact if it is distorted (or lost) before reaching those who will actually use it.

In the agencies we studied, information often had to pass through several internal communication channels before reaching the officers who needed it. When information becomes delayed, distorted, or lost before it reaches its destination, one of the consequences is that the public will experience the agency as not responding (or not responding appropriately) even though it has been given the information to do so. Organizational factors that affected patterns of internal communication affected the quality, for better or worse, of every agency's problem-solving efforts.

In the Lowell Police Department, captains were responsible for solving problems. They generally relied on data generated by crime analysts, but they also communicated with community liaisons, picking up additional information that might otherwise have been missed. Lowell was not tracking problem-solving projects, however, so we inferred that project information was not formally being shared among patrol officers. That would leave officers with little chance to learn how others in the department might be responding to problems similar to ones they were encountering. They also were less likely to know when and how to share relevant information from their own problem-solving experiences, information that could have helped others.

In some agencies, information about community problems had to pass through several organizational layers before reaching individuals responsible for its use.

- In Portland, commanders passed information to a specialized neighborhood response team, which in turn passed it to patrol officers. This provided several opportunities for information distortion and loss.

- In the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, community resource deputies were expected to learn about problem residences from patrol deputies and crime analysts; reportedly strained relations between the two deputy units could be predicted to affect the quality of this information transfer.

- In Newport News, code enforcement inspectors worked closely with police sergeants, and sergeants passed relevant information on to officers.

When relying on informal channels of communication, the potential for losing data further increases. This increases the likelihood that the organization will be less responsive or less appropriate in its response than it could be. That was particularly true in places where we observed tensions among the parties that were constricting communication flow through informal channels. That could prove particularly critical in agencies with a specialized community policing model, in which only designated officers are formally responsible for problem solving and community engagement. The departments in our study clearly recognized the strong potential for communication problems associated with a specialized approach.

Instituting community policing behaviors. The second function of internal police communications is to equip and encourage officers to engage in community policing behaviors. When a department implements community policing, clear, direct communication is critical for an officer to understand and deliver what is expected, and for the organization to grasp and respond promptly to officers' concerns. Effective internal communication offers learning opportunities both for individuals and for the organization as a whole. Certain agencies that we studied had problems in these areas.

- In Billings, personnel indicated that the organization had failed to inform sergeants that they were expected to solve problems.

- In Reno, officers apparently knew how to solve problems, but they needed additional motivation to do so.

- One Newport News police employee said that problem solving was not promoted in that agency; either the department was not actively pursuing problem solving, or it was not clearly communicating its problem-solving expectations to officers.

As organizations initiate community policing, they can expect and prepare for some degree of internal resistance to change. Paying attention to the ways in which the agency directs the flow of information would be a highly effective investment in advancing community policing. The Newport News Police Department learned this lesson early in its process. The previous chief had begun planning for community policing by involving individuals from different ranks, but first-line supervisors were excluded. That exclusion predictably created resentment among sergeants and friction throughout the department. Many in the department commented on this as having been a critical error in their community policing implementation plan.

The lesson learned in Newport News is, in part, that first-line supervisors have a pivotal role in promoting community policing reform.[200] Our study data reinforced this. We found that first-line supervisors knew best what officers were actually doing about problem solving and community engagement. Sergeants are the ones who have and must use this information, and they are the ones who can then respond in accord with departmental expectations. This does not always happen.

- In Reno, where sergeants were responsible for encouraging problem-solving activity among their officers, communication problems between the two ranks appeared to be inhibiting their effectiveness.

- In Concord, corporals were facilitating community policing and encouraging officers to solve problems and communicate with citizens; however, one manager indicated that the deputy chiefs and sergeants who should have been problem-solving mentors needed to become more effective communicators.

Some departments had found effective ways to involve supervisors.

- The Colorado Springs Police Department held annual meetings with first-line supervisors to discuss issues of importance, giving these critical players the opportunity to learn from and share information with others in the department.

- In Portland, the police chief demonstrated his commitment to hearing sergeants' perspectives and acknowledged their position of influence within the agency when he personally presented information on community policing to them.

Facilitating internal information flow. The departments in our study had made organizational changes to facilitate the internal flow of information. Some had created formal groups or conducted focus meetings to encourage communication on a variety of issues. Rather than rely entirely on informal channels, those agencies were taking steps to ensure that information would be shared when important issues emerged.

In the Portland Police Department, for instance, an internal advisory committee was organized to address persistent under-valuing of work performed by nonsworn personnel in the department. Also in Portland, a group of citizens and police employees from across department ranks organized to communicate with the police chief about the direction he was taking the department. In the Colorado Springs Police Department, formal internal groups had been meeting to consider issues related to diversity.

All of the agencies were relying on crime analysts to inform them about community problems and police activity. Most analysts had the capability to generate and share information about arrest trends and calls for service, by geographic area and by shift. For example, the Reno Police Department held crime analysis meetings twice weekly to discuss problem-solving projects. In Naperville, crime analysts provided officers with beat-level data about crime and disorder trends. Similarly, Newport News crime analysts had been assigned to precincts to help officers; as hoped, according to police personnel, close proximity had increased the communication occurring between officers and analysts. Overall, we found that crime analysts working in police agencies were sharing useful information with department personnel. (The ultimate value of that information would depend on how it was translated and used in decision-making. Answering that question was beyond the scope of this study.)

Some agencies had used employee surveys as an internal communication medium. The significance of this, for our purposes, was that agency leadership was soliciting information from employees that could be used to improve agency functioning. In the Knoxville, Portland, Colorado Springs, and Concord police departments, personnel reported using internal surveys for this purpose.

- In Knoxville, internal surveys were conducted to shed light on why officers were not using the services of crime analysts.

- The Portland Police Department surveyed officers, seeking their insights for strengthening community and other external partnerships.

- Colorado Springs used a survey to compare officers' and citizens' perceptions of police services, hoping to understand the differences and to improve services. Officers in Colorado Springs also had been surveyed for their opinions on various deployment strategies.

- In Concord, as in Portland, tensions existed between sworn and nonsworn employees; the department surveyed both groups to learn more about the matter.

Many of the agencies held regular staff meetings to facilitate the flow of information about community problems and solutions being pursued. Unlike CompStat meetings, which gained notoriety in the New York City Police Department in the mid-1990s, the meetings held by these departments seemed genuinely to be for the purpose of communicating, not for singling out individuals to hold accountable for problems. For instance, in Billings, the police chief met twice a month with lieutenants and crime analysts to discuss community problems and solutions. Similar meetings were occurring in other agencies, including Concord, Knoxville, Lowell, and Newport News. Such meetings served to remedy problems associated with over-reliance on informal communication channels; those channels could become neglected over time, resulting in distorted and lost information.

The agencies were using several other strategies, as well, to ensure that information was communicated internally and that their organizations had opportunities to learn from within. In Newport News, officers being transferred spent a week riding with another officer to become familiar with their new precincts. In an attempt to capitalize on experience within the agency, the Knoxville Police Department over-promoted individuals to the captain rank and rotated them through different assignments, giving them opportunities to learn from their predecessors. We observed these and many other attempts being made to improve internal communications.

Limitations of internal communications. During our study, we encountered several of the more common limitations of internal communications, none of which will come as a surprise to most readers. Understanding the nature of those limitations can help police organizations consider alternatives during structural change. Paying attention to overcoming them can enhance internal communications and advance community policing.

In general, internal communications across functions, shifts, and geographic areas of assignment all are inherently limited in important ways. Some of the agencies we visited were making the effort to work around those limits. Several departments reported communication obstructions between shifts. Knoxville had responded by rotating shifts, helping officers to become familiar with assigned geographic areas at differing periods of the day and week. In Naperville, fire stations maintained log books for police officers to record significant events

occurring during their shifts, and those who followed could refer to the logs for updates. Naperville also used a database program, *Beat News*, for beat officers to record relevant happenings, including crime trends and neighborhood gossip; the database became the medium for disseminating information across shifts.

The departments also reported difficulty communicating across functional divisions. Agencies with specialized community policing officers (e.g., Green Bay and Hillsborough) seemed aware of the importance of sharing information between officers about problems, and they had attempted some solutions. According to a Green Bay employee, information started to flow between patrol and community policing officers once the specialized officers proved that they had valuable information to share. This was an instance of informal information-sharing fostering continuing communication. When we visited, Greenville's specialized officers were reported to be working well in their department, largely because of the quality of cooperation already in place. The Hillsborough agency was still looking for solutions.

We observed some instances in which spatial decentralization had been used to facilitate information-sharing. That is, functional divisions were sharing responsibility for a specific geographic area and working together in a single building. This typically meant that some combination of investigative functions, crime analysis, and officers was assigned to a specific geographic area with the objective of enhancing communications across functions. The belief was that those involved would develop a comprehensive perspective on the problems to be solved and would collaborate on potentially effective solutions.

Spatial decentralization was reported to be successful in some agencies, but at the cost of a perceived loss of expertise. Police personnel in both Knoxville and Lowell indicated that investigative expertise had suffered when the experts were dispersed. In addition, some in the Lowell Police Department claimed that colocated officers and detectives still were not communicating effectively. On the other hand, the department experimented with different models when Knoxville considered spatially decentralizing some investigative functions, and personnel there determined that spatial decentralization did increase communications.

Culture. Occasionally, some individuals in an agency would declare that their department supported an environment in which open communication could occur, while others in the same agency would say that the departmental culture was limiting opportunities for communication. In Billings, a department employee reported that some officers had mentalities that were not conducive to attending community meetings, where it was necessary to sit and listen to residents' concerns. Personnel in another agency suggested that sergeants were not receiving support from their managers for community policing; given the crucial role of those sergeants in facilitating community engagement and problem solving, this was an important concern.

In Portland, personnel mentioned that the organizational environment had gotten more informal, and this was beginning to allow information to flow up the ranks as well as down. In the Concord and Naperville police departments, as well, informal environments were mentioned as having increased opportunities for communication across ranks. In those agencies, chiefs and other police administrators were perceived as approachable. However, in the Lowell Police Department, some perceived that informality had eroded traditional lines of authority—that accountability had been undermined by the freedom of individuals to communicate outside the formal chain of command. Departments serious about increasing organizational information flow would benefit from attending to such issues, even those that seem mundane. Informal norms are among the factors that can severely constrain information-sharing, and the opportunity for the organization to learn from within is ultimately limited when communication channels are constricted or blocked.

Technology. In most of the police departments we visited, technological advances emerged as an important theme in external and internal communications. (See Chapter 5 for more on the role of information technologies in community policing.) One agency seemed particularly to be lagging behind in this respect. It did not have voice mail capability and officers had not been given beepers or mobile phones. All other agencies in the study seemed to have adopted technologies that supported efficient information-sharing.

Some agencies, including the Knoxville, Concord, Newport News, and Portland police departments and the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, had taken advantage of technologies that would allow officers with laptop computers to receive detailed crime information in the field. As one person pointed out, however, technology is not an end in itself. In the Naperville Police Department, an employee reported that technological innovation in the department was outpacing the officers' ability to make use of it.

The appropriate role of technology is to provide timely, relevant information to officers to support excellence in decision-making and functioning. In Concord and Knoxville, among others, electronic mail (e-mail) was credited with facilitating internal communications, especially between officers and investigators. Other agencies, such as Colorado Springs and Portland, had set up secure intranets to facilitate intra-agency communication.

Conclusions

Changing patterns and modes of communication is an inherent and inevitable element of implementing community policing. Unfortunately, systematic information describing police communication patterns and their importance for community policing remains largely unavailable.

Examining issues related to communications was not an original goal of our research. In the course of the project, however, it became apparent that communication was an issue of significant concern to community policing agencies. The group we studied had devoted considerable time and resources to improving both internal and external communications to advance community policing.

We found that the agencies were relying on external communications to share information about police activities with the various communities that they served: businesses, other government agencies, and citizens. The agencies also communicated to learn about issues of concern to those groups. The people we interviewed stated clearly that quality communication was necessary for building and strengthening meaningful partnerships. Public relations scholars argue that genuine dialog is one of the most the most effective ways to build and manage relationships. External communication is much more than what is commonly referred to as "public relations" or "image management."

Community policing advocates genuine collaboration with citizens, in contrast to thinking of constituents merely as an information source. One-way communication is unlikely to produce the kinds of partnerships that community policing agencies want and need. In addition, police organizations must consider whether internal mechanisms are in place to receive information and to channel it efficiently to those who can interpret and use it. Problem analysis would benefit from improved internal and external communications. Failure to consider such processes may undermine an organization's ability to learn from its environment and ultimately to be more responsive.

The community policing agencies that we studied had examined their internal communications and had adapted their organizational structures and processes to increase the flow of information. Some had attempted to remove conditions that were inhibiting communication between functional divisions by spatially decentralizing crime analysis and investigations and by making geographically determined assignments. One strategy was to place investigators, analysts, and patrol or community policing officers in closer proximity, creating an environment in which information-sharing came naturally and was inherently rewarding. Wherever they found communication barriers, the agencies had attempted to break them down to improve police functioning and service delivery.

 Personnel in several agencies acknowledged that occasionally first-line supervisors and officers did not receive or correctly interpret messages about their administrators' desires— their priorities pertaining to community engagement and problem solving, for example. This is the kind of difficulty that innovative communication approaches may alleviate in the future. These departments all had attempted to become more learning-oriented, as they were soliciting employee feedback and ideas, forming issue-oriented work groups, and involving more personnel throughout their ranks in decision-making. The ultimate goal of enhancing communications for all of them was to improve police service delivery.

Billings, Montana Colorado Springs, Colorado
Concord, California Green Bay, Wisconsin
Greenville, South Carolina Hillsborough,
County, Florida Knoxville, Tennessee Lowell,
Massachusetts Naperville, Illinois Newport
News, Virginia Portland, Oregon Reno, Nevada

Part Two:
Case Studies of 12
Community Policing Agencies

CHAPTER 9. Billings, Montana

William Wells and Alex Robinson

When we visited Billings, Montana, in July 2000, the Billings Police Department was serving a city of approximately 100,000 people with 121 sworn officers. During the 1990s, the department had been led by four different chiefs. In 1992, the city hired its first community policing officer with a Housing and Urban Development grant. The chief at that time had become interested in the potential of community involvement after a group of residents organized successfully against local hate-related incidents. Soon afterward, six more community policing officers were hired with a grant from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Community policing was underway in Billings.

The evolution of community policing in Billings

Billings began its community policing effort using a specialist model with designated community policing officers. Several years later, the department changed direction. In 1998, within about 6 months of having been hired, Chief Ron Tussing led the transition to a generalist model. He expected all of his officers to become community policing officers.

During our site visit, Chief Tussing summed up his philosophy this way: "You're not doing community policing if you [just] have officers called community policing officers." He intended to institutionalize the community policing philosophy. Some personnel with whom we spoke said that it was too early to say whether the generalist approach would work in Billings. One manager suggested that it might not be possible across the entire city to replace conventional, more authoritarian practices with the flexibility required for community policing.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. Once the generalist model had been implemented, all Billings police officers were expected to engage in problem-solving activities. They were given the freedom to pursue projects without prior permission from supervisors. The department was not requiring officers to document their problem-solving efforts, but for supervisory reasons, mandatory documentation was future possibility.

Police officers were identifying community problems in Billings in several ways, drawing upon interactions with victims and business owners, calls for service, reports generated by the department crime analyst, and the officer's own research. One lieutenant was reviewing computer-generated data daily to determine how best to use police resources. A crime analyst was regularly examining reports looking for trends and distributing information bulletins. The department had not centralized its information on nonincident problems, but the analyst was tracking gangs, gang-related activities, and Part I incidents.

Billings' chief and lieutenants met weekly to discuss events of concern and potential solutions to problems. They most commonly dealt with issues such as incidents at bars, false alarms, property and drug crime, and the city's transient population. Officers were addressing such problem situations with nontraditional responses.

The following was given as an example of problem solving in Billings. A local bar had become a source of trouble in the neighborhood, mostly through the actions of one particular employee, a bouncer. The police apparently had a good working relationship with that bar's owner and its other employees. In this instance, a sergeant simply discussed the situation with the owner, and the troublemaker was fired. Other bar owners, however, were less willing to work with police. An officer remarked that one in particular showed a lack of concern for neighborhood problems being caused by transient customers as long as his place was making money. When trouble occurred under circumstances like that, officers reverted to threats of formal sanctions to gain the necessary cooperation.

In another example, community members had contacted a patrol officer about an unsightly vacant lot. The officer's investigation found that, to the surprise of its current managers, the neighborhood YMCA was the "negligent" property owner. When it heard about this, a local company had offered to clean up the property for a reduced fee, and the city cleaning department donated time to help. In a similar case, the police partnered with a group of high school students to remove graffiti in public areas; a local business donated paint for the project. The Billings department had also participated in public information campaigns to raise community awareness about domestic violence. On another occasion, experiencing an unusually high volume of false-alarm calls, the agency turned to a national committee for possible solutions.

Outcome assessment, the final phase of problem solving, was not a strongly represented component of community policing in Billings. Some personnel attributed this to the chief's emphasis on the *means* used in problem solving rather than on *ends*. Formal training on the SARA problem-solving model might have helped, but this was not happening, unless one counted the efforts of the one lieutenant who described the model to all of his sergeants. A Billings lieutenant told us that officers either did not assess their work or they were failing to document their assessments. One manager believed that change would only happen when the department clarified its recognition and acceptance of the fact that not every attempted solution would succeed, and that simply reducing problems and calls for service would be considered a sign of progress.

Although limited, then, we did observe evidence of problem solving in Billings. Officers were using a variety of information sources to identify problems, and they were relying on collaborative partnerships to generate nontraditional responses. Nevertheless, training, problem analysis, and response assessment were not routinely happening. A significant disincentive— officers' problem-solving skills and outcomes were not being reflected in the agency's performance evaluations.

Community engagement. Some Billings police managers expressed frustration with a lack of information about ways to increase community cooperation; others thought the community's level of willingness to work with police was fine as it was. At the time of our study, six community task forces were active in the city, some of them vocal advocates for community interests. Task forces received operating funds from the city. One had organized in response to widespread concern with traffic safety. Another task force reported having 150 members, about 85 of whom were active and regularly attended meetings.

The amount of interaction between community task forces and the Billings police was unclear. One task force member described the group's function as "bringing problems to the attention of the police." Officers were expected to attend task force meetings in their areas of assignment, but some indicated that they had not been formally assigned or directed to do this, so they did not interact with the groups. Some believed that the responsibility for attending task force meetings had been assigned to specific sergeants and a liaison officer. A police manager acknowledged that police officers were not the only ones falling short of meeting their information-sharing goals: Task force members were not always communicating directly with other area residents. The department apparently had not yet found the best way to inform residents about the task forces' work. This effort appeared still to be a work in progress.

Designed as another way to increase contact and cooperation between officers and area residents, COP Shops are small neighborhood-based stations. The department's COP Shops had been operated by the Billings Community Crime Prevention Council (CCPC), which managed the city's traditional crime prevention programs. Then the council went bankrupt and the program's resources were shifted to the police department. CCPC had experienced dramatic changes after 1998. When we visited Billings, the previous CCPC director had just been replaced. For the moment, the department was taking responsibility for prevention programs such as the McGruff House, the national Operation ID, neighborhood watch, and an auto theft prevention program. We were told that police were just now beginning to "get things done" in conjunction with the council.

One community task force member reported that Billings citizens favored COP Shops as a place to get direct access to officers and to complete reports. A COP Shop had been established in donated space within a grocery store. Another was located in a large shopping mall. In the latter case, mall security personnel were delivering lost items and suspected shoplifters to the COP Shop, as well as directing crime victims to go there. That location was often overlooked by the public, according to a volunteer, because it was outside the main mall; still, we heard that increasing numbers of citizens were showing up there. A third hard-to-find COP Shop was located behind another shopping center; again, the out-of-the-way location was partially blamed for its lack of use and difficulty attracting volunteer staff.

Relationships between police and other city departments appeared to be mixed. A few personnel reported conflicts between police, the city's administration, and the county attorney's office, but most reported that these relationships were healthy and that the city administrator and city council supported community policing.

The Billings Police Department worked with other law enforcement agencies in the region, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the FBI, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). According to one officer, the level of information-sharing among those agencies was "great."

Organizational adaptation. Chief Tussing had taken several steps toward institutionalizing community policing. Under his leadership, the department had adopted a generalist model, flattened its organizational structure, changed to a geographically based system of deployment, and redirected routine tasks to civilians to free officer time for problem solving.

In flattening the organizational structure, Tussing had eliminated the assistant chief and captain ranks. One deputy chief oversaw patrol and operations, and another directed investigations and support services. Sergeants became the department's front-line supervisors, overseeing nine officers each. Some thought the ratio needed changing—sergeants were often too busy to stay aware of events occurring in their assigned areas.

Billings had only about 12.5 officers for every 10,000 residents. That comparatively low resource level was attributed to the fact that Montana had no state sales tax. Several Pacific Northwest police departments of similar size had higher officer-citizen ratios. In Washington State, for example, the city of Kent had 25 officers for every 10,000, Vancouver had 20, Yakima had 17, and Everett had 19; by comparison, Boise, Idaho, had 15 officers for every 10,000 residents and Eugene, Oregon, had 14.

Department personnel also perceived a gap between staffing resources and workload. The statewide crime rate in 1999 was close to 4,000 index crimes per 100,000 residents. Billings' crime rate was approximately 7,500 per 100,000 residents, higher than the rates in other regional cities—6,700 in Great Falls, 4,800 in Boise, and 4,300 in Cheyenne. Reportedly, during one summer month in 2000, a single district in Billings had averaged 180 calls a day. One officer commented that the demanding workload prevented officers who wanted to problem solve and work with community residents from doing so. A Billings lieutenant indicated, however, that officers were not problem solving and engaging more with the community because they had become "programmed" to wait for calls before responding.

The perception of having scarce resources led some to question whether the generalist model of community policing was the best approach for Billings. Some believed that the department had abandoned the specialist model mainly as a tactic to put more officers on the street.

Shifts and zones. Billings assigned officers using a district-based deployment system of day, afternoon, and night shifts. The department had divided the city into three districts, each led by a lieutenant, and nine beats, each supervised by a sergeant. Patrol officers' beat assignments remained stable for at least one year. The chief met weekly with the lieutenants to keep abreast of events taking place in the districts.

The goal of this deployment scheme was to develop better relationships between police and their customers. One Billings lieutenant told us that he found community policing good for

meeting each neighborhood's needs. Officers explained that district-based deployment worked well in that they were becoming more familiar with their areas and more likely to detect and understand the underlying conditions related to recurring problems.

One patrol officer indicated that district assignments were allowing officers working in each area to get better acquainted and to form better working relationships. Patrol officers expressed a sense of case ownership; as one put it, officers could "work a case until they couldn't work it anymore," and then would follow up with detectives. Still, some agency personnel thought that district-based deployment might not work in all areas of Billings, depending on the nature of the local problems and situations.

Managers generally agreed that Chief Tussing was supporting creativity and decision-making autonomy for lieutenants and sergeants. Lieutenants as district leaders had wide latitude. They were described as "minichiefs" who could make patrol and personnel decisions for their districts, authority that had not been afforded them under previous chiefs.

Similarly, sergeants were giving patrol officers the discretion to respond to problem situations without first getting permission. One sergeant indicated that he had given a "tremendous amount of freedom" to the patrol officers in his command. An officer agreed with his claim, noting that officers on patrol were indeed working with little oversight. (No one commented on the potential for problems that might arise from lack of oversight.)

Some thought that the department needed to do more to convince sergeants to use their authority and creativity to solve problems themselves, and that a lack of organizational communication was responsible for their reluctance to assume that responsibility. In other words, some believed that sergeants were not using their decision-making authority because either the message had not been clearly communicated or it had not been heard. Still others believed that decision-making needed to be pushed even further down the chain of command to line-level officers.

Civilian volunteers and employees. To help conserve officers' time for community policing, the Billings department had shifted routine tasks to civilians. Volunteers staffed three community COP Shops, taking citizen calls and serving as points of contact with the department. Volunteers sometimes returned calls to citizens who had contacted the department's main communication center when the caller's situation did not require that an officer be dispatched. Volunteers were finding the public receptive to their help, but a lieutenant thought that Billings residents still expected responses from an officer and noted that changing public expectations would be a long-term effort.

Officer training. The department's community policing training strategy corresponded with the department's generalist model—all officers participated. New officers were trained at the statewide police academy. Some had been dissatisfied with the academy's program, geared toward more rural departments, and Billings began sponsoring its own intermediate and advanced community policing training sessions. Chris Braiden, a recognized community policing trainer, had conducted a well-received program for the department earlier in 2000.

Performance assessment. Chief Tussing believed that patrol officers ought to be evaluated on decision-making, and at least one patrol officer with whom we spoke agreed, objecting to being evaluated solely by measures such as numbers of arrests and tickets. The chief told us that the agency had found little external guidance for developing good performance measures. Administrators were getting frustrated with unsuccessful attempts to measure officers' problem-solving efforts. Quality performance assessment was needed, and it had to start with accurately measuring how officers were doing their jobs—a difficult undertaking. It was clear that like many others, the Billings agency was struggling to find a workable way to accomplish this.

Change in the Billings police department was not being achieved without resistance. According to one manager, younger officers were even less willing than their older counterparts to engage in problem solving, and the attitude of night shift officers was something like "let the day guys clean up the mess." We also heard that a few officers had mentalities that were "not conducive" to sitting through meetings with citizens, and that the department was still trying to change that.

Answers to our questions about whether the public was willing to embrace community policing were mixed. One manager indicated that public buy-in was less of a problem than the internal resistance attributed to "the old mentality" in the department; but a higher-level administrator indicated that the opposite was true. The coexistence within Billings' police leadership of such vastly differing viewpoints suggested that perhaps the department as a whole lacked consensus and a clear understanding of the obstacles to institutionalizing community policing.

Nevertheless, overall the managers believed that organizational change had been well received. They understood that fully institutionalizing the ideals of community policing would take time.

The future of community policing in Billings

Chief Tussing believed that the police department would continue to progress toward institutionalizing community policing. He viewed it as an ambitious undertaking, one that could take a long time to complete. One officer described community policing as a plan that is never fully implemented, one that involves setting and meeting new objectives and continually building. From that perspective, implementing community policing would have neither a clear beginning nor an end.

A few in Billings suggested that the generalist model might not be best for the city and that alternative implementation models might need to be explored. Some personnel mentioned that the department already was exploring a different policing model that would assign specific tasks to teams of officers.

Postscript (March 2001). Several months after this report was completed, we got an update on what had happened with community policing in Billings. We found that the police department had indeed changed direction. In January 2001, the department adopted a team-based approach. The city was split into two districts, each supervised by a lieutenant. Supervisors and police officers were assigned to specific geographic areas for a full year. Twelve teams had been formed, six in each district. Each team had five or six officers, supervised by one sergeant.

CHAPTER 10. Colorado Springs, Colorado

William Wells and Mike Wells

Community policing became a focus of the Colorado Springs Police Department (CSPD) following a city-initiated police study project in 1982–83. The project sought ways to make police operations more efficient and to address the growing crime problem. Then several years later, during a period of declining state tax revenues, CSPD's staffing level dropped to 1.7 sworn staff per 1,000 residents. More than 90 percent of officers responding to a survey at the time believed that the agency had too few patrol officers to respond to calls for service.[201]

Relief came in 2001 in the form of a voter-approved public-safety sales tax. The next year, 70 new recruits graduated from the CSPD academy. When we visited, the CSPD was employing 653 sworn personnel and more than 250 civilians; they were serving approximately 375,000 residents.

The evolution of community policing in Colorado Springs

The appointment of Chief James Munger in 1985 jump-started community policing in Colorado Springs. Chief Munger led a significant reorganization effort, decentralizing police operations into three geographic commands and creating a neighborhood policing unit. Like many other police agencies, the CSPD had learned about community policing by sending police managers to conferences and inviting prominent community policing leaders to Colorado Springs to give presentations. Over time, community policing in the city continued to evolve and grow.

From 1991 to 2001, Chief Lorne Kramer and an influential deputy chief instituted changes suggestive of a generalist model of community policing. For instance, Chief Kramer moved decision-making to lower levels in the organization, emphasizing individual empowerment, and he continued to decentralize command. In 2002, Luis Velez replaced Kramer as chief. Velez intended to continue institutionalizing community policing. The organization remained willing to take the risks inherent in implementing innovative ideas and strategies.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. As early as 1992, the CSPD had been promoting and encouraging problem solving at all organizational levels. Problem solving as an operational philosophy was pilot-tested by a single division. When analysis of the pilot results showed promise, the department adopted the approach agency-wide. Officers were asked to identify problems and make independent decisions about how best to solve them, in the belief that the process would become more effective as officers gained experience in exercising discretion. Department leaders understood the risk they were taking. They believed that some failures were inevitable, but that the benefits of increasing officer effectiveness would justify the risks.

The problem-solving model that developed in Colorado Springs could best be characterized as a hybrid, with elements of both generalist and specialized approaches. Established in 1985 and restructured in 1993, each neighborhood policing unit (NPU) was led by one of the two sergeants assigned to each of three police divisions. The NPUs' primary function was to apply the SARA model to problem solving in their neighborhoods. NPU officers facilitated contact between the community and the police department, and they served as a point of contact for all problem-solving projects.

Although the entire department was taught and encouraged to practice problem-oriented policing, NPU officers appeared to be the driving force, leading most projects, while patrol officers provided support. One patrol officer acknowledged that all of them should have been more aware of the NPUs' work, but another countered that patrol officers had too little time to be able to focus on problem solving. As was the case in other departments relying on specialized community policing officers, friction was apparent between the two groups.

Nevertheless, Colorado Springs police leaders were seeking to embed problem solving and individual empowerment in many levels across the department. Detectives who conducted vice and narcotics investigations were encouraged to approach cases with a problem-solving perspective and to try innovative responses. In one instance, a case detective had been given wide latitude to deal with several problems in a difficult geographic area. He had been selected for the assignment because department personnel believed that he was especially well-suited for innovative problem solving. Rather than rely on reactive strategies, the detective responded by increasing communication and fostering a relationship with residents in the immediate area. Despite some initial struggles, he reported, the response had paid off with some important drug arrests, and it had improved community relationships with the police.

As evidence of the department's commitment to problem solving, a 2001 study conducted by an external consultant documented more than 750 CSPD problem-solving projects occurring between 1995 and 1999.[202] Problems in those projects were identified primarily by analyzing police data; a few were raised as concerns by community members or other groups. Problem solving in general was being directed at disorder and quality-of-life situations, such as excessive calls for service and traffic problems. We found that officers had tried a variety of responses, and were not relying solely on traditional police strategies.

Following the 2001 study, CSPD acknowledged that it needed to strengthen the assessment phase of problem solving. The department was finding that some of its initial successes were dissipating, and it began looking for ways to maintain positive outcomes. Giving attention to sustaining results was recognized by the department as a form of assessment.

New CSPD police recruits were being introduced to problem solving through problem-based learning. The innovative alternative to task-oriented training provided officers with a more general set of tools to use across a wide variety of situations. With assistance from the Police Executive Research Forum and the Reno, Nevada, Police Department, CSPD replaced its field training program with a police training officer (PTO) program. The PTO program set aside

the task lists commonly used in field training for real-life problems that recruits assessed and attempted to solve.

In the police academy, new recruits were receiving this training. Each completed a neighborhood portfolio that encouraged and reinforced the problem-solving process. Anecdotally, training personnel reported that patrol officers who had completed the PTO program were relying less on their supervisors when solving problems in the field.

Community engagement. CSPD maintained several formal partnerships with community groups. These included business and neighborhood associations, an active clergy, apartment complex managers, retail associations, social service providers, and other law enforcement agencies. They also included hundreds of smaller neighborhood and block groups that communicated local concerns to the department. According to CSPD, in one division the number of neighborhood watch groups had nearly doubled in a 3-year period. To facilitate communication, officers maintained e-mail lists of all block-watch captains and key community contacts.

CSPD also helped create citizen advisory committees that met with area division commanders monthly or bimonthly. Their purpose was to allow the community and department representatives to share concerns and ideas. A number of success stories emerged from these partnerships; at the same time, some department personnel reported that power-sharing with the community could be difficult.

Improving communications and cooperation with the various communities that made up Colorado Springs was one of CSPD's primary objectives during Chief Velez's tenure. The department requested that each month, officers make at least two community contacts with neighborhood or business watch groups, schools, senior citizens, Police Activity League participants, or similar groups. Lists were posted with information about upcoming community events and contact information to help officers meet those goals. The idea was to facilitate patrol officers' greater community engagement and development of problem-solving projects. We could observe the evidence of such police-community partnerships.

Overall, police partnerships with other city departments were less strong than those with community groups. One exception was notable, however: DVERT—the Domestic Violence Enhanced Response Team. Since 1996, CSPD had been using an innovative, team-based approach to the problem of serious domestic violence. The multidisciplinary group of representatives from 13 agencies sought to identify those at greatest risk for serious domestic violence and to craft a comprehensive plan to ensure their safety.

DVERT members represented community diversity; they included, for instance, a full-time CSPD detective, a full-time prosecuting attorney, and representatives from women's shelters and children's services agencies. Team members worked from shared space in a separate building from police. That choice was made to facilitate communication, close working relationships, and victim cooperation. Colocation also served to create a sense of equality among the individuals on the team.

At the time of our visit, DVERT was carrying a maximum load of 75 cases. In arriving at decisions on individual cases, the group considered information and recommendations from all team members. Interagency information-sharing in domestic violence cases is uncommon and challenging: The personal information involved is sensitive, and a legacy of mistrust often exists between law enforcement and women's advocates. Yet each of the 13 agencies represented on DVERT had signed agreements permitting them to share case information, providing that the victims agreed. This alone was a remarkable breakthrough in community agency partnering.

Organizational adaptation. In 1985, the CSPD had reorganized into three geographically based commands. The department was planning to carve a fourth division out of its largest geographic command by 2005. Operations were decentralized: patrol, neighborhood policing units, property crime detectives, accident investigators, and crime analysts, among others, were assigned to each division. Only person-crime detectives remained centralized.

The geographic division commands were partitioned into quadrants with patrol beats. In 1998, the department moved its management services bureau to the office of the chief, leaving the department with two bureaus—patrol and operations support, each led by a deputy chief. Three lieutenants served under each division commander, and sergeants served as supervisors for line-level staff. Shift coverage was determined by computer software using calls-for-service data, but division commanders could at their discretion adjust the computer-based deployment models.

In an innovative organizational move, in 1996 CSPD had switched lieutenants from shifts to having 24-hour functional responsibility for their areas. The disadvantages of that arrangement soon became apparent, and after another year, the department restored shift-based assignments. One manager thought that the department had benefited from the short-lived innovation. The lieutenants had acquired a more global sense of responsibility during the experimental year, and that continued to serve them well. The department was planning to rotate assignments for sergeants beginning in 2004, believing that they, too, could benefit from a broader perspective on policing roles.

To allow sworn officers to focus on community policing, CSPD had employed 250-plus civilians and had given some responsibilities to more than 300 volunteers. Civilians were employed to manage human resources, planning, police information technology, and fiscal services sections. Civilians were not yet handling nonemergency calls for service, but the possibility was being discussed. More than 20 volunteer interpreters had completed 15 hours of training and were answering crime-stopper phone calls, supporting patrol officers and serving as a communication bridge between the community and the CSPD. Volunteers were also deploying the department's four "smart trailers" on the street to deter speeding.

Innovative performance measurement. Conventional management wisdom holds that employee performance evaluations ought to be aligned with explicit performance expectations. In 2002, in one patrol division, the CSPD tested an innovative approach for measuring organizational performance and increasing accountability. PASS (Police Accountability and Service Standards) is a comprehensive model that involves citizens in identifying the services they want, helping to guide the department in setting service standards. Using PASS,

the department's long-range planners had identified seven general categories of service standards, and they set goals for each standard. One goal, for example, was to obtain a more comprehensive assessment of organizational performance, moving beyond traditional measures of police performance and drawing from multiple sources of data.

One analyst characterized PASS as an internally focused problem-solving model that addressed the police organization itself. A CSPD lieutenant noted that with the use of PASS, the department's focus had shifted to organizational goals and performance, and individual accountability began to matter less. The PASS model did hold officers accountable for how they spent time on patrol. Officers in the test division electronically logged all of their time, every shift. Patrol sergeants reviewed the time logs to assess officers' behavior and discretionary use of time. We observed this in action; while we were there, a patrol sergeant who was reviewing time logs and writing notes to patrol officers called for a meeting with one who had not adequately accounted for his time. The PASS model gave supervisors tools for monitoring problem-solving projects and directing officers toward specific problem-solving tasks. A supervisor told us that this level of supervision had been impossible before PASS was implemented.

In part because it began with citizen needs, the PASS model had the potential to reduce differences between community expectations and organizational performance. The CSPD conducted frequent citizen surveys in an effort to understand public expectations and the factors that affected the public's evaluation of police performance. Officers were involved in developing PASS, and incorporating their ideas into the model gave them more buy-in. The CSPD continued to conduct internal surveys of police personnel, as well, as part of PASS implementation.

Apparently technology limitations had somewhat compromised the model's effectiveness. A lieutenant told us that the department was working to incorporate a wireless server to facilitate real-time supervision. Other new technologies were expected to help achieve PASS's underlying goals, such as increasing time for officers to spend on problem solving and responding to calls, increasing information flow, and improving data quality.

The future of community policing in Colorado Springs

The Colorado Springs Police Department intended to continue using the generalist model of community policing, distributing responsibility throughout its organization, even in areas thought to be resistant to change. The department was in the process of identifying those areas to focus its change efforts. Chief Velez believed that the notion of individual empowerment would need to be part of that process.

The department was also seeking to "measure what matters." Agency leaders were interested in identifying the most highly valued *organizational outcomes*. This would enable the agency to emphasize and measure departmental results rather than count individual activities. With the PASS model in place, the department had already begun implementing this approach.

Finally, Chief Velez indicated an ongoing need to engage more fully with the Colorado Springs community and to learn from community members.

CHAPTER 11. Concord, California

Charles Katz and Michael Kelly

Concord, California is 40 miles west of San Francisco and 65 miles south of Sacramento. Thirty square miles in size, Concord is geographically fairly small. At the time of our research, its population was just above 112,000. The majority of residents were White (82 percent), followed by Asian and Pacific Islanders (11 percent), Blacks (2 percent), and others (5 percent); approximately 13 percent were of Hispanic origin.

Concord residents enjoyed a relatively high average household income ($60,000) and were well-educated, with almost 68 percent of the workforce having attended college and 42 percent having an undergraduate degree.

The evolution of community policing in Concord

At the time of our site visit, the Concord Police Department had 155 sworn officers and 114 nonsworn personnel, 61 of them full-time. The majority of officers (70 percent) worked from the Field Operations Division, assigned to patrol, traffic, or special enforcement duties. About 25 percent were assigned to the Support Operations Division working in units such as Gangs, Narcotics, D.A.R.E., and Persons. The remaining officers (about 5 percent) worked in the Administrative Services Division conducting training, crime analysis, and crime prevention.

Throughout the 1980s, the department had taken pride in using traditional policing strategies to "kick ass and take names." Then in March 1991, Los Angeles police were videotaped using excessive force in the arrest of Rodney King. In 1992, in the aftermath of that incident Concord Chief Robert Bradshaw and others began planning for the redirection of the agency. Bradshaw established the Participative Management Task Force to develop a strategy for implementing community policing. During the next 2 years, task force members evaluated the department's underlying philosophy, its mission, vision, and values, and its service delivery issues. Task force members researched community policing and developed a training strategy for officers.

The task force presented its plan, and the department began agency-wide community policing training in 1993–94. The training consisted of visits by officers to other police departments with a national reputation for excellence in community policing. At the same time, the department began surveying the Concord community to understand the public's priorities for police services.

Taking an aggressive approach, in a short time the Concord Police Department itself came to be viewed as a national model in community policing. In 1997, still under Bradshaw, the agency was awarded a much-coveted grant from the Advancing Community Policing Demonstration Center Program, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office). Under the grant terms, Concord worked with nine other U.S. police departments, helping them implement community policing.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. All Concord police officers were expected to use problem-oriented policing (POP) techniques. In the police academy, recent recruits received POP training; during field training, they received hands-on experience. More experienced officers were trained (or retrained) by the Police Executive Research Forum and other consultants hired through the COPS Office. We often heard officers and administrators saying that they had been "trained to death" in community policing.

Every sub-beat officer was being encouraged—in some cases required—to complete up to three POP projects a year. On-duty corporals would cover sub-beat officers' calls for service to free the officers' time for working without interruption on their projects. Initially, officers were evaluated haphazardly on POP, but more recently the department had begun evaluating district commanders by the number and quality of POP projects in their districts. This put real pressure on sergeants, corporals, and sub-beat officers to engage in and document POP projects.

Concord's POP capacity was enhanced by crime-analysis system upgrades that enabled the capture of crime statistics all the way down to the sub-beat level. The local data helped sub-beat officers scan for problems and assess their efforts to solve them. For example, officers could view the top five locations for calls for service in their areas, and the number of index crimes reported by crime type. They could compare their sub-beat's most current crime statistics with those of prior weeks and with those for the rest of the city.

When problem solving a particular issue required more time than usual, the department's Special Enforcement Team (SET) stepped in. SET was created by the city council as a way to add police resources for solving major problems, such as gangs and drugs, that were plaguing the city. The team, staffed with 11 officers and one sergeant, was deployed whenever a problem came to the attention of the district or operations commanders or when a sub-beat officer requested SET assistance.

Concord had completed a series of POP projects just before our team arrived. The Virginia Lane Project, located in an area of high-density low-rent apartment complexes plagued with gangs, drugs, and violent crime, was one of its first and most successful efforts. After the department analyzed area problems, it responded by cracking down on social disorder (e.g., loitering, street-level drug sales, public intoxication) and cleaning up physical disorder, and it targeted chronic offenders for eviction. The police department, leisure services, the parks department, public works, apartment managers, and the community development agency all worked together in carrying out this project. Afterward, project analysis showed that the collaborative effort had in fact significantly reduced criminal activity, which in turn reduced the amount of police resources normally needed to serve the area.

The Concord department had several other major POP projects underway. For example, local shop owners had been complaining about day laborers loitering on their properties, waiting to be transported to jobs. The department was collaborating with the shop owners and with

other city agencies to create labor zones where workers could wait without disrupting the local shops. Problem analysis had also shown that repeat domestic violence offenders were accounting for 45 to 55 percent of Concord's incidents and that many victims did not know how to get help. The department had formally partnered with the district attorney's office, a local battered women's shelter, the chamber of commerce, and probation and parole in joint efforts to reduce the problem; it was developing a plan in which police and the district attorney's office would make a priority of targeting repeat offenders and referring victims to appropriate assistance programs.

Community engagement. The Concord Police Department valued community partnerships, as we have seen above, and was promoting community oriented government citywide. District partnership committees fostered formal partnerships between city departments, other public agencies, and community-based organizations, bringing stakeholders together to discuss neighborhood problems and to develop effective responses and resources.

The district commanders and a city representative co-facilitated monthly meetings in each district. Typically, department representatives served as members—patrol sergeants assigned to the district commander, sub-beat officers within the district, and detectives from major units such as Persons, Property, Juvenile, and Special Investigations were candidates. The city's representatives came from organizations such as Housing, Parks, Neighborhood Preservations and Code Enforcement, Public Works, Traffic Engineering, and the city attorney's office.

With the shift to community governance, city departments had made organizational changes aimed at decentralizing city services. The number of departments had been reduced from 10 to 8, and 21 positions were eliminated, 10 from management. Several city services were reallocated to front-line service providers who were given greater decision-making latitude.

To increase its responsiveness to citizen needs and priorities, the police department was administering annual citizen and business surveys. These focused on such issues as quality of life, satisfaction with police, fear of crime, effectiveness of police strategies, and perceptions of crime and disorder. Survey data were being used to assess how well the department was meeting its own annual objectives. For example, in 2000, an objective was set for 85 percent of those surveyed to rate their districts as "safe." Districts that scored lower would be developing and carrying out a plan to address their underlying problems.

The department was using media to reach out to the community, producing *Street Smart*, a crime-prevention television program broadcast twice monthly on a local public access channel. The show focused on neighborhood crime problems and crime-prevention techniques. Residents could call in to ask officers questions, and program hosts announced "Concord's Most Wanted." A city survey indicated that 25 percent of Concord's residents had watched the program.

In other public involvement efforts, the department had established neighborhood and business watch programs and a citizen police academy. The crime watch programs served as a way for community members to gather to discuss local safety and law enforcement issues. Sub-beat officers attended the meetings and helped members solve problems. The citizen police academy gave the public an insider's view of the agency. The 12-week academy sessions surveyed the department's functions and operational procedures covering topics such as arrest laws, narcotics enforcement, community policing, and gang investigations.

Yet with all that Concord was doing to invite community involvement, the department had stopped short of organizing a civilian review board. Such a board would have included community members in decisions involving citizen complaints against officers. Instead, the department retained the more traditional closed-door approach—the internal professional standards unit for investigating complaints against its own.

Organizational adaptation. From 1994 through 1996, the Concord department had made several organizational changes to support community policing. It had altered the command structure, modified how the agency prioritized responses to calls for service, and adjusted officers' geographical deployment and shift schedules. From 1997 through 2000, Concord continued reorganizing. The sub-beat system was adopted, dividing the city into 48 geographical areas, one officer in each sub-beat responsible for its community policing activity. Field offices sprung up in each district, staffed with part-time civilians.

Not all of these changes went smoothly. Reportedly, the union had mounted strong resistance to community policing. In early 1999, it polled officers on Chief Bradshaw's performance. The results were negative, largely centering on his efforts to implement community policing. With the union's findings in hand, the city council delivered a vote of no-confidence; Chief Bradshaw left office in late 1999. In early 2000, the council chose Chief Ron Ace from the Reno, Nevada Police Department—another strong supporter of community policing—to replace him.

Concord had been divided into three community policing districts. Boundaries were drawn using existing landmarks boundaries (e.g., major roadways) balanced with data on calls for service and time needed for serving the area. A district commander and an operations commander, both lieutenants, were responsible for each district. Commanders managed quality-of-life issues; they attended community meetings, acting as resources, facilitators, and liaisons between the department and community. They also worked with the operations commanders to determine deployment priorities. Operations commanders were responsible for most operational duties, such as shift management and fielding calls for service.

Concord had decided that the department needed still smaller, more manageable geographic policing subdivisions. Using data analysis of calls for service and workload, it had divided each district into two beats, each managed by a corporal and a sergeant. Beats represented identifiable communities—a business area, a specific cluster of high-density multifamily housing, or a residential neighborhood. Corporals managed community policing activities,

training patrol officers and working with them on community policing projects; they reported to the district commander. Sergeants managed noncommunity policing operations such as calls for service; they reported to the operations commander.

Each beat was further divided into eight sub-beats; sub-beat officers were responsible for community policing issues. When not responding to calls for service, sub-beat officers were facilitating problem-driven meetings, performing directed patrol in sub-beat hot spots, and assisting other city departments with problems in the sub-beat. When a neighborhood problem arose, citizens contacted the sub-beat officer for help with finding a solution. The sub-beat system was intended to encourage "co-ownership" among the community members being served and the neighborhood officer.

Since community policing had come to Concord, the department had sharply increased the number of civilians working there. Three new positions had been created: administrative clerk, dispatcher, and community service officer (CSO). At the time of this study, Concord's 114 nonsworn employees accounted for 38.5 percent of staffing.

Administrative clerks worked in the records department, filing and disseminating information. Dispatchers worked in the communications unit, receiving calls for service and other dispatch calls. Most community service officers (CSO) worked at district offices, taking reports from citizens who walked in to report a crime. CSOs also analyzed crime-trend data for district commanders or citizens, on request. These positions were created to relieve sworn officers from the more time-consuming and tedious aspects of reporting, to give them time to perform community policing and problem solving. It appeared that in Concord, this strategy was working: In 1999, CSOs had processed 40 percent of all reports for the police department.

Also in an effort to free additional officer time for problem solving, the department had created the Volunteers in Police Service program. Sixty volunteers were working a required minimum of 16 hours a week; they were generally assigned to headquarters, district offices, and neighborhood patrols. Those assigned to headquarters performed administrative duties such as data entry and extraction, or they worked with specialized units performing specialty assignments. Those assigned to district field offices greeted and met with residents who walked in seeking assistance. They helped process resident requests and fielded inquiries related to their neighborhoods (e.g., number of calls for service, sex offenders registered), and referred residents to appropriate police departments and other community resources.

Some volunteers received 40 hours of advanced training; working in pairs, they wore uniforms and drove marked vehicles. They were assisting officers with police reports pertaining to misdemeanor thefts and vandalism and conducting neighborhood patrols. Neighborhood patrol volunteers performed home checks, assisted with traffic and crowd control, and helped collect residential and commercial security survey data.

Concord's police union had resisted civilianization, particularly the volunteer program. Our interviews led us to conclude that union management may have generated some of the anxiety among officers about civilians taking over their jobs. To help counter those worries and to build good working relationships, volunteers were posting photographs of themselves with short biographies, hosting coffee-and-bagel breakfasts for sworn officers, and organizing potluck dinners where officers and volunteers could get acquainted. Most of our interviewees reported that this was helping, that officers were realizing that having civilians and volunteers taking police reports and doing other lower level tasks gave sworn staff more time for concentrating on their professional law enforcement responsibilities.

The future of community policing in Concord

Concord's agency administrators told us that they were expecting next to work toward the goal of decentralizing investigations. They anticipated that detectives would be redistributed from headquarters into the three district offices, a move they expected to instill a sense of geographic ownership in the investigators and to strengthen the relationship between investigations and patrol.

The department was also exploring the possibility of formalizing its relationship with Concord's neighborhood associations. Neighborhood watch groups had been forming and disbanding in reaction to their rising and dissipating sense of criticality at any given moment. The department thought that formally partnering with the associations might foster a stable, more reliable working relationship, perhaps displacing members' crisis-driven activities with a longer range perspective on neighborhood order and safety that could include prevention and earlier problem solving.

CHAPTER 12. Green Bay, Wisconsin

William Wells and John Fisher

In 2000, when we visited Green Bay, it had a population of approximately 100,000 and was the third most-populous city in Wisconsin. The Green Bay Police Department had 195 sworn officers at that time.

The evolution of community policing in Green Bay

Community policing was introduced in Green Bay in May 1995 under former chief Robert Langan. Five designated community policing officers (CPO) had been assigned to specific neighborhoods. When we arrived, Chief James Lewis was at the helm, and 18 Green Bay CPOs were serving in nine neighborhoods.

To facilitate the practice of community policing, Chief Lewis initiated significant organizational changes. He enjoyed the support of city administrators and had the able assistance of key police managers. Local media were widely publicizing the CPOs' problem-solving efforts. In August 2000, two Green Bay community policing officers earned the Herman Goldstein award and national recognition for their accomplishments.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. Award-winning Green Bay CPOs earned national recognition for their leadership and work in rehabilitating what had been a disorderly and dangerous part of the city. This project represented the department's most complex and significant problem-solving effort. The Broadway section of the Fort Howard community had long generated more calls for service than any other area. The department had been pouring personnel into the area in response to calls for service for so long that officers had developed the tendency to dismiss its problems—it was "just Broadway"—and behaviors were overlooked that would not be tolerated anywhere else. To turn this around, the CPOs needed to change both the public and the internal perception that Broadway's problems would continue to be ignored. The department's determination to reduce the volume of calls for service in the area developed in 1993–94. From that time forward, the law would be enforced.

About this same time, the department had become aware of progressive tactics in use at the San Diego and Madison police departments. A group of Madison officers came to Green Bay to make a presentation and two Green Bay officers attended community policing school. After being trained, the two new CPOs were assigned to Fort Howard. They were granted the freedom and discretion to work the Broadway area as they saw fit, applying community policing techniques.

The CPOs identified several bars located within a block of each other as sources of the worst of the violence and a thriving drug trade. Those Green Bay residents and businesses that could were vacating or avoiding this area. Those who remained were upset by the growing criminal activity, the kinds of businesses (e.g., bars and an adult bookstore) that were moving in, and the increasingly negative public perceptions of their community.

Early in the project, the police and the city attorney's office formed a problem-solving partnership. One of their first goals was to strictly enforce violations occurring in area bars. Initially, one city attorney's commitment proved too weak to be effective. By our arrival, that individual had been replaced with a city attorney who worked closely with police. They described him as "a real bulldog" who supported them well.

The two CPOs organized area residents and encouraged them to attend city council meetings. The resident response was so overwhelmingly positive that the council had to move the meetings to a larger facility. This was a critical moment in the department's problem-solving effort, a step toward the community policing goal of helping the community "to [help] take care of itself." As a result of collaborative action by the community and police, several problem bars were cleaned up or closed. The adult bookstore had also closed, and the building was demolished. Several new businesses were thriving on Broadway. The initial problem that led police to focus on the area had been reduced: The number of annual calls for service from the Broadway area declined from 2,000 in 1993 to about 950 in 1998.

Green Bay's other problem-solving projects may have been smaller in scope than the Broadway effort, but they were important to the communities that benefited from them. For example, CPOs conducted sting operations using vehicles donated by a local auto dealer, ran background checks on potential tenants for landlords, and closed a salon that was serving as a drug distribution point. The department also initiated a landlord-tenant program and a nuisance-abatement program.

Officers were using a variety of information sources to identify problems, including e-mail messages from citizens and contacts at neighborhood centers. Most problems continued to be identified by analyzing calls-for-service data. Department administrators wanted to increase the ability of lieutenants to obtain timely, detailed information about problems occurring in their own zones. Lieutenants began meeting regularly with the patrol and community officers who worked in each zone, and this helped. New computer software that would facilitate the information flow was expected to arrive soon.

Community engagement. As we saw above, community engagement was a vital part of the department's most publicized community policing success. Residents in other neighborhoods were becoming more active in bringing problems to the attention of the department.

As another example of community engagement, Green Bay touted its partnership with the probation and parole office. Police officers accompanied parole officers on home visits to enforce violations. The visits helped them uncover information that otherwise would have been missed.

Organizational adaptation. Within months of being hired, Chief Lewis made several organizational changes. He flattened the hierarchy by eliminating the assistant chief, deputy chief, and sergeant ranks. The department reduced the number of police zones from 12 to 10 and permanently assigned lieutenants to the zones. Lewis launched a field training program,

revised standard operating procedures, instituted a testing-based promotion system, organized a citizens' academy, and initiated production of legal, information, and training bulletins.

All of those changes seemed to be well-received in the agency. A few individuals believed that change had occurred too rapidly and had been too extensive, however. The example was given that following the reorganization, CPOs were receiving comparatively little supervision and guidance from the lieutenant to whom they all were assigned.

Chief Lewis believed that the police union and contract had been critical obstacles to his agenda for organizational change. He had faced the union in 42 court cases; he had won 41 of them. In his view, the union had slowed the movement to bring civilians into the department and hindered new training programs. For instance, the contract had prevented the department from hiring a qualified civilian to replace a retiring manager of the computer systems. In an apparent victory for Lewis, however, 12 sworn officers then working in communications positions would soon be reassigned when the county took control of communications; afterward civilian staff would fill those positions.

When community policing first was discussed in 1995, some Green Bay managers resisted the idea. Some in the agency credited Chief Lewis with strengthening the movement. Progress was also aided by the timely retirement of a number of opposition managers and by the institution of a test-based promotion system. Some patrol officers initially resented that CPOs appeared not to be carrying their share of the workload since they were not required to respond to calls for service. That perception began to change as CPOs started sharing information from their own experiences with detectives and patrol officers. Information sharing was reported to have developed into a two-way flow, to and from CPOs. Even with increased information sharing, however, problem-solving collaborations between CPOs and patrol officers were rare.

As resentment declined, openings for CPO positions began generating an ample number of applicants. Nevertheless, CPOs told us that occasionally they still were subjected to other officers' animosity. Some attributed this to differences in how CPOs were managed. Flexibility is viewed as a job perk; the CPOs greater ability to determine how they did their jobs was believed to contribute somewhat to the limited acceptance of community policing within the agency. Clearly, some of our interviewees did not view the organizational culture as entirely positive. During our visit, we observed few interactions between CPOs and patrol officers.

Green Bay's CPOs had graced the cover of the city's annual report shortly before our site visit. City hall was a key supporter and facilitator of community policing. The mayor was viewed as a strong ally. His support was reflected by the fact that the police department was the only city agency in recent years that had been allowed to hire new personnel.

Community policing officers.[203] Green Bay's model of community policing had been founded on the assumption that time spent responding to calls for service was time taken away from community policing—that responding to calls for service would put a roadblock in the way of CPOs' success. When community policing first was introduced, one supervising lieutenant determined that he would prevent that from happening. Exempted from responding to calls for service, CPOs were free to devote their time entirely to solving persistent problems. That lieutenant was considered a critical contributor to the promotion of community policing in Green Bay. In addition, CPOs were not counted toward the department's minimum patrol staffing requirement so as not to create shortages in other services. When we visited, the department had 18 CPOs working on two-person teams across nine communities.

Community policing training in Green Bay was limited, informal, and tended to occur on the fly. CPOs attended regional meetings where discussions about problems and problem solving took place. They attended the department's roll call and received in-service training and training bulletins. A new CPO resource manual had been published, but no community policing training manual existed. The department recognized the importance of managerial support and the need to prepare managers to promote community policing principles, but it was still exploring potential training resources.

Most department personnel believed that the key to successful community policing would be to minimize supervision and especially to avoid micromanaging officers. CPOs worked flexible hours, managing their own workloads and prioritizing the problems that came to their attention. They were free to change their schedules and to dress as needed to do their jobs. A police manager noted the importance of CPOs thinking on their own and having sufficient discretion to get the job done.

Finding the right balance of supervision and independence was not always easy. When community policing was introduced in 1995, one lieutenant was supervising five CPOs, spending about 2 hours per shift on the task. He believed that this was too little. Yet when we visited, one lieutenant was charged with supervising and evaluating 18 CPOs, spending more time, not less, on supervisory oversight. He was expected to meet monthly with each CPO and to conduct all 18 annual evaluations.

A few months before our arrival, CPOs had started filling out problem-solving sheets meant to help the lieutenant track their work, but they had not been directed to do this regularly. They were required to write brief monthly newsletters to update residents and the supervising lieutenant on events taking place in each beat. Chief Lewis expected his CPOs to be able to speak intelligently about events and conditions in their beats and to explain how aspects of the beat had changed due to their efforts.

Police managers were aware of the risks associated with the latitude given. One manager emphasized that employee integrity was crucial for the system to work; officers so inclined might work less than the expected 40 hours a week. CPOs recognized and valued the freedoms they enjoyed, however, and peer pressure to preserve those benefits by doing a thorough job was evident.

Shifts and zones. CPOs were assigned to specific geographic areas for 12-month periods. Patrol officers were assigned to one of four work shifts and were responsible for one of 10 geographic zones. Before, geographic assignments had been erratic because officers were assigned to zones for variable periods. Now a lieutenant commanded each zone across morning, day, and evening shifts, and that lieutenant was the direct point of contact for zone residents.

Lieutenants had the discretion to assign either CPOs or patrol officers to work particular problems. This system allowed commanders, CPOs, and regular patrol officers to communicate closely about events occurring in their areas. The ultimate goal was for commanders and officers all to have in-depth knowledge of their areas of assignment. Agency personnel told us that the system was working, and the new computer software expected soon would further increase the information flow and help with problem identification.

Lending support to the claim that community policing was operating in Green Bay, a police captain had been authorized to initiate the current deployment system without prior approval from Chief Lewis. The captain first studied the way that officers had been working zones. He had discovered that during one 28-day period, 28 different officers had worked in a single zone; no one had had a chance to understand the area, its inhabitants, or its problems. Starting with one shift, the captain moved to permanently assign officers to specific zones. Eventually this system was adopted on all shifts.

The future of community policing in Green Bay

The Green Bay Police Department was planning to expand community policing to assign more CPOs and to serve more neighborhoods. Because the department viewed information sharing as a key aspect of problem solving, at least one commander believed that citywide implementation would be a daunting goal. The arrival of new computer software was expected to play a critical role in the continuing expansion of community policing in the city.

CHAPTER 13. Greenville, South Carolina

William King and Randall Shields

In the mid-1970s, the Greenville Police Department adopted innovations that set the stage for the later emergence of community oriented policing (COP). By 1999, Greenville had grown into a medium-sized police agency with 217 full-time employees. Its community oriented policing efforts also had grown and evolved.

The evolution of community policing in Greenville

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, building on earlier innovations, the Greenville Police Department developed a formal version of COP. Like others implementing COP at that time, Greenville had to decide how it would organize and implement the complicated and sometimes confusing strategy—how to identify and actually resolve pressing community problems, how to inform and engage the community, and how to restructure the department to support the effort from within.

As often happens, the department's first formal version of COP was influenced by other police organizations. Greenville's chief first visited the Houston (Texas) Police Department to learn about that agency's program, and then returned to implement COP in Greenville. The department started with a four-officer unit. A year later, it doubled its size. In 1991, in a major reorganization Greenville consolidated COP activities within its Community Services Bureau (CSB).

Apart from its early emulation of the Houston model, Greenville's version of COP appeared to be relatively home-grown. Some officers had been trained at the Carolinas' Institute for Community Policing. When we spoke with COP officers, they made no mention of other departments having influenced them or of having contacted other departments to discuss community policing.

By our visit in August 2000, Greenville's community policing efforts, still centered in the CSB, had grown to more than 30 officers and 2 civilians. Community patrol officers had been assigned to residential and business communities and housing complexes. They were attending community meetings to learn about local concerns and to inform residents about police department activities.

Five other groups of specialists in the CSB were contributing to COP activities:

- In 1975, Greenville had assigned an officer to crime-prevention duties; this position had been relocated to the bureau.

- In 1991, bike patrols were formed to bring patrol services and community interactions to Greenville's downtown area.

- School resource officers provided law enforcement, counseling, and information to students and school employees.

- After becoming disenchanted with D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), Greenville organized its own drug-and-alcohol-resistance education program for school children (Community Officer Drug Education, or CODE).

- The bureau employed a civilian community recreation coordinator who organized youth sport activities and holiday toy runs for local children.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. Unfortunately, we were unable to collect meaningful information on problem solving or to compare the approach of COP/CSB officers with that of regular platoon patrol officers because of time constraints. We also were also unable to talk with supervisors about problem-oriented policing practices, or to observe interactions between platoon and community patrol officers.

Community engagement. Greenville community patrol officers were a vital link between the department and area businesses, schools, and residents. CSB officers were expected to be in close contact with their respective communities and to attend community meetings. Some reported attending meetings weekly; others reported attending a couple of meetings a year.

CSB officers had cell phones and pagers. They also had supplies of attractive trading cards with their pictures, a motto, and contact information. The officers reported that the trading cards were popular, especially with local children, and served as a good ice-breaker with community residents. One officer had introduced a Spanish-language driver's manual to the Hispanic community to familiarize Spanish-speaking drivers with South Carolina's motor vehicle laws. Overall, Greenville officers appeared to be active in engaging residents and others in community policing efforts.

Greenville's community policing benefited from a responsive city government and cooperative community organizations. The officers' ability to resolve pressing neighborhood concerns, like removing abandoned cars, relied on cooperation from other city agencies. Officers told us that the mayor's motto was "neighborhoods first." The city had helped close troublesome nightclubs with aggressive code enforcement, and it had conducted Weed and Seed operations in deteriorating neighborhoods by buying tracts of land and building houses, then selling the homes to lower income residents. Overall, CSB officers reported, the city had been helpful in the effort to improve Greenville.

Likewise, various local organizations had worked closely with police to bolster their community presence. For example, an organization called Within Reach employed community organizers and outreach specialists to work with the police and neighborhoods to make improvements. Within Reach had provided community officers with their police trading cards. A number of officers commented that without the participation of the city and local organizations, many of their efforts could not have succeeded.

As part of the community policing expansion, three part-time substations were opened throughout Greenville, available to all Greenville officers. One also housed a part-time nurse who served community residents. The police department's primary 24-hour facility, the Justice Center, provided space for a number of specialized police department units, including the CSB, and the facility was shared with the county sheriff. A part-time annex was co-occupied by the city court.

In support of the effort, Greenville's specialized community policing unit paid close attention to internal communications and supervision, and matched incentives to CSB officers' responsibilities. Most said that their rewards were intrinsic to the work they were doing within their communities, but the more tangible incentives still were meaningful and substantial. CSB officers were issued take-home cruisers, cell phones, and pagers. They often could schedule flexible work shifts. Some community officers told us that they were, in fact, motivated by the better working hours.

Those whom we observed did appear to enjoy initiating informal interactions with residents. The community officers had an intimate knowledge of their specific beats and local residents. They not only knew where crimes were likely to happen, but they had an almost encyclopedic knowledge of their entire beats and the beat residents. It appeared to us that community patrol officers simply enjoyed being in the position to do a good job with and for their communities.

Organizational adaptation. The Greenville department had been divided into five divisions or services: support, professional standards, investigative, administrative, and patrol. Each was headed by a captain or major. The patrol services division was further divided into seven smaller units, each headed by a lieutenant: the CSB, three uniformed patrol platoons, traffic enforcement, reserves, and court security and warrants.

In the early 1990s, Greenville had begun expanding community policing geographically, and gradually the number of communities with their own COP officers increased. Community patrol beats often were small designated areas within regular platoon beats concentrated in the western parts of the city—areas that generally had more calls for service and the greatest demand for police services. Officers were allocated based on need.

Successful applicants for community policing positions had at least 2 years of police experience that included time as a field training officer and passed a promotion board. Many of Greenville's community officers had attended the Carolinas' Institute for Community Policing. Not only did most appear to us to be motivated and committed, but the agency clearly noted, valued, and rewarded their community-based work. Still, the majority of patrol services were being provided by the regular patrol unit. The brevity of our visit meant that we could not fully assess the relationship between community and patrol officers, but despite the functional division, we saw no overt signs of friction.

The CSB documented and tracked the work of community patrol officers using three forms. Officers recorded shift activities on typical shift activity logs, using the forms to record numbers of arrests, field interviews, warnings, and so forth. CSB logs documented contacts with community residents, problems identified, and actions taken to correct them. In addition, CSB officers submitted reports of community meetings that they had attended, summarizing the proceedings and documenting their presentations and any problems discussed. Finally, CSB officers used forms to request services from other city departments, including investigations and resolutions of problems like accumulating trash, abandoned vehicles, and code violations.

CSB compiled the information from shift activity logs, community meeting reports, and requests for city services into monthly reports that were passed up through patrol services. We could see that Greenville cared enough about community policing to record and track the activities of CSB officers. We were unable to ascertain whether or how that information later was used by commanders and other police executives.

In spite of its early innovations and adoption of community oriented policing, we found few structural changes in the overall organization that had been made specifically to integrate community policing.[204] Civilian employees still were used in the traditional ways: behind the scenes in dispatch and clerical roles. Community policing service delivery remained a specialized function, and although centralized decision-making was no more rigid than in most departments, we heard of no plans to give more discretion to line officers. None of the officers with whom we spoke reported being overly burdened by the department's rules and regulations, however, and the department had been accredited (and reaccredited) by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.

The future of community policing in Greenville

In the summer of 2000, Greenville appointed W. L. Johnson, a 25-year veteran of the force, as the new police chief. In August, during our visit, the leadership change seemed to have infused the department with renewed optimism for the future. A number of officers noted that Greenville had been technologically behind the times, and they were hoping that the new chief would change that.

Chief Johnson was not yet expressing clear plans for the future of community policing in Greenville. In early 2007, a look at the Greenville Police Department web site told us that Greenville's COP activities still were housed within the Community Patrol Bureau, which covered 70 percent of the city. Thus, 7 years after our visit, community oriented policing in Greenville still was being delivered by a specialized bureau.

CHAPTER 14. Hillsborough County, Florida

Eugene Paoline and Suzanne Devlin

In 1986, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office (HCSO)[205] became the first agency of its kind in the Southeast and the third in the nation to be accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. Since 1996, it had been reaccredited without interruption. When we visited, the HCSO had nearly 2,900 employees. Law enforcement deputies accounted for 1,056 of them; about 960 civilians were working in certain law enforcement and corrections positions.

The HCSO was serving an area that covered 926 square miles, home to 718,000 residents. Sheriff Cal Henderson, serving his third term, had been with the HCSO for more than 30 years. Like many in-house administrators, he was well-liked throughout the organization.

The evolution of community policing in Hillsborough County

In 1993, shortly after Henderson's first appointment, community policing was formally introduced in the agency. Funded by federal grants, the practice flourished in the county. Sheriff Henderson noted that he had not been entirely sold on the concept at first, but over time he came to embrace it fully, and he surrounded himself with a command staff that was on board. Both the sheriff and his top command staff were willing to try different ideas and strategies and well-versed in information-sharing and crime analysis. When we were there, two HCSO majors appeared to be leading the charge to make community policing the overarching organizational philosophy.

Our discussions with HCSO personnel at different ranks underscored that the sheriff was serious about community policing. A few top-level individuals who had resisted the shift had been encouraged to retire early. The message was understood throughout the ranks: Community policing and problem solving was a valued philosophy within the agency—the future of HCSO.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. The formal beginning of problem solving in Hillsborough County is traceable to a series of grants that funded, among other things, the county's new community resource deputy (CRD) positions. Initiated during a 1993 pilot study, the positions were assigned to perform street-level problem solving. The first CRDs worked part-time, spending 1 day a week on community policing functions. They interacted with citizens and merchants, focusing on disorder—the so-called broken-windows aspect of community policing. After the pilot study concluded, the department upgraded the CRD positions to full-time status—again with federal funds.

A 3-year grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (later transferred to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services) funded two new community stations and the expanded CRD positions. One station was situated in a high-crime urban center (later to become District 1), the other in a rural area with several migrant labor camps (later, District 4). Enjoying internal and community support, the HCSO continued accepting grants to fund its growing CRD force. Each year from 1995 through 2000, the agency received U.S. Department of Justice funding (Universal Hiring Programs I-V). Each grant enabled the agency to establish more stations throughout the county and to further increase the number of CRD positions.

By the time federal funding came to a halt, the HCSO had employed approximately 134 full-time and part-time CRDs. Both CRD and street deputies told us that part-time assignments were viewed as positive—they could help bridge the gap between the two kinds of policing assignments. Later, several full-time CRD positions were converted to part-time, as deputies were lost to military service and homeland security details at the local airport and seaport.

The early community policing focus on disorder shifted gradually to one of identifying and solving broader problems. This change resulted in part from the findings in an evaluation of a 1993 Bureau of Justice Assistance grant project. The assessment showed that county residents and CRDs had succeeded in using community policing techniques to identify problems such as drug dealing, juvenile crime, and other index offenses occurring in the urban area served by the grant. The assessment prompted a U.S. Department of Justice Weed and Seed grant to fund follow-up action in 1994. HCSO began integrating problem solving and aggressive disorder policing into its concept of community policing.

CRDs usually came to the position with at least a couple of years of street experience, although hiring criteria varied across the four districts. Most new appointees received a 3-day training course, and were encouraged to continue training throughout their tenures. As in many U.S. police and sheriffs' agencies, community policing officers and deputies were relieved of direct responsibility for calls for service. Supervisors were encouraging all deputies to practice problem solving, but specialized CRDs conducted the majority of the county's community policing activities.

CRDs worked essentially at the will of supervisors and street deputies. Characteristic problems such as drugs, homelessness, public drinking and disorder, and burglaries varied across the four districts, but in all of them CRD activity appeared to be directed at two issues: traffic problems and repeat calls for service.

Individuals at all ranks cited the well-publicized statistics that showed Hillsborough County to have the highest traffic fatality rate in Florida and the second highest in the nation. CRDs in collaboration with citizens and other organizational members spent much time and energy identifying high-volume traffic accident locations and enforcing traffic laws. For example, in District 1 a CRD had been placed in charge of operating a mobile automobile speed detector that displayed and stored driver speeds. The HCSO used the data to notify citizens about traffic problems and to inform the agency's problem solvers who were working on challenges such

as stationary traffic enforcement. In an area known for the high speeds associated with traffic fatalities, a CRD and another deputy teamed up to operate radar at one point and issue tickets at another—a common practice, but with a new twist.

The local radio station routinely broadcast alerts on area speed traps, enabling offenders not to get caught. To avoid being spotted, the deputy on radar would use various disguises—a person waiting for a bus, someone with a broken-down car, a person in a wheelchair, a telephone-repair technician, a homeless person. He told us that to protect people from the very real risk of fatalities caused by excessive speeders in the area, he had had to resort to keeping people "guessing at all times."

The agency was more or less formally using the SARA problem-solving model (scanning, analysis, response and assessment). We found occasional evidence of innovative problem-solving approaches and community-building efforts, but for the most part, systematic problem solving in all four districts remained aimed directly at solving the issues underlying repeat calls for service, a central focus of problem-oriented policing (POP).[206] This allowed street deputies to relay known problem areas to CRDs. CRDs also worked with district crime analysts. Together, they identified addresses where repeat calls for service originated, then a CRD would visit those residences or businesses and develop potential solutions. CRDs' monthly reports emphasized how the deputies were responding to issues related to repeat calls for service.

CRDs had the latitude to initiate POP projects in their assigned areas. For example, one CRD set out to eliminate the homeless camps that were moving around Hillsborough County. That individual had worked with other deputies to investigate the camps, hoping to displace them to areas outside the county. In some instances, deputies seemed to be interpreting "success" to mean "eliminating the immediate problem from the county," even if it meant that the problem was displaced to another jurisdiction or that the result was only temporary. HCSO did not require formal demonstrations of success from its deputies, but CRDs were expected to document problems they were addressing. CRDs explained that they had their own ways of tracking success. For example, they routinely checked calls-for-service lists and the current repeat list, making sure that their particular repeat call(s) did not reappear.

Other HCSO personnel were referring crime outbreaks, such as auto burglaries, to CRDs. The CRDs responded by patrolling hot spots and talking with citizens about unusual activity noticed in the area. In Hillsborough County, problem solving was mostly about identifying and documenting problems. Assessing the success of outcomes was only an informal part of the process. The county did have mechanisms in place for measuring problem-solving impacts. In all districts, the CRDs worked with a crime analyst, and they had access to computers with tools such as electronic pin maps to track repeat calls for service and community action reports. CRDs had the ability to self-assess POP outcomes—to learn and improve without jeopardizing their reputations—had they chosen to do that.

Community engagement. HCSO had developed community and interagency partnerships throughout the immediate and surrounding areas of Hillsborough County. CRDs were the agency's links with various neighborhood watches and associations, independent community and church groups, schools, and businesses. They often teamed up with the centrally located Crime Prevention Unit to provide programs and services to individuals and groups. Management encouraged them to forge and maintain such partnerships, but the specialized deputies varied in their level of involvement. An active neighborhood association leader recalled that partnering had increased when community policing grants appeared in the mid-1990s; he later commented that he understood the current state of affairs—a decline in partnering—because HCSO was experiencing manpower issues.

One of the county's most productive formal community partnerships arose from a 1993 grant-funded project. Using data analysis, the agency discovered that domestic violence was accounting for numerous repeat calls for service. HCSO submitted a successful proposal to the Department of Justice to fund two detectives and a civilian community service officer (CSO) to address the problem. The newly hired detectives conducted countywide training programs in domestic violence awareness and reporting, including information about referring victims to available shelters. Their objective was to deliver an awareness-and-referral message to other agency members. HCSO was continuing those efforts, and the CSO became a vital link between the public and sheriffs' deputies and investigators.

As a community relations project, in 1996 the sheriff instituted a citizens' police academy. He also organized an electronic citizen survey to determine levels of community support and the public's perceived problems. To the extent that residents reported problems and complaints, the sheriff and command staff relied on CRDs to address them.

The HCSO engaged in interagency collaborations, as well, especially in light of homeland security issues following the events of September 11. Hillsborough County was home to a major seaport, and the HCSO was on continuous heightened alert for terrorist threats. A program called Cool Ice enabled the HCSO to connect, interact, and exchange information with other area law enforcement agencies including the police departments at Temple Terrace, Plant City, Tampa, and the University of South Florida. Cool Ice also could be used to identify and solve day-to-day problems in local communities, although it was more commonly used in emergency situations.

In addition to forming partnerships within the community, CRDs were encouraged to partner with other government officials such as code enforcement, probation, zoning, and juvenile justice to address mutual problems and concerns. Levels of involvement varied across the four districts. To the extent that partnerships were formed, CRDs documented them in monthly activity reports.

Organizational adaptation. At the time of this study, the HCSO's jurisdiction consisted of four geographical districts, each with its own station. Two new districts had been added in 1996 to address population growth and to decentralize service delivery.

1. District 1, with a 77-mile radius and a population of 111,479, had been formed to encourage policing at the neighborhood level. Despite having the lowest population, the district covered the most urban area with the highest crime rates.

2. District 2, about 260 square miles with a population of 203,936, was located in the northeastern part of Hillsborough County. Internally, it was regarded as the leading district in the development and implementation of community policing.

3. District 3 encompassed the northwest region of the county, serving approximately 230,759 people and spanning about 123 square miles.

4. District 4, the other newer district, served the southeastern part of the county, a developing rural area of about 466 square miles and 171,721 people.

The HCSO's main operations (internal affairs, criminal investigations for violent crime, crime prevention) were centrally located at headquarters. Each of its four districts operated as a typical municipal police department. Each was headed by a major, with a captain and four shift lieutenants providing direction and oversight. Twelve sergeants and corporals supervised the daily operations of four squads.

Street deputies were deployed across the districts based on a grid system. Grids were aggregated into zones, which were further aggregated into quadrants. Street deputies worked 12-hour shifts. There were 2 day-shift platoons and two night-shift platoons; an afternoon platoon overlapped the day and night shifts. The deputies' shift arrangement had been approved by a vote of line personnel in 1992, a testament to command staff's flexibility.

HCSO employed 1.1 sworn personnel for every 1,000 residents, well below the national average (3:1000) for sheriffs' departments. According to several sworn employees, the low ratio was impeding their ability to raise community policing to the level of an organizational philosophy. Conversely, one major—a leading force in the community policing charge—explained that the numbers were somewhat misleading. The HCSO might be below the national average, he said, but the agency had plenty of personnel for calls for service. This observation exemplified how top administrators looked beyond broad traditional indicators such as manpower and service deployment. The street-level perception, however, remained that the HCSO suffered from a manpower shortage.

The agency's command staff were both flexible and receptive to the needs of street-level deputies, two essential characteristics for successful leaders of community policing. In recognition of its wide geographic range, the HCSO maintained a take-home cruiser program, a policy with which no deputy at any level took issue. Moreover, the HCSO had a straight deployment policy—street deputies reported directly to their assigned patrol areas. In lieu of daily roll call, deputies received messages and information by CAD and from printed postings originating with district crime analysts.

The 12-hour shifts and permanent zone and shift deployments all were introduced in an effort to cover peak service periods. In particular, the permanent zone and shift deployments were intended to foster deputies' sense of ownership of their assigned areas. Such accommodations were representative of the nontraditional strategies that the HCSO had incorporated into daily routines. All of its strategies appeared to be geared toward empowering personnel and loosening administrative controls.

Day-to-day community policing in all four districts was carried out by 134 CRDs. Unlike street deputies, CRDs reported directly to district commanders. They worked 12-hour shifts only if they chose. Like street deputies, CRDs were assigned to areas, but unlike them, CRDs were deployed to specific community stations. Community stations and crime analyst positions also provided new opportunities in the agency for civilians to be employed.

Sergeants and corporals supervised street deputies; CRDs had no immediate supervisors—depending on the district, they reported to lieutenants, captains, or majors. CRDs were encouraged but not required to help with calls for service. Undoubtedly, the CRDs' flexible schedules, lack of immediate supervision, and freedom from the dispatch radio generated a certain amount of animosity among other staff.

Organizational and district accountability. The HCSO had a process in place for citizens to file commendations and complaints. The agency publicized the procedures on its web site, or people could initiate action at headquarters in the Internal Affairs Division or at any of the four district stations. Citizens could also complete survey forms to communicate support and concerns; these were forwarded to the sheriff and his command staff. This was an indicator of the HCSO's acceptance of its organizational and district accountability both to policing professionals and to the community.

At the district level, the agency had developed the Sheriff's Crime Information Strategy System (SCISS) for commanders to report on their district's activities. SCISS, the equivalent of the New York Police Department's CompStat, met monthly; each district made a presentation once every 4 months. The chief deputy headed the meetings. The presenting district was mandated to address issues of general concern—crimes, traffic stops, manpower deployment, response times, and so forth. The concerns were then delineated in proceedings meetings, giving the district ample time to address them. During these meetings, district commanders demonstrated their ability to use crime analysis to solve problems in corresponding areas. The process gave rise to interdistrict comparisons and friendly competition, as districts correlated their "outputs."

Most perceived that the HCSO sheriff took SCISS meetings seriously. It was rumored that a top commander had been forced to retire after failing to perform adequately at SCISS.

The HCSO expected problem solving throughout the organization, not just among CRDs. In spite of this, street deputies in all four districts, even though encouraged by supervisors to participate in problem solving, most often were responding to calls for service. When they encountered an issue that needed a problem-solving approach, they were more likely to refer it to a CRD than to handle it themselves.

Throughout the organization, the specialized approach to problem solving was recognized by top commanders, and it was receiving broad attention. Middle managers and other organizational leaders who were not on board were being reassigned. There were also efforts underway to quantify CRD qualities for incorporation into the hiring process for all sworn personnel. The sheriff was building a command staff of strong proponents of problem solving who worked diligently to spread the philosophy throughout the organization.

The future of community policing in Hillsborough County

The future of the HCSO's community policing movement looked bright. The sheriff had surrounded himself with individuals who understood, supported, and promoted the concept. Supervisors who had resisted change were being replaced or retired. Moreover, the HCSO's top commanders understood the challenges that needed to be met to make community policing more than a tactical approach—to take it to the level of an overarching organizational philosophy.

One remaining challenge—the agency had yet to involve street deputies in problem solving. As in other U.S. police agencies, the HCSO's street deputies were entrenched in traditional policing, responding to calls for service, and they continued to imagine themselves to be the agency's "real" deputies and officers. Both CRDs and street deputies were aware of the latter's attitude, expressed in two widely used plays on the CRD acronym: "CRuDs" and "Can't Respond to Dispatch." Although the sheriff supported community policing, the extent to which street deputies would eventually incorporate it remained to be seen. The sheriff and his command staff understood the importance of this deficit, and the agency's street sergeants and corporals were expected to foster the street deputies' development in community policing skills and attitudes.

The HCSO demonstrated commitment to community policing with its effort to expand the CRD program. Two of the agency's more progressive majors and the University of South Florida had worked to develop community policing performance measures for deputies. The project, Hiring in the Spirit of Service, was using community and supervisory assessments to develop the measures, and these were expected eventually to be applied to all deputies hired by the agency. This was a strong strategy for moving problem solving forward to the level of organizational philosophy.

CHAPTER 15. Knoxville, Tennessee

William Wells and Mike Garrihy

At the time of this study, the Knoxville Police Department was serving a population of nearly 175,000 with a force of approximately 417 sworn officers and more than 100 civilians. According to those we talked with, before Chief Philip Keith's arrival in 1998 the department had been "operating on autopilot." As chief, a position he held until 2004, Keith was responsible for integrating community policing into the department.

The evolution of community policing in Knoxville

Chief Keith had championed a generalist community policing model for the Knoxville agency. That decision was credited with inhibiting infighting and differential treatment, two problems often found in agencies using a specialist model. Generalizing had made it possible to implement community policing across the entire city. The department, able to report successes right from the start, had never deviated from the model.

Throughout the ranks, Chief Keith was well-respected as a leader who had made positive changes. We were told that Chief Keith's long-range vision—his ability to think 5 or even 10 years into the future—was one of his greatest assets. Police personnel told us that the department's strong relationship with Mayor Victor Ashe and his support also had made their jobs easier.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. Problem solving as a community policing function was formally instituted in Knoxville in 1995. The department had expected all officers to learn and engage in the practice. Apparently this met with little internal resistance; officers' main concerns were with the amount of time that problem solving might take and that they were starting without a thorough understanding of what exactly was expected and how to go about it.

The Knoxville officers had received police academy and in-service training in problem-solving methods. In the academy, recruits were given reality-based problems to analyze and solve, simulating what might happen when they encountered similar situations on their beats. Their problem-solving kits were built on a modified form of the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment). Trainees identified and analyzed problem situations, defined the desired results, developed and compared potential responses, and assessed outcomes.

Agency employees were familiar with the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Since 1997, department leaders had been attending biweekly tactical planning meetings to discuss alternative environmental responses to problem situations. Crime analysts produced reports for the meetings, and district commanders discussed their area issues and responses.

Like other police departments, Knoxville had been struggling to include problem-solving skills in officers' performance evaluations. One employee thought that, had the agency been able to change performance criteria as it instituted problem solving, the transition might have gone more smoothly. Eventually annual evaluations evolved to include a section devoted to problem solving, but department managers told us that the agency continued to be driven by more conventional numbers.

Knoxville claimed several long-term problem-solving successes, a number of them addressing difficulties in public housing complexes. Officers were attending monthly Public Housing Tenant Council meetings to hear which issues were most important to the residents. Patrol officers had engaged in "tap and raps" in one complex, walking door to door and introducing themselves to residents. The idea was to make law-abiding tenants feel safer and to make law violators feel unwelcome. According to one officer, nearly all problems arising in the complexes were caused by nontenants. In Knoxville, public housing complexes legally were considered private property, so officers were able to establish ID checkpoints to assure that visitors had legitimate reasons for being on the premises.

Following the demolition of a large public housing complex, drug-trade-related problems had begun to develop in the area. One officer had been devoting an average of 2 hours per shift for more than a year to trying to improve the situation. He told us that area neighbors were resisting the idea of "getting on each other" and persisted in calling police to settle most disturbances. He was still trying to help them become more responsible and self-reliant—to prevent and manage certain kinds of disorder and safety problems themselves rather than depending entirely on the police.

In another attempt to curb the public's overreliance on law enforcement, the department had helped establish a community mediation program in one district, starting by identifying community members to act as mediators when certain kinds of problems arose in their geographic areas. Knoxville had borrowed the idea from a department in an eastern city, where it was an alternative approach used in instances where police were making good progress toward solving certain community problems.

One of the agency's most successful problem-solving partnership projects—helping to revitalize Knoxville's Old Town—had been nominated for the 2000 Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. Old Town had once been a vibrant commercial center, but when some of the area's core businesses relocated, the landscape gradually deteriorated into a field of vacant buildings and homeless encampments.

In 1996, Knoxville organized groups of city residents, businesses, and agencies to work on reversing the fortunes of Old Town. The police department had played a vital role in this partnership. Citizens participated in meetings and responded to a systematic survey conducted by the University of Tennessee. Officers conducted extensive crime analyses using CPTED tools and crime mapping. The response they planned included bicycle patrols, foot patrols, and improved lighting and fencing, among other things, to give people renewed confidence

that Old Town again was a safe and welcoming place. Judging from the reductions in reported crime and calls for service, increases in the number of new businesses and visitors, and the positive impression one got when walking through Old Town, the revitalization project had been a solid success.

Officers were solving problems related to several smaller, but no less significant community issues, as well. For example, agency personnel had solicited the assistance of city engineers after crime analysts identified locations with high rates of traffic accidents. In another case, a group of neighborhood residents became concerned about a dangerous route that children were walking to catch the school bus. The first city agency that parents approached seemed unable to help. Next the parents contacted the police, and officers brought the relevant parties together to collaborate. Together they solved the problem.

To inform Knoxville residents about crime-related problems in their neighborhoods, the department was employing a city watch program. Under its auspices, an automatic telephone dialer could call residents with recorded messages on relevant issues. For example, a message had been issued to alert residents when several burglaries had occurred in their area. Officers in the safety education unit were making presentations to businesses and citizen groups on a variety of topics such as crime prevention. They offered alcohol-server courses, and they conducted child safety-seat checkpoints to ensure that the car seats were properly installed. The agency's Bringing Home the Badge program invited Knoxville homebuilders to request an environmental analysis (CPTED) from police and city engineers. Through these and other efforts, the agency was identifying and responding to or preventing potential problems.

Community engagement. The Knoxville department had several strong community partnerships aimed at preventing problems. Community input was helping it identify and respond to crimes, and the partnerships were strengthening police-community relations in general. Knoxville's annual crime-control public planning process was one of its most productive efforts.

In 1995, the department had begun sponsoring annual meetings with residents to identify and prioritize local concerns and to develop acceptable ways for police to respond. The community had a strong voice in this process. The department invited organizations and more than 2,000 residents to the table. At the meetings, small groups discussed and prioritized neighborhood concerns, and then everyone reconvened to select the 10 most urgent issues. Next, participants broke into small groups again, this time to discuss potential responses to those issues. The department's annual crime-control plan, a product of this partnering activity, was reflecting choices made by Knoxville residents themselves.

The 1998 crime-control plan had emerged from a meeting of more than 200 citizens who had helped set goals such as reducing crime related to drugs, alcohol, and weapons; expanding justice reform; and reintegrating released juvenile and adult offenders into the community. Solutions emerging from the interactive process had incorporated tactics such as increasing rehabilitation services for drug users, reserving jail space for serious offenders, and using alternative sentences where possible.

The Community Safety Collaborative had emerged from Knoxville's commitment to build police-community partnerships. The collaborative was a group of representatives from more than 20 city agencies that supervised and served probationers and parolees, including police officers, individuals from the probation and parole department, and treatment providers. Together, they attempted to organize appropriate reentry services for each Knoxville parolee and probationer. Police personnel told us that after the collaborative formed, interagency channels of communication improved considerably. Police officers began accompanying probation and parole officers, conducting home visits. The parole and probation department joined with police to clean up a park that drug dealers had taken over, a dual-purpose response to resident complaints both about the park and about the possibility that excessive force had been used in a suspected drug dealer's arrest.

The department had indeed developed a number of partnerships to increase public safety and promote outstanding police service delivery, but not all of them were popular internally. In response to the 1997 deaths of four civilians in police custody, for example, a civilian review board had been created to examine internal affairs reports, once cases were closed. The board directed its comments to Chief Keith, who made final decisions on the issues. Officers told us that the civilian review board had met with significant internal resistance.

The department was leading in teaching the principles and applications of community policing to other police departments. The Regional Community Policing Institute SCOPE (Southeastern Community Oriented Policing Education), based in Knoxville, was established in 1997 with funding from the federal Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Through SCOPE, Knoxville police personnel had provided training for law enforcement agencies in eight southeastern states.

The Knoxville department claimed other community partnerships, as well. For example, along with schools, hospitals, and ministries, the agency participated in an outreach program to address the particular needs of local Hispanic communities. In 1995, it had established a citizen police academy; its alumni association continued to be active in police events such as Habitat for Humanity homebuilding projects and the Torch Run for Special Olympics.

Organizational adaptation. Knoxville was divided into three service delivery districts, each supervised by a police captain. One crime analyst and three or four lieutenants were assigned to each district. District commands had the flexibility to make deployment changes as needed. Several department employees mentioned that the organization was fortunate to have had experienced captains who were not "new to the block" and were capable of performing at high levels.

Five regular patrol squads and two special squads worked within each district. Officers were assigned to a particular geographic beat until they were promoted. To develop a 24/7 knowledge of beat issues, regular officers rotated shifts; special officers were assigned to specific days and times. A sergeant was in charge of each squad, with a supervisor-to-officer ratio of approximately 1:6. Patrol officers worked three 9.5-hour shifts (day, afternoon, or night) for 6 consecutive days, then had 4 days off. This deployment system had been implemented in 1997.

The department itself was organized into three divisions: administrative, operations, and criminal investigations. Investigations of crimes against persons remained centralized, but property crime investigations were assigned to each district. Initially, the department had experimented with different investigation deployment scheme in each district. After examining each of the three systems, crime analysts determined that property crimes were, as expected, strongly associated with geographic locations, and decentralization improved communications between investigators and patrol officers.

Chief Keith had reorganized the distribution of personnel, reducing the number of lieutenants and captains, increasing the number of sergeants, and creating two new deputy chief positions. Very few individuals were being promoted to the sergeant rank before the early 1990s; nearly 60 officers were promoted during the next 10 years. All promotions within the Knoxville Police Department were time-and-test based.

Keith advocated leadership development, recognizing that most of his current managers would soon be stepping into leadership roles where they would serve for many years to come. In 2000, several officers—more than were immediately needed—were promoted to the captain rank. The intention was to give them time to be trained and to become acclimated to the responsibilities of the rank before assuming full duties. All new sergeants completed a 5-week leadership training regimen.

Approximately half of the department's crime technicians already were civilians, and the agency planned to continue employing nonsworn staff as additional technician positions opened. The department also maintained strong volunteer and reserve officer programs. Volunteers were interviewed by sergeants and lieutenants and subjected to background checks. Some were assigned administrative roles. For instance, volunteers in two police districts made follow-up phone calls to citizens. Volunteers also worked in the training academy and the juvenile crime unit. Reserve officers wore uniforms and worked at special events such as the city's large fireworks display or University of Tennessee football games.

Department managers and supervisors acknowledged the challenge of responding to calls for service while implementing generalized community policing. In response, they had created a Teleserve unit in 1990 to take property crime reports by telephone, freeing patrol officer time for actual policing. Around the clock, 7 days a week, cadets and officers assigned to light duty answered Teleserve phones, handling an estimated 40 percent of all calls for service. Citizen reaction to Teleserve was believed to be positive, in part because it freed patrol officers to more often come to the scene when citizens requested them.

In another time-conserving move, the department had placed laptop computers in patrol cars. Officers now could write reports from the field; the reports were uploaded automatically into centralized computers through a wireless network. The idea, again, was to increase the time available for officers to use in solving neighborhood problems.

The future of community in policing in Knoxville

Chief Keith told us that the Knoxville Police Department still needed to involve citizens more directly. To help accomplish this, two officers in the safety education unit were planning to revisit a few community groups that had become inactive. They were hoping to reenergize the groups' participation in problem solving to maintain safer, more orderly neighborhoods.

We left the Knoxville Police Department with the impression that it was likely to continue practicing the principles of community policing, using the generalist model and emphasizing problem-solving and community partnerships.

CHAPTER 16. Lowell, Massachusetts

William King and Randall Shields

In the early 1990s, under the leadership of new police superintendent Edward F. Davis, the Lowell Police Department implemented community policing. From the beginning, the agency's attempts to shift from the traditional reactive mode toward community policing and problem solving encountered some serious challenges.

The evolution of community policing in Lowell

Between 1992 and 2002, the department took three steps that facilitated its transition to community policing. First, although the department began with a specialist model, it decided almost immediately to move to a generalist model. Second, it carved out three new geographical sectors, each headed by a captain; decentralized decision-making; and instituted a version of CompStat to help organize crime information and solve problems. Third, the department increased its staffing, adding police officers and civilian employees in key positions that were to interact with the community.

The Lowell department had decided to adopt a specialist model for the agency in 1994, early in its transition to community policing. Specialist officers were assigned to the Centerville neighborhood where they focused on community policing and problem solving, rarely responding to emergency calls. The differences in their respective responsibilities seemed to generate animosity between the community oriented policing officers and regular patrol officers, however, and in 1998, the department extended responsibility for community policing to all patrol officers. The change was supported by corresponding modifications to the police academy's new officer training program.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. In a move meant to facilitate community policing, the department had divided the city into three geographical sectors commanded by captains, with two or three precincts in each. A version of CompStat was instituted at the sector level to involve certain community representatives, working with the captains, in sector-level problem solving. Once a month, command staff and the crime analysis unit, along with the civilian liaisons and representatives of various agencies (e.g., juvenile court and probation), would meet. One of the captains would use sector maps to display the locations of various crimes, and participants would discuss crime-related problems and potential solutions.

Community engagement. As it shifted to community policing, the department sharply increased staffing and benefited from a number of timely retirements. The influx of new sworn officers and civilians made the necessary internal cultural shift—from being a closed, tough enforcement agency to one that communicated with and involved the community—much easier than it otherwise might have been.

Between 1994 and 2002, the number of sworn officers nearly doubled, from 140 to about 260, and approximately 150 of them were new to the agency. This created both opportunities and challenges. The more open attitude toward the community that was now expected was far easier for newer officers to adopt, and they soon were in the majority. Civilian employees began to fill certain jobs, helping to bridge the chasm between police and community. Among other moves, the agency organized a citizen volunteer program, employing two civilian liaisons who were attending community meetings and working with sector captains and community groups on common issues.

The department had joined in the city's community-wide renaissance when Edward Davis became police superintendent in the early 1990s. Lowell's Department of Neighborhood Services coordinated the city's responses to community problems. City government and community activists and groups were deeply involved in the positive changes occurring in Lowell, including those at the police department. Davis developed new connections for the department with other city agencies, and the department engaged in some but not all of the city's revitalization projects. A few interviewees believed that the police department had gotten more credit than it had actually earned for the effort, at the cost of credit for other agencies. We noted that federal grants and the location of a national park in Lowell had been factors in drawing businesses to the downtown area, as well. We could see that many of the city's improvements were the outcome of persistent efforts on the part of civic and city leaders who had started as far back as the mid-1970s.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, grassroots neighborhood groups had organized themselves to deal with crime and disorder problems. The concept and later the reality of community policing allowed police and these groups eventually to become natural collaborators rather than antagonists. The groups were instrumental in bringing community policing and precinct stations to their neighborhoods. Fortunately for Lowell and the police department, the neighborhood resident groups sought collaboration with the city and police. We had no doubt that the success of community policing in Lowell was due in large part to the engagement of those groups.

Sector captains served as the department's contact for many community groups, although community liaisons also served in this role, reporting back to captains. The captains attended community meetings where they discussed local problems and crafted solutions. Much of the police-community interaction in Lowell was occurring at this higher level, rather than with line patrol officers.

Aware of the need to recognize issues important to members across the community, the department had created a race relations council to work with ethnic communities. For historic reasons, these groups were still reluctant to interact with police.

All of these changes were intentional efforts to improve communications and cooperation between the police and the community.

Organizational adaptation. In 1998, Lowell evolved to a generalist approach to community policing involving all police officers. The department still retained a centralized hierarchy, although dividing the city into three geographical sectors, each with two or three precincts, made way for limited decentralization.[207]

The sectors were serving as new centers for patrol, problem solving, and accountability. Sector captains became accountable for the community policing effort, and most community information was funneled to them. The captains exercised considerable discretion as they and their officers identified and responded to sector-based problems. Although the department maintained a central bureau for the investigation of serious crimes and crimes that crossed precinct boundaries, most crime investigations were delegated to precinct investigators.

Sectors were the basic reporting units for the agency's CompStat operations. Meeting monthly with other departmental and city agencies, captains used crime maps to report and review sector crime data, and the group discussed the problems and proposed solutions.

Nearly every Lowell neighborhood was served by a precinct station. Patrol officers stopped at the stations to use the telephone and write reports. These were not 24-hour facilities, but they housed precinct investigators, gave officers a place to do paper work, and often provided space for other community activities. At some, civilian volunteers helped officers and greeted other visitors.

The most profound changes made in the agency's organizational structure to facilitate community policing occurred simultaneously with the agency's growth: its turnover of sworn employees and its deployment of civilians. From 1994 to 2002, the number of sworn officers nearly doubled; many older officers retired, making way for a new generation more amenable to collaborating and communicating with community members. Civilian employees' roles were expanded to include the front desk, dispatch, and similar duties; others were hired as community liaisons to interact with neighborhood groups and others in the community and to staff the new race relations council.

The department had adapted its informal structures more than its formal ones to accommodate community policing, however. Several specialist units (e.g., domestic violence and juvenile) were disbanded in the early 1990s, but the underlying administrative structure and the number of levels in the rank structure were left intact. Interviewees told us that policies and procedures manuals were outdated and rarely used. Supervisors did not formally evaluate their patrol officers, and promotion to sergeant remained based on state civil service exam results. The department's formal organizational structure had changed little.

The organizational modifications it had made, such as empowering the internal affairs division and its professional standards unit, seemed to have made a difference. The police department had entered the 1990s with a reputation as a closed, enforcement-oriented agency focused on fighting crime with coercive force. For years, Lowell had suffered more than its share of economic downturns, crime, and violence. Hell's Angels, certain Asian gangs, and other violence-prone groups had been operating in the city. Efforts to grow Lowell's economy sometimes failed; the Wang Corporation downsized in the late 1980s, and then declared bankruptcy in 1993. The police department's tough approach had not endeared it to the community or to city leaders.

Our interviews with officers and community and civic leaders left us with the impression that those days were past. The massive staff turnover had been a significant event in the life of the agency, opening the doors to new officers and civilian employees capable of solidifying the culture of new expectations. The police academy curriculum incorporated a substantial new unit on problem solving for incoming officers. The agency had also made a few strategic equipment changes. Chemical incapacitants were replaced with pepper mace spray and officers were being trained to use the PR-24 baton; these measures also appeared to have decreased the use of force. The commitment to community policing, regardless of the progress yet to be made, was making a difference.

The future of community policing in Lowell

From our perspective, the future of community policing in Lowell depended on whether the department would stay the course. We identified three possible challenges it would have to meet to do so:

1. We viewed Lowell's neighborhood groups as vital to long-term stability, but we were concerned about whether they would maintain their interest and involvement. Membership and meeting frequency had declined, perhaps as residents began to take decreasing crime rates for granted and competing personal or community issues became more compelling. We believed that ongoing community awareness and activity would be essential for the Lowell Police Department to sustain its hard-won improvements.

2. The department was vulnerable to potential backlash from other city agencies. Many of the positive changes occurring in Lowell had been credited to the police. Other agencies that had worked long and hard toward the city's reinvigoration could harbor resentment and resist the hiring of still more officers. We learned of another reason that new hiring would be unlikely: The city already was in need of alternative funding simply to pay officers on the payroll who originally had been hired with grants from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

3. Attempts to decentralize investigations to the precinct level were encountering problems. Numerous interviewees complained that precinct investigators were not properly trained, that their lines of accountability were unclear, and that precinct-level investigative efforts sometimes overlapped those of other precincts, the Central Bureau, and the state police.

All of these were problems in search of solutions. Community policing in Lowell, as in so many places, was a work-in-progress.

Chapter 17. Naperville, Illinois

Charles Katz and Kent Shafer

At the time of this study, the city of Naperville, located just 30 miles west of Chicago, had a population of around 133,000. The fourth-largest Illinois city in population, Naperville was geographically small at 36.2 square miles. Approximately 85 percent of the city's population was White, 10 percent was Asian, 3 percent was African-American, and 2 percent was American Indian. Naperville residents enjoyed a relatively high average household income of about $89,000. The city's educational system ranked among the best in the world; in 2002, Naperville was honored for having beaten 64 countries in the International Mathematics and Science Test.

When we visited, Naperville had an extremely low crime rate, with about 18 index crimes reported per 1,000 residents. In 2002, the police department responded to about 88,000 calls for service; in addition to one homicide, the department reported 17 sexual assaults, 15 robberies, 60 aggravated assaults, 334 burglaries, 1,923 larcenies, 96 auto thefts, and 16 reports of arson.

The Naperville Police Department was nationally accredited, and employed 284 personnel including about 180 sworn officers and 104 civilian staff. Most personnel were assigned to the patrol division (50 percent), followed by the investigations division (25 percent), the communication division (15 percent), and support services (10 percent). The department at that time was led by a chief of police, 3 captains, 8 lieutenants, and 25 sergeants.

The evolution of community policing in Naperville

The development of community policing in Naperville began in 1990 with the hiring of Chief David Dial. Before, the department had relied heavily on traditional policing strategies. According to some officers, however, the department had been experimenting with community policing strategies since the 1970s, adopting programs such as Crime Stoppers and Neighborhood Watch.

Before coming to Naperville, Chief Dial had been a police executive with the Lakewood (Colorado) Police Department, where he had begun to implement community policing. When he arrived in Naperville, Chief Dial established a minority citizens' advisory board including individuals employed by the city's major corporations. In 1990 and 1991, he initiated training in community policing practices. He brought in experienced police officers from Colorado and sent Naperville officers to community-policing and problem-oriented policing training seminars sponsored by the Police Executive Research Forum and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

In 1992, the department began adopting the principles and practices of community policing more formally. Chief Dial created a committee staffed with sworn officers and civilian personnel to incorporate the community policing philosophy into the department's mission and values statements. About the same time, the police department began working with the Naperville Junior Women's Club and the fire department to create Safety Town, a miniature village that included streets, buildings, railroad cars, and classrooms where such topics as street safety, CPR, and Internet safety were taught to children and their parents.

In 1993, the police department established a police area liaison (PAL) unit to strengthen ties between neighborhood residents and the police department. The unit was staffed with sworn officers assigned to specific areas. By 1996, the PAL unit had been replaced by the Permanent Beat Officer program. Patrol officers were assigned to permanent beats and shifts, where they were responsible for problem-oriented policing, working with community groups, and addressing resident concerns.

In the mid-to-late 1990s, the Naperville Police Department participated in the Concord (California) Police Department's community policing demonstration site, the Concord Coalition. This project brought together nine police agencies from across the nation to exchange ideas about community policing practices and to formalize the implementation of community policing within each agency. Naperville adopted a number of ideas generated from the Concord project. These generally fell into one of three areas that corresponded with the main dimensions of community policing: problem solving, community partnerships, and organizational adaptation. Below, we describe the strategies adopted from the Concord Coalition and other community-policing tactics that Naperville had implemented in recent years.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. All Naperville officers were expected to participate in problem-oriented policing (POP) within their assigned beats. Officers received training on the SARA problem-solving model (scanning, analysis, response and assessment) in the police academy, and they attended at least 1 additional hour of in-service training on related topics every year. They were prepared to implement POP, but many of the officers we met told us that they had encountered an unusual obstacle: Naperville seemed to have very few problems to solve.

According to police officers and administrators, only 4 percent of their calls for service were related to crime. All officers agreed that in Naperville, issues such as street-level drug dealing, prostitution, and gangs were nearly nonexistent. The most-often requested services were help with house and car lock-outs, parking, and animal control.

Naperville's police officers nonetheless had the resources to support the POP problem identification process. Patrol vehicles were equipped with laptop computers that gave officers access to crime-analysis data, and that data could be retrieved on the spot to examine address-level trends in activity from the date of inquiry back to 1985. A few managers expressed concern that the available technology may have outstripped the officers' capacity to use it; the officers would need further training to apply their new analytical capabilities.

In addition, officers received crime maps showing address-level events in their beats, and they reportedly used this information to scan for potential problems. The police department had established a program titled Beat News. Officers used their computers daily to record items of interest in the beat, including calls for service, crime trends, and neighborhood gossip. In this way, officers working different shifts in the same beat could be kept current by accessing the network.

Patrol captains and shift lieutenants were expected to review the information generated with these tools and to hold officers accountable for crime trends in their areas. Interestingly, however, neither officers nor managers in the investigations division actually used these tools, and they told us that they had no plans to do so in the future.

Naperville officers could initiate problem-solving projects without formal permission. Officers and managers explained that most officers submitted some kind of paperwork on their projects so their immediate supervisors would know that they were actively problem solving. Although the managers noted that measuring POP performance was not part of the formal evaluation process, officers knew that they needed to participate if they wanted to be considered for promotion.

As they addressed problems, developing strategies and seeking resources, officers were free to request direct assistance from other department units and city agencies. Officers and managers both thought that crime analysis and crime investigators were the most-used resources. In 2002, the police department documented 194 completed POP projects.

More recently, the department had embarked upon a project aimed at reducing underage drinking. This came about when a young person died from excessive alcohol consumption, and several residents filed complaints about high school parties. The police department responded with a three-pronged strategy. First, it established a unit that responded to citizen calls about teen parties and ticketed youths who illegally consumed alcohol. Second, the department began to perform alcohol and tobacco checks at local stores; local youth in the police explorer program were sent into the shops to try to buy alcohol and tobacco, and those that sold to minors were ticketed. Third, a five-officer DUI (driving under the influence) unit was created to combat drinking while driving at all ages, emphasizing youthful offenders. The department had not yet assessed the impact of this project.

The police department tracked POP projects by officer, beat, funds expended, and officer time dedicated. One manager explained that although participation in problem solving was not mandatory, staff regularly examined the data. Officers were financially rewarded for exemplary problem-solving projects that improved the quality of life in the city. Immediate supervisors recommended projects to the police chief, who in turn made recommendations to the city manager's office. Rewards for outstanding projects ranged from $100 to $1,000.

Community engagement. Perhaps the most impressive aspect of community policing in Naperville was the police department's connectedness with the community. Officers were embedded in the community personally as well as professionally. For example, one captain was the past president of the Naperville Rotary Club, another chaired a local university planning committee, and the chief of police headed the city's United Way fund drive. Most officers we interviewed stated that community citizenship was not only typical among the department's administrative staff, but also among its line-level officers. Interviewees gave a number of examples of police officers who volunteered personal time to serve as Big Brothers to the city's children, to read to impoverished children, and to work with Habitat for Humanity.

The police department participated in a number of formal partnerships with the community. Some efforts were particularly innovative, aimed at bringing together several city services to improve quality of life for community members. One example was the establishment of the Community Connection office. In the mid-1990s, the south end of the city was experiencing a number of problems related to emerging gangs, thefts from automobiles, and burglaries. In fact, the south end had the highest number of calls for service in the entire city. Using analysis, police found that many of the neighborhood's problems were associated with the high number of multifamily housing complexes located in the area.

In response, the police department opened a neighborhood service center in the south end, an idea that had emerged from their participation in the Concord Coalition. The Community Connection office was staffed with two community service officers, one staff member, a code enforcement officer, and a police lieutenant. It remained open from 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. The objective of the storefront office was to open the police department up to the community and to provide municipal services at the neighborhood level. At the center, residents could file a police report, obtain commuter parking permits, pay utility bills and parking violations, and register to vote. They could also make requests for city code enforcement, obtain crime prevention information, and have building plans reviewed. In the first 100 days after the center opened, 288 people made utility payments, 159 people paid parking tickets or requested information about parking, 97 people filled out police reports, and 46 people came in for city permits or to ask questions about city services; 74 others came in for miscellaneous reasons. The office appeared to be well-used.

To address other problems in the area, the police department started the Naperville Crime-Free Multi-Housing Program, an idea shared by the Schaumburg (Illinois) Police Department. The program's purpose was to improve resident safety, decrease the number of criminally active tenants, and increase social cohesion. The multifamily housing program in Naperville became a formal partnership between apartment complex owners and the police department, taking a three-pronged approach to crime prevention.

First, police officials provided information to apartment complex owners on the nature of the program, exposed them to the realities of potential tenant problems, and introduced them to basic strategies for attracting quality tenants. Second, owners were taught the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and given steps they could take

to ensure tenant safety. Third, to earn CPTED certification, property managers could hold a tenant crime-prevention meeting and distribute crime-prevention materials to tenants. Upon completion of all three steps, managers would be permitted to post signs on their property indicating that they had participated in the Naperville Crime-Fee Multi-Housing Program.

The police department implemented the Senior Citizens Program, operated by the department's elder-services team since 2000, as yet another innovative strategy to increase community connectedness. The elder-services team consisted of three police officers and members from other agencies such as social services, county health, animal control, the fire department, and the electric utility. The team met several times to identify problems experienced by older residents, then developed a number of programs that addressed them.

- Cell Phones for Seniors redistributed donated cell phones at no cost to elderly persons; the phones could be used to dial 911 in an emergency.

- The 911 Guardian program, a reverse 911 system, made periodic telephone checks on seniors' well-being.

- The Senior Buddy Program matched city employees with older residents who were otherwise alone in the city.

- The Senior Photo ID Database permitted family members or friends to place a digital photo and emergency contact information on file with the police department so that seniors who became disoriented or lost while out could more quickly be identified and returned home.

Naperville's police department used more traditional strategies to partner with the community, as well. The police department sponsored a citizen police academy that it had established in 1995 to improve communications between the public and police officers. The academy offered an 11-week program that gave participants an in-depth look into the operations of the police department. Sessions were held twice a year, enrolling about 25 to 30 residents per session.

The police department also operated a community radio watch (CRW) program. CRW, started in 1982, was created as a partnership between the police department and citizens who were interested in helping the community. About 22 people received special training from the department on how to observe activity on the street and how to report to the police. CRW participants also served as liaisons between Neighborhood Watch programs and the police department, and provided surveillance services for various police units and extra security patrol in selected areas. The CRW program received a number of awards from the state and was featured in local newspapers.

Third, the police department participated in Neighborhood Watch, which had been adopted by about 100 Naperville neighborhoods. Beat officers gave the groups information related to crime trends, updated them on the department's concerns and efforts, and made presentations on various crime prevention strategies. Neighborhood Watch groups also provided a means for officers to hear about and better understand the problems that their neighborhoods faced.

The police department entered into partnerships with the local school system, emphasizing child safety. Depending on grade, students received programs such as D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) or GREAT (Gang Resistance Education and Training), runaway prevention, and violence education. The police department also ran the Police Explorers program through the schools. Police Explorers allowed 14- to-21-year-olds an opportunity to consider careers in law enforcement. It offered first-hand knowledge of what it was like to be a police officer and of the types of issues police officers faced daily. In addition, the police department's crime-prevention unit made community presentations related to date-rape prevention, retail loss prevention, bicycle safety, Halloween safety, and workplace violence awareness.

Finally, the police department was surveying about 125 residents each month through the mail, asking questions about their satisfaction with the police department. The survey went to recent victims, witnesses, arrestees, and others. This information was used to make operational decisions and to suggest steps that could be taken to increase citizen satisfaction with police services.

The police department's efforts in problem solving, community partnerships, and police work in general were recognized by several city businesses. For 8 years, local businesses had been sponsoring an annual Citizens Appreciate Police recognition dinner, where citizens presented awards to police officers, staff members, volunteers, and units for meritorious service. Police officers throughout the police department appreciated the citizen awards and the positive feedback that they might otherwise have missed.

For all of its community connectedness, the Naperville Police Department stopped short of using civilian reviews to examine complaints against the police. Instead, it used the traditional method: An internal affairs unit investigated such complaints and the chief of police determined appropriate disciplinary actions.

Organizational adaptation. Naperville police managers and officers pointed out that organizational change in their department was comparatively uncomplicated because of its small size. Our observations indicated that managers and officers worked closely together and that change was directed from the bottom up as often as from the top down. Police managers regularly discussed practices and issues facing the department with officers during normal working hours. Managers were viewed as approachable by all police employees interviewed.

Naperville was divided into three zones, each with three or four beats. A watch commander of lieutenant rank was responsible for all three zones during each 8-hour shift throughout the work week. On weekends, a senior sergeant was in command. The watch commander was responsible not only for routine patrol functions, but also for attending Neighborhood Watch meetings and working with other community groups to ensure that the department was being responsive to community needs and problems.

In 2001, the police department began to examine alternative methods of assigning officers to beats and teams. Police managers felt that the "permanent" beat assignment method they were using was not permanent enough. They explained that officers typically would be assigned

to a beat for only 3 months—too little time for the officer and the community to become well acquainted. Their preference was to assign officers to an area for at least 1 year. Also, managers wanted patrol officers to work in permanent teams to build the department's capacity for effective problem solving and to build stronger partnerships within the department and with the citizenry. Police management was interested in establishing an organizational structure that would place the responsibility for community policing with officers and line supervisors, rather than with specialized units and police managers.

These issues had been brought to the local police union, which was given the task of identifying a schedule and method of personnel management that would allow for permanent beat assignments and for the placement of officers on teams. A series of meetings was held to discuss the benefits and limitations of different strategies. The officers elected to move forward with a schedule in which one sergeant and five or six officers would be assigned 8-hour shifts in one zone, with each officer being assigned to a particular beat within the zone. Likewise, the watch commander was assigned a permanent shift for an entire year. The union argued that permanently assigning managers to shifts and teams would increase accountability and, they hoped, would lead to the department becoming more effective and efficient. They also believed that the new strategy would help the department coordinate its efforts across all three daily shifts and would increase the sense of officer ownership of assigned areas.

Our interviews indicated that, in general, officers were satisfied with the change. They thought that the new system could help with personnel evaluations; they would be working for the same supervisor throughout the year. Managers stated that the system could help them identify the superstars of the police department and lead to greater recognition for outstanding officers. Most officers thought that the new strategy might become problematic if teams tended to hold onto rather than share information. They were also concerned that competition between teams could result in officers becoming too aggressive in their policing tactics.

The police department had created a full-time downtown police officer position, an idea adopted from the Concord (California) Police Department as part of the Advancing Community Policing Demonstration Center Program. The officer was permanently assigned to downtown Naperville, working during normal business hours, typically 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. The officer responded to calls for service in the business district and served as a liaison between the police department and the business community, attending monthly business association meetings and meeting regularly with business owners and managers. During those contacts, the officer and business owners would identify quality-of-life problems and solutions in the downtown area. When interviewed, members of the Chamber of Commerce indicated that they were pleased with the downtown officer position—it had had a measurable impact on quality of life in the area.

The above changes had led the department to reconsider how it was evaluating officers. In the past, police officers had been evaluated in accord with traditional measures such as average response time, citizen complaints, number of arrests, and how well they performed administrative tasks. With the move toward team policing, the department began reconfiguring its personnel evaluation process to include job performance aspects related to problem-oriented policing and the officers' relationship with the community.

Since the implementation of community policing, the use of civilian employees also was steadily increasing. At the time of our visit, the department was employing about 104 civilians. About 43 percent (n=45) worked in the communications division as telecommunicators and dispatchers, and another 24 percent (n=25) worked in the support services division as records technicians and their supervisors. The police department had hired 12 civilian service officers (CSO) to write parking tickets, assist officers with paper work, direct traffic, and work in the reception areas of police headquarters and a community resource center. Our interviews indicated that many CSOs were energetic younger persons who were interested in becoming police officers. Police officers in the department were very satisfied with the use of CSOs. They believed that the use of civilians in those roles had helped free officer time, allowing them to spend more time on community policing activities.

The future of community policing in Naperville

Naperville police managers explained that in the future, they planned to move toward the concept of e-policing. They were interested in providing the public with alternative methods such as e-mail for contacting the police, hoping this would continue to foster better relations between the department and the community.

The department also intended to open the citizens police academy to disabled and younger people. Police officials pointed out that young people in the community were exhibiting some negative attitudes toward the police, and by opening their doors to youngsters and educating them on what police do, they hoped more of them would become well-informed and better satisfied with police services. Finally, the chief of police was requesting three more CSOs to free additional officer time so that more attention could be given to community policing.

CHAPTER 18. Newport News, Virginia

Edward Maguire, Craig Huneycutt, and Megan Gantley

Newport News is in the southeastern corner of Virginia in a coastal region known as Hampton Roads.[208] Located on a peninsula surrounded by the James and York rivers and Chesapeake Bay, Newport News is the fourth-largest city in the state. Its unique geographical location has provided the setting for a rich cultural history.

Local lore has it that the city got its name in 1610 when Captain Christopher Newport landed his fleet in Jamestown to revive the weary colonists.[209] The Newport News shipbuilding industry, established more than 2 centuries later in the mid-1860s, has supported our nation's war victories and developed numerous kinds of aircraft carriers. The shipping industry expanded over the years; it now defines the economy of the city. The ports of Newport News process about 50 tons of cargo annually.[210] Such high volumes of cargo are good for the economy, but they also make Newport News vulnerable to importation of illegal goods and susceptible to terrorist attacks.

As of the 2000 census, the Newport News population was 180,500 and the city occupied 69.2 square miles of land. The city is racially diverse: 54 percent of the population was Caucasian, about 39 percent was African-American, and slightly more than 7 percent was of other or mixed races. More than 14 percent of the city's households consisted of single parents and their children, higher than the percentage of single-parent families for the region and nation. Average household income was $36,597. The Newport News Police Department was established more than a century ago, in 1882.

The evolution of community policing in Newport News

At the time of our visit in December 2002, the department employed 412 sworn officers and 155 civilians. Under the direction of Chief Dennis Mook, all officers were being strongly encouraged to use community policing strategies. Community policing was already a part of this department's identity. Earlier, in 1986, the department had become the 14th U.S. policing agency to be accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. It had since been reaccredited four times, including in 2002.

In 1998, the department was selected from 82 applicants around the world to receive the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. Its award-winning project was titled "Police Response to Incidents of Domestic Emergencies," or PRIDE. The program had helped to decrease domestic homicides in the area substantially. The prestigious award had served both to recognize and to reinforce the agency's commitment to community policing.

The Newport News Police Department had earned its place in police history as one of the early innovators in the fledgling community policing movement. In 1984, under Chief Darrel Stephens, the department was selected by the National Institute of Justice to implement problem-oriented policing organization-wide. A group of police employees and staff from the Police Executive Research Forum developed the problem-oriented policing framework that came to be known as the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response and assessment) of problem solving.[211] SARA, sometimes critiqued for being overly formulaic, is nonetheless the most popular framework for implementing Herman Goldstein's ideas about problem-oriented policing.

We found that the majority of officers whom we interviewed and with whom we rode in Newport News had never served under Chief Stephens (1983 to 1986). Most command staff, however, had vivid memories of Stephens' term in office, and they retained a strong sense of his legacy. As we will show, in spite of some missteps in his implementation methods, elements of Stephens' philosophy were continuing to influence the evolution of community policing, even 20 years after his departure.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. The evolutionary milestones in the Newport News agency's problem-solving effort appeared to correspond with transitions from one police chief to the next. Chief Stephens had set out to make the department a national model for problem-oriented policing. He started by training his command staff in the problem-solving process. But then Chief Stephens had attempted to take the organization in new directions at a pace that was unsustainable. (See *Organizational adaptation*, below.) As a result, it would be Newport News' future chiefs who fully launched the agency into problem solving.

Technology's role. Proponents of problem solving generally agree that thoughtful analysis supported with information technology will enhance officers' ability to recognize and solve community problems. We found that Newport News was technologically sophisticated. According to one employee, it had "the best planning unit in the region, bar none."[212]

Just 5 years earlier, the agency had owned only 27 computers, none of them networked. When we arrived, it was operating 242 computers in its various offices and 214 mobile computers in vehicles, and all were networked. Officers were working with far more information, and mobile digital terminals in their vehicles were allowing them to work far more independently. They could see calls-for-service data on screen. They could choose to enter reports electronically or hand-write them for later scanning into the records management system. Terminals in patrol cars permitted silent dispatching and included panic buttons; these features were also available on the officers' radios. The department was working closely with other regional law enforcement agencies and the FBI on information-sharing initiatives.

Crime data analysts. Technology is not an end in itself. To be cost-effective, it must change police practices for the better. In Newport News, much of the responsibility for translating information into strategic planning data fell to crime analysts. At the time of our visit, Newport

News employed three strategic analysts who worked from headquarters and three tactical analysts who were assigned to precincts.

Like most crime analysts, those with the Newport News department compiled hot spot reports and conducted tactical analysis for precincts. They reviewed reports, searching for patterns and trends, and compiled maps. They conducted next-hit analyses to predict crime patterns and provided statistics to officers on request, often for community meetings. The tactical analysts compiled weekly reports for precinct captains.

Colocating analysts in the precincts improved their relationships with officers, but analysts thought that their skills still were underused. They viewed officers' definitions of what constituted a problem as sometimes narrow. Often, the analysts would be the first to recognize patterns in the data. Crime analysts believed that additional crime analysis training might prime officers to request and use more of the kinds of information that they were prepared to produce.

According to one interviewee, high-intensity patrol (HIP) units in each precinct were the most frequent users of the analysts' information. HIP units were the most active in problem-oriented policing (POP); they had completed three or four large projects in the past 2 years. For example, one unit had spent nearly 6 months dealing with problem apartments; it had helped to get several troublesome tenants evicted, and the unit had made a number of arrests.

Overall, we found the status of problem-oriented policing in Newport News to be uncertain. Repeatedly, we were told that even after the demise of an unsuccessful problem-solving committee (see below), everyone continued "doing POP"—that problem-oriented policing was so ingrained in the organizational culture that many "did it" without recognizing it. Others we interviewed, however, thought decentralizing POP to the precincts and reducing its formality was having the opposite effect; they believed that the intensity of the practice had diminished throughout the agency. One interviewee told us:

> POP is a good concept and some people do it. But POP is not really done here. It is in the personnel evaluation form, but it is not practiced or used in evaluating officers. . . It has dwindled off . . . It is not a philosophy we live everyday.

Others repeated that POP was "not pushed here." POP activities were included in officers' personnel evaluations, but some viewed this fact to be misleading. They echoed the sentiment that you had to know the terminology to be promoted, but most officers did not actually practice POP. Another individual called problem solving in Newport News "an informal institutional process" that varied from precinct to precinct.

The officers with whom we spoke were unsure whether they had received formal training in problem solving. They had heard of SARA but could not remember what it stood for, and they had not personally conducted POP projects. One said, "This is patrol. Our primary responsibility is calls for service. Problem solving is done by somebody else. Calls for service is what policing is all about." At the same time, we discovered one captain's light-duty officers combing through old POP reports, trying to reinvigorate precinct-based POP projects.

Community engagement. According to Chief Mook, the department had several outreach programs underway for improving relationships with the community. These included the creation of a youth development officer position and police academies customized for youth, seniors, and other citizen groups. The department had also provided grants to community watch groups, and started a citizens' outreach center at the local mall using donated space and volunteer staffing, the latter at no expense to the city.

Newport News had employed two full-time community resource officers to work with the public, supporting community watch groups, instructing the community on crime and law enforcement issues, advising on Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, and assisting with proper installation and use of child safety seats. Newport News was in the process of building a new police headquarters building, and Chief Mook had instructed the architect to design the building to be community-friendly, with a community room and an ATM in the lobby.

In Chief Mook's view, community policing belonged within a broader framework of community oriented government. He saw police as falling naturally into a leadership role, taking the first step and then letting other agencies learn from that. One employee whom we interviewed, however, sensed resistance from other agencies that were questioning why the department was crossing onto what they considered their turf.

Overcoming such resistance for the good of the community is a perennial challenge when implementing community policing. From the perspective of another employee, the department was "very involved in the community, but there is not community government here." This individual believed that the department was working well with the codes compliance office and the fire department, but that community policing overall was being hampered by underdeveloped relationships with other agencies.

Nearly everyone spoke highly of the fruitful relationship between the police and codes compliance departments. The two were about to formalize a program that had been in existence informally for some time, in which an officer and a property maintenance inspector visited properties as a team. Code enforcement inspectors had been assigned to precincts for about the past 5 years to increase their interactions with police. Inspectors' workloads had grown as a result, but one precinct captain reported that the inspectors had been invaluable in closing down and condemning drug houses. Property maintenance inspectors and police officers, as well as social services staff, were being trained to be alert to suspicious conditions inside the homes that they visited. According to a representative from the codes office, the two agencies mobilized one another.

The department was working hard to cultivate good working relationships with other law enforcement agencies, as well. The chief was active in the Hampton Roads Chiefs of Police Association, enabling formal contacts with other chiefs at regularly scheduled meetings and informal contacts resulting from personal relationships that developed among the regional members. In addition, the agency was participating in a regional information-sharing network called CRIMES that linked the records management systems of the member agencies. CRIMES was also serving as a pilot site for the FBI's new data-warehousing software, tested initially in St. Louis. The software facilitated information sharing among local, state, and federal agencies.[213]

According to Chief Mook, the war on terrorism had changed the way his department looked at things. "Community oriented policing is more important than ever," he said. The department knew that Newport News could be a prime target for terrorist activity; many military installations were located in the area and a nuclear aircraft carrier was under construction in the harbor. As part of the effort to gather intelligence while expanding community partnerships, officers visited and gathered information from the city's apartment complexes. They met with rental agents and managers, explaining how to recognize potential problems. The contacts generated useful intelligence, but also established good working relationships and interagency trust.

Officers visited all possible target facilities, including ports, labs, railways, nuclear fuel facilities, and hospitals, sharing information and establishing networks with both public and private agencies and organizations. Department representatives met routinely with those from the U.S. Navy about their joint responsibility for various functions, and they had radio contact with the military when needed. The counterterrorism unit was expanding and served on a task force that included other local and federal agencies.

In the local community, the department had placed a school resource officer (SRO) in every high school. Middle schools also had SROs and D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) officers, and officers were visiting with children in elementary schools. The department was attempting to recruit new officers from minority colleges and universities, as well as from their most productive resource for minority recruiting—the military. Officers were being taught enough Spanish to communicate effectively with Hispanic residents. Those and other efforts reflected the department's genuine concern with improving community partnerships.

The Newport News department operated under a generalist model of community policing, allotting 20 percent of its officers' time to community oriented activities. According to crime analysts, however, patrol officers were under the impression that their entire shifts were being consumed by racing from call to call, with no time left—certainly not 20 percent of their time— for "knock-and-talks" and other community policing activities.

Our own experience with Newport News patrol officers confirmed that this was a common perception among them. They, like officers with whom we have spent shifts in many other agencies, remarked that we were visiting on "a dead night—usually it is a lot busier than this." This has become a cliché among police researchers, who hear it nearly every time they ride with patrol officers. Workload analyses performed for numerous police agencies have shattered the longstanding myth that officers do not have time for community policing activities. The myth persists, nonetheless.

Granted, mobilizing their communities can be difficult for patrol officers. According to one Newport News captain, keeping the community involved and interested in what police were doing was hard. Public participation tended to wax and wane with local community crises. As those crises resolved, support faded. Another Newport News employee told us that the department had tried to form a business watch group in the southeast section of town, but only two community members had showed up for the meeting. This was disheartening to those officers who had invested time and energy initiating community policing activities.

Communities vary, however. One precinct captain reported that his community would not tolerate an apathetic captain—the captain in that precinct *had* to attend community meetings. HIP officers within the precinct were expected to meet with new business owners and resident organizations and to read with kids at local schools. HIP officers had recently conducted interviews with neighborhood residents in 100 randomly selected homes (N=350) to forge better relationships. From this captain's perspective, the department had a history of violence and fear within the community that history had to be overcome. The department's current concerted and sustained efforts to develop community partnerships were changing its public image.

Organizational adaptation. According to most employees with whom we talked, prior to Chief Stephens' arrival in 1983, equipment had been outdated and the department had been badly in need of significant change. Many recalled that Stephens hit the ground running, trying to implement radical change quickly. He did not always take time to explain those changes—he just made them. Many viewed Chief Stephens as a visionary who tried to do too much too quickly. To be fair, "change" had been his mandate from city hall. But at the end of the day, Stephens' experience may have constituted a classic lesson in how *not* to implement community policing. Among other things, he had promoted a few officers directly to lieutenant, bypassing the rank of sergeant. He then tried to empower line officers directly, but failed to include first-line supervisors in the planning process. The resulting shakeup caused a great deal of friction within the department, and some senior managers retired or quit.

Chief Stephens attempted to institutionalize problem solving as a process and to build community partnerships by convening what he called the Problem Analysis Advisory Committee (PAAC). The multiagency problem-solving group was designed to allow officers to present current POP projects, walking through each step of the SARA process while the department recorded the information in a database. The committee included representatives from various city agencies who initially met monthly, and then quarterly or as needed. Several with whom we spoke referred to PAAC meetings as centralized, rigid, and bureaucratic,

sometimes inhibiting the department's ability to solve problems quickly. The meetings reportedly alienated a number of people within the department. One participant described the meetings as being "like the Spanish Inquisition." Another said that they were intimidating to the point that officers would sometimes leave in tears.

Much later, under Chief Mook, the committee was eventually disbanded. When the department dropped the unpopular PAAC, it also decentralized problem solving to the precinct level. Each precinct was assigned a civilian crime analyst to assist officers, supervisors, and administrators with information-gathering and hot-spot analysis. The chief received a monthly report on POP activities. New project files were kept at the precinct level, and the decentralized record-keeping procedures became less formal.

In fact, the entire practice of POP became less formal with the dissolution of PAAC. Precinct captains no longer had files at their own fingertips, but had to request what they needed from first-line supervisors. According to one source, this worked because "everybody knew who was working and on what." According to others, however, the transition lessened the emphasis on POP. One person related that "we are not doing as much POP as we were some time ago. POP is less present."

Long before Chief Mook's tenure, Jay Carey had served as executive officer under Chief Stephens. In 1992, Carey had become the next new chief, and the department began experimenting with geographic accountability. The North patrol precinct was divided into three areas, and a lieutenant was assigned to each 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The South patrol precinct remained a traditional patrol area. North patrol officers and supervisors received intensive training, a new set of expectations, and new call signs. Some elements in the new arrangement worked; others did not. In January 1993, a rash of pizza delivery robberies occurred. During a sting operation set up by a sergeant, an undercover officer dressed as a pizza delivery person was shot and killed by the robber. Another major shakeup ensued, and Chief Carey was fired.

Chief William Corvello, former superintendent of the Virginia State Police, who succeeded Carey had a different style of leadership. He suspended the North end experiment, returning lieutenants to their shifts and captains to being in charge of precincts. Not all community policing ceased, but Corvello stressed tighter controls. Due to lingering questions about the role that empowering lower ranks to make independent decisions had played in the death of the undercover agent, Corvello pulled back some of the empowerment granted by his predecessors.

The future of community policing in Newport News

Newport News has a long and storied community policing history. Each change in administration had meant a change in the nature of the agency's community policing philosophy and practices. One could see this as underscoring the rich diversity of opinion within the policing field on how community policing should be implemented.

The Newport News department certainly had learned a number of valuable lessons from its experiences. During our interviews, we often heard some of those lessons repeated:

- Directly involve supervisors in implementation.

- Train detectives and make it clear what is expected of them.

- Avoid turning problem solving into a bureaucratic, rigid process.

- Involve everyone.

The future of community policing in Newport News was difficult to predict, but it would likely continue to be a process in which more lessons were learned, and the practice could be expected to continue to evolve as a result.

CHAPTER 19. Portland, Oregon

Charles Katz and Michael Wells

Portland, Oregon, a West Coast city of about 150 square miles, has a population of just over 500,000, with 1.5 million in the greater metro area. Portland's population is about 85 percent White, 8 percent African-American, 5 percent Asian, and 2 percent Native American. Home to more than 90 neighborhood associations, the city prides itself on being "neighborhood oriented."

The evolution of community policing in Portland

Portland's political structure includes a mayor and four city councilors. Historically, the mayor has managed the Portland Police Bureau and assumed the title of police commissioner, a position with the authority to hire and fire the chief of police. At the time of our visit, the Portland Police Bureau employed 1,315 personnel, including 1,028 sworn officers working in police headquarters and five precincts. Most (78 percent) were assigned to the operations branch, performing patrol and traffic duties. About 18 percent were assigned to the division of the investigations branch (e.g., detective, drugs and vice, and forensics). The remaining 4 percent worked from the chief's office or the service branch, assigned to duties such as training, internal affairs, and record-keeping.

Portland community policing has roots in the city's 1984 mayoral campaign. Bud Clark ran for office promising to open the city and police bureau to the public. At the time, the bureau was in administrative chaos, suffering from political and financial problems. In the prior 2 years, three different chiefs had attempted to lead the agency. Not surprisingly, Portland's vision of community policing remained underdeveloped throughout this period.

In 1988, under Chief Richard Walker, a well-articulated vision for community policing finally began to emerge. Walker used a strategic planning process to help with the bureau's transition. The resulting plan was formally accepted by Portland's city council in January 1990, providing the necessary developmental framework. Chiefs Tom Potter and Charles Moose led the bureau between 1990 and 1999. The two are credited with implementing many of the original plan's community policing objectives.

In 1992, the bureau hosted the first-ever national community policing conference. When we visited Portland nearly a decade later, Chief Mark Kroeker was in charge. He was reputed to be a national pioneer in the community policing movement, and Portland was serving as a national community policing demonstration site.

Local dimensions of community policing

Problem solving. Problem solving in the Portland Police Bureau has been characterized by formalized partnership agreements with other organizations, associations, and businesses. For example, in 1989 the bureau recognized that rental properties often were being used for the manufacture and sale of illegal drugs, activity which was promoting neighborhood decay and crime. In response, the bureau created a landlord training program to help owners and managers prevent drug activity on their properties. Landlords, management associations, private attorneys, tenant screening companies, and a number of others contributed to the course content. The bureau trained more than 5,500 landlords and property managers, affecting more than 100,000 Portland rental units. The Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University recognized the program as an Innovation in State and Local Government, and it was adopted by several other police departments across the country.

The Neighborhood D.A. program was another example of Portland's problem-solving activity. The program assigned deputy district attorneys to specific neighborhoods to identify public safety problems and to mobilize community resources to address them. The district attorneys spent much of their time trying to implement long-term solutions to quality-of-life problems such as theft, vandalism, car prowls, and illegal camping. They worked from the bureau's precinct offices where they could easily collaborate with police. Many officers whom we interviewed commented that the district attorneys provided invaluable legal advice on problem-solving projects, greatly enhancing their ability to solve problems using alternative legal methods.

The bureau's problem-solving activities frequently involved formal partnership agreements, but officers also relied on more traditional strategies. For instance, one problem-solving project originated in Portland's Hawthorne district, where business owners had become concerned that "unconventional behaviors" exhibited by certain residents were causing them to lose business. Several of them brought the problem to the attention of the police; the bureau responded by helping to organize the United Southeast Business Association, representing about 500 area businesses.

Police and association members worked together to assess the cause of the problem and to determine how it might be resolved. The group put out the message that some behaviors simply would not be tolerated in the district. With the assistance of the neighborhood district attorney, it created a list of prohibited behaviors. Those engaging in them would be removed and banned from the store where they were observed; further, they would be banned from entering any other store in the Hawthorne district. The police role was to manage and distribute the list of excluded individuals, and to arrest those who, after being banned, trespassed in any of the district's stores. After about 30 offending individuals had been prohibited from entering area shops, officers were able to report that the project had resulted in a dramatic reduction in disorder in the area.

There were other noteworthy accomplishments. The bureau's partnership agreements with several Portland motels and hotels addressed problems related to auto theft, vandalism, and motel/hotel room burglaries. The bureau was also working with the Portland housing authority to address crime and quality-of-life problems in public housing complexes. The problem-solving projects described above are only a few of the many that had been undertaken by the Portland Police Bureau and its officers.

Community engagement. In Portland, problem-solving and community partnerships were tightly integrated dimensions of community policing, as described above. From the beginning, community policing focused on the bureau's relationship with the city's 95 distinct neighborhoods, each with its own legally recognized neighborhood association.

Starting in the early 1970s, Portland neighborhoods had developed strong individual identities and had exerted influence on local government agencies, including the police bureau. The associations were essentially groups of neighborhood volunteers who had organized to address neighborhood problems including crime. Each association was served by 1 of 11 neighborhood coalitions: not-for-profit organizations that contracted with the city government to help organize and run neighborhood meetings, create and distribute newsletters, and provide technical assistance related to crime prevention, among other things. The coalitions reported to the Office of Neighborhood Associations (ONA), within city government; ONA provided financial resources and personnel to support the coalitions' work.

The bureau took full advantage of Portland's neighborhood orientation. First, it created the Neighborhood Liaison Officer (NLO) program to receive community input at the neighborhood level. Each neighborhood had an assigned NLO who worked in the afternoons and evenings, attending neighborhood association meetings and answering questions about quality of life in the neighborhoods. When NLOs could not directly solve a problem, they would either guide the community through the city bureaucracy or ask the most appropriate agency to take action. When NLOs were not working on neighborhood problems, they were patrolling their assigned neighborhoods and responding to calls for service.

Second, the bureau created advisory groups for underserved populations. The police chief and his staff met regularly with those groups to discuss their concerns about neighborhood and policing issues. Possibly the most influential of the advisory groups was the Chief's Forum. Neighborhood and police bureau representatives, local politicians, police union officials, and various city officials gathered at the forums to advise the chief on policies and practices affecting quality of life in the city.

The bureau established other advisory groups, as well. For example, the African American Community Advisory Council met periodically with the chief and his staff to discuss issues that affected the police and the African-American community. Similar police advisory councils were formed for individuals who were of Hispanic or Asian descent, members of sexual minorities, and those with disabilities. Precinct commanders had advisory councils for addressing problems at their service level, as well. The bureau chose not to establish a civilian review board; however, instead, the internal affairs unit reviewed citizen complaints against officers, without the participation of community members.

Third, the bureau sponsored several community activities. For example, it operated the Police Activities League (PAL), a program of after-school activities, and PAL PLUS (Play and Learn Under Supervision) for at-risk youth. The bureau also provided organizational infrastructure for the Sunshine Division, a group of volunteers who provided food and clothing for the poor and served as an organizational resource for managing volunteer crisis-response teams that helped victims deal with the aftermath of crime. Besides these activities, the police department organized citizen foot patrols and a community policing workshop for the public; maintained a police explorer program for youth interested in becoming police officers; and was starting an outreach program to address problems related to the mentally ill.

In accord with community policing principles, the bureau made several opportunities for members of the community to share their concerns and ideas. For example, the agency:

- Administered surveys to community members and other criminal justice agency personnel.

- Using focus groups, listened to homeless and court-diverted youth to better understand their perceptions of community problems and crime.

- Collected survey data from high school youth on their perceptions of safety and crime in schools and neighborhoods; students ranked problems of concern and indicated how well police had addressed them in the past.

- Conducted focus groups with representatives from criminal justice and social service agencies asking them to prioritize problems in the community.

- Gathered survey data from community members regarding their perceptions of crime, disorder, and the effectiveness of police in addressing those problems.

Organizational adaptation. At the time of this study, Portland was divided into five precincts. Districts and precincts had been established to maintain the integrity of neighborhood association boundaries, rather than by the geographic distribution of calls for service. Precincts each comprised at least three units: district officers, neighborhood response team (NRT) officers, and precinct detectives. Each precinct had a storefront office open to residents.

Most patrol officers were assigned 8-hour shifts in one of Portland's 44 districts, where they remained on assignment for at least 3 months. When an officer was unable to patrol (e.g., due to illness, training, vacation), a utility officer substituted. The district officer working the evening shift typically was the designated neighborhood liaison officer.

Within this organizational structure, district officers were expected to engage in problem-solving activities when not responding to calls for service. All bureau officers had been trained in the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response and assessment) and knew how to use several different resources for identifying problems, but typically precinct commanders passed problems on to district officers based on repeat citizen complaints and analysis of calls for service data.

The officers we interviewed told us that they had been directed to improvise and "use their imaginations" to identify and solve problems, but that organizational factors were inhibiting them. First, they found the department fairly formal, with rules and policies that effectively blocked the problem-solving process. Some felt that the sheer number of departmental rules put them at greater risk of violating one and incurring disciplinary action. Second, a stringent request process had to be followed before starting a project. Officers perceived that administrative details such as the correct proposal format (e.g., was it to be single or double-spaced?) were of more concern to the administration than a project's potential for success.

Administrators, on the other hand, believed that problem solving was not occurring among district officers for a different reason: The department lacked a formal evaluation process. As a consequence, they argued, community policing actions could not formally be considered in decisions about promotions and transfers; therefore, the officers did not engage in them.

Precinct-level NRTs were expected to address substantial problems that district officers lacked the time and other resources to pursue. The teams typically included one sergeant, three officers, and one crime analyst. They did not handle calls for service, conserving their time to effectively manage problems such as abandoned cars, public drinking, and drug houses. Problems often were brought to the team's attention by district officers or by citizens using problem identification forms. The issues they were dealing with frequently required interagency collaboration, and NRT officers had developed strong working relationships with personnel in other city agencies, such as the licensing bureau and housing authority, and with criminal justice agencies, such as probation and parole. Those relationships had strengthened their capacity for problem solving.

Four or five property crimes detectives also served in each precinct. The chief had decentralized property investigations in 1992 with the intention of increasing communications between patrol officers and detectives. Detectives worked from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., overlapping their shifts with those of neighborhood district attorneys. Officers argued that decentralization had had a negative outcome on property crimes investigations; whenever an officer took leave, that precinct was left short-handed so that property crimes detectives could not proactively address potential problems. Under the centralized system, a larger pool of property crimes detectives had been able to take up the slack.

Administrators commented that under decentralization, with property crimes detectives scheduled only during the day, responsibility for investigating property crimes occurring at night shifted to district officers who had had little relevant training. It seemed that administrators and officers were in agreement that decentralizing property crimes detectives in this case had, in fact, resulted in less-effective investigations.

The future of community policing in Portland

Chief Kroeker, as well as other police administrators, indicated that community policing would advance further in the bureau only when administrators and officers could be evaluated on performance measures relating to community policing and problem solving. The Portland Police Bureau did not have a formal evaluation system in place. Administrators believed that they would not only have to sell officers on the benefits of establishing a formal evaluation system, but they would have to convince them to include community policing performance measures within that system, as well. Chief Kroeker told us that in the near future, the bureau did hope to put an evaluation system in place, and that the system would help to institute community policing practices within the agency.

CHAPTER 20. Reno, Nevada

Charles Katz and Robert Heimberger

The city of Reno has a population of about 180,000 and is near the California border, 130 miles east of Sacramento. The local economy is based on gambling, recreation, and tourism, attracting 40,000 to 60,000 visitors each day. According to the U.S. Census, Reno's residents are White (80.5 percent), Asian (6.3 percent), African-American (3.2 percent), American Indian (2.1 percent), and Other (11.7 percent). Reno's Hispanic population has grown substantially in recent decades, increasing from 3 percent in 1985 to about 20 percent in 2000. The crime rate is 55.8 per 1,000 residents.

The evolution of community policing in Reno

At the time of our site visit, the Reno Police Department consisted of 326 sworn officers and 170 civilians. Most officers (71 percent) worked in the Patrol Division, which included the patrol and traffic units and the community action team. The Detective Division employed about 21 percent of the department's sworn personnel assigned to the general detective, narcotics, and extradition units and other functions. The remaining officers (8 percent) worked in the divisions of Planning and Research, Professional Standards, Program and Services Management, and Communications. All units and the department's community liaison and legal advisor reported directly to the chief.

In Reno, the development of community policing began in 1987. Before this, officers and administrators told us, few interactions occurred between police and the public other than in Neighborhood Watch chapters and during responses to calls for service. Some officers stated that the police-community relationship had been so poor that the chief would not allow the media near his officers.

Between 1983 and 1987, the city lost two ballot initiatives that sought additional public safety funding. New legislation had capped property taxes, further handicapping the department's budget. As a consequence, the police department had reduced the number of sworn officers by 25 percent.

In an effort to rebuild its reputation, the department surveyed residents, asking how it might improve its performance and image. The survey results confirmed that Reno residents were dissatisfied with police services. They perceived their police as callous and aggressive, and they wanted a voice in setting police priorities and practices.

Administrators told us that, based on these findings, then-Chief Robert Bradshaw had initiated community policing as a strategy for increasing citizen satisfaction. He hoped to give voters a reason to support legislation to increase the police department's budget. The community policing plan, referred to as COP+, called for the agency to strengthen its ties with the community and with other municipal and county agencies.

Problem solving. Once the plan was underway, the department invested substantially in training officers for problem-oriented policing (POP). In the academy, all officers received 4 hours of instruction and got even more during field training. Those interested could get advanced POP training such as that offered by the Police Executive Research Forum. Each year, the department sent five officers to the annual POP conference in San Diego for exposure to what other agencies were doing.

In addition, the department was conducting its own well-attended 40-hour POP course. It was offered to 20 to 25 officers, two or three times a year. About 33 percent of the department's employees had completed it. The course began with an 8-hour classroom introduction to problem-solving principles. Then officers spent 4 days practicing, as they planned and implemented POP projects and presented their findings to classmates, commanders, and the police chief. Afterward, in the field, course graduates served as POP mentors. The department had begun allowing civilians from other city agencies to attend, as well.

Police administrators and officers made clear to us that not all Reno officers were practicing POP. Some thought that police officers had been conditioned instead to wait for calls and to remain available to help each other. Others pointed out that making arrests gave officers immediate gratification, while POP projects meant delaying that gratification. All administrators agreed that officers could not be *required* to practice POP and that their efforts to evaluate officers on POP performance had so far been unsuccessful. One administrator declared that "if [officers] are not going to do [POP], that is fine. But they are not allowed to complain about it— that we will not tolerate!"

In fact, many officers considered "POP" to be a bad word. Several told us that they were tired of needing to "handle everything" using the POP approach. Others explained that what looked like a lack of interest was really a lack of time for anything other than responding to call after call for service. Still others told us that POP simply required more paperwork than they were willing to do. To partially address these criticisms, the administration purchased a computerized POP project tracking system at a cost of $25,000. It was rarely, if ever, used. Even though many officers were unsupportive, there was general agreement that one did have to practice problem-oriented policing to be promoted in Reno.

Despite the apparent negativity, a number of POP projects had been completed in Reno. Perhaps the most successful was Project HELP (Homeless Evaluation Liaison Program). In 1993, several officers noticed that a number of transients were repeatedly being arrested and jailed for relatively minor offenses, at a per-person cost to the city of $65 a day. Some had been jailed more than 50 times. Analyzing the problem, the officers learned that many homeless persons had come to Reno expecting to find employment. They had either failed or had lost whatever money they had earned gambling. Either way, they could neither afford a home in the city nor a ticket out of Reno.

In 1994, the city and county responded by annually allocating $15,000 each for Project HELP. One police officer was assigned to the bus station, where the Greyhound Corporation

contributed an office. The officer was responsible for contacting the families of homeless persons, and when a family member agreed, the project paid for the person's bus ticket back. Greyhound discounted HELP fares by 10 percent. In 1999 alone, the project sent 451 homeless persons to family members, saving the city and county a substantial sum. Homeless shelters were reported to be less crowded than they had been, and they were serving 150 fewer meals a day because of lack of demand—a further indicator of the POP project's success.

Community engagement. As part of the department's commitment to community policing, the agency was working with residents and other organizations to better understand community needs. The department conducted biannual community surveys, asking residents about their levels of satisfaction with police, their levels of fear of crime, and their perceptions of the crime and disorder problems that existed in their neighborhoods. Survey results were distributed to media, residents, the city council, and the public.

Department units occasionally conducted their own surveys for the purpose of assessing unit performance. The traffic unit surveyed 60 residents who had been cited for traffic violations, asking about officer behavior: Did the officer explain the reason for the citation? Was the officer's conduct professional? Unit administrators used that information to identify problem officers. The traffic unit commander thought that the strategy had worked. He told us that prior to collecting and sharing this information with officers, the department had been averaging six complaints a day about the traffic unit; afterward, complaints had dropped to about one a month.

Reno officers began receiving mandatory community policing and problem-oriented policing training, with an emphasis on creating collaborative relationships within the community and with other local government agencies. Not long afterward, the department began formalizing relationships with neighborhood advisory groups and working ad hoc with other local agencies to address issues such as graffiti abatement, disorderly behavior, and street-level drug sales. Neighborhood advisory group members, appointed by the city council, represented each neighborhood's sociodemographic makeup.

The groups met monthly to identify and discuss neighborhood problems. They were responsible for area development and for producing a monthly newsletter for area residents. Each group received a $50,000 annual budget from the city. Apart from these advisory groups, commanders worked with community members informally. They attended neighborhood association meetings, making themselves available to discuss local problems. One commander noted that he was attending two or three neighborhood meetings a day: "That's what my job is—building relationships."

The department had established several formal relationships with other local government agencies and companies. The traffic unit, for example, worked with the Department of Transportation and Safety to coordinate traffic changes. The police department had collaborated with several other law enforcement agencies to form an interagency gang task force staffed with criminal justice agency personnel from the surrounding metropolitan area.

The department also had created a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) committee. That committee reviewed all city building plans to ensure that physical features did not inadvertently promote crime, disorder, or fear of crime. That effort in particular strengthened relationships among the police department, parks department, and city services and zoning. In fact, many officers and staff mentioned that the program had become so successful that private companies and architects were starting to use the committee as a resource.

The department had taken a few steps toward strengthening its relationship with Reno's minority communities. A commander wrote a weekly column for a local Hispanic newspaper, *The Police and You*, in which he talked about current events, police policy, and "misperceptions about police" within the Hispanic community. The department had created a diversity/outreach-officer position, responsible for ensuring that minority communities' issues were being heard and responded to by the administration. It was unclear how the majority of officers felt about this position; a few commented that the diversity officer's job was to "make sure that [the minority community was] being massaged." Such a comment suggests that at least some were questioning the underlying objective—was the move meant to assure that the community's needs were being addressed or simply to placate its members?

Finally, the police department had developed a formal working relationship with Reno's downtown casino industry. The downtown area commander was meeting monthly with area security managers and their advisory committee to discuss crime trends and potential neighborhood problems. At the casinos' request, the city had created a special tax district and had increased the taxes paid by downtown casinos, with the revenue to be used for salaries and equipment for 14 bike officers assigned exclusively to patrol downtown and to work with hotel security and detectives addressing crime and disorder.

In contrast to the several ways in which the department was reaching out to the Reno community, it was continuing to rely entirely on an internal professional standards unit to investigate citizen complaints against police. Administrators and officers remained convinced that citizens should not have access to privileged information, and thus could not be participants in the review process. Although the African-American community was pressuring the department to create a civilian review board, individuals within the department noted that African-Americans comprised a relatively small part of the population and their request probably would not be met.

Organizational adaptation. In Reno, organizational change was actually the first step taken toward institutionalizing community policing. Prior to 1990, captains had been responsible for precinct-level operations. When we visited, the police department no longer was organized geographically. In a budget-cutting step intended to save the city about $160,000 annually, Chief Richard Kirkland had eliminated all captain positions and had appointed deputy chiefs to command the divisions. In effect, this had flattened the organizational structure, but it also had shifted accountability for results up to deputy chiefs. Officers believed that the change had resulted among the lower ranks as a loss of the sense of geographically-based ownership.

In 1997, newly appointed Chief Jerry Hoover formed a committee to explore the idea of restoring geographic accountability and assigning area commanders. He and committee members visited five police agencies—Portland (Oregon), Seattle (Washington), San Diego (California), Charlotte (North Carolina), and Lincoln (Nebraska)—to gather ideas. Subsequently, the department was realigned geographically into three areas (precincts) based on natural boundaries and calls for service, each managed by a commander who became responsible for the area 24 hours a day, 7 days a week—a substantial change, since in the past lieutenants had been responsible for operations only during their own shifts. Sergeants and patrol officers were permanently assigned to an area. The chief chose this approach hoping to inspire an attitude of ownership among officers, supervisors, and commanders; he expected that with permanent assignments, officers of all ranks would become better acquainted with and more invested in the residents and problems in the areas in which they worked.

In another move to support the organizational shift to community policing, the department established area substations. Business and community groups donated space and much of the equipment. The storefront substations were open to the public from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. Citizens came to them to report crimes and request information, and officers used them as a base for completing paperwork.

As the department was taking these steps to initiate community and problem-oriented policing, however, sergeants and officers were still being trained under the 1960 professional policing model. Then a $300,000 grant from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services made it possible to implement and study a new training program. All incoming patrol sergeants were taught how to manage personnel and to work with officers to implement problem-oriented policing projects.

Early on, it had been decided that community policing would be implemented throughout the entire department, partially because the personnel shortage at the time made specialization impossible. To place more officers on the street, the chief reassigned 20 from administrative duties to patrol. He then established a community service officer (CSO) position and filled these administrative jobs with civilians. Eighteen CSOs eventually were hired to take noninvestigative reports and to conduct basic traffic control and crime scene investigations. We learned that CSOs were handling 65 percent of the department's noninvestigative reports and 73 percent of its cold calls. The police department had also initiated a senior auxiliary volunteer effort (SAVE), attracting as many as 71 older volunteers. SAVE workers were performing disability enforcement, visiting with the elderly, watching out for and reporting graffiti, and performing house checks.

Some Reno officers told us that having civilians in the department freed their time to perform other duties. A few, however, referred to civilians as "scabs" who were taking jobs from sworn officers.

The future of community policing in Reno

Since the department's initial implementation of community policing, several chiefs had come and gone. Our interviews suggested that some had embraced community oriented policing, and others had not. As leadership priorities fluctuated, it was not always clear to officers which kinds of police work would be rewarded. They were finding the inconsistencies frustrating and confusing.

Some pointed out to us that the department was actually in its second attempt to implement community policing. Most were aware that Chief Hoover—in office at the time, but since retired—supported community policing and problem solving. They questioned, however, whether it would remain a permanent part of the organization or would be dropped again when Chief Hoover left his command.

As next steps, Reno police administrators told us that they were working on developing a beat system, and were conducting a demographic study to examine the city's neighborhood structure. After the study's completion, the department intended to match area and beat boundaries to natural neighborhood boundaries. The department was also trying to hire another eight CSOs to staff substations. Administrators indicated that they would like to be increasing each substation's capacity for report-taking to free more officer time to practice problem-oriented policing.

CHAPTER 21. The Future of Community Policing

Edward Maguire and William Wells

The research on which this volume is based began well before September 11, 2001. We visited our first seven sites in July and August 2000, and then, for unavoidable logistical reasons, we visited the remaining five sites 2 years later, between September 2002 and January 2003. In the interim, 9/11 had shaken the very foundations of the American policing industry.

The 2001 terrorist attacks served as an "environmental jolt," the term used by organizational scholars for events that have profound effects on organizations.[214] For some, in an era in which fundamental concerns about homeland security loomed large across the nation, community policing had lost relevance, but for others the move toward community policing had become even more important.[215] In this chapter, we explore the future of community policing in the United States and how its philosophy fits into the post-9/11 American policing industry.

Community policing has been a fluid reform movement, continually evolving and expanding. As the 21st century dawned, police agencies were growing more sophisticated in their understanding of community policing and of its adaptability to local circumstances and contingencies. Our goal with this study has been to discover and more deeply understand how U.S. police agencies are making sense of the community policing movement—how they are interpreting its meaning and content and how they are going about implementing the organizational changes that reflect their perceptions.

We hope that this study is of value to the large and growing community of social scientists and policy analysts who study policing and that this volume becomes part of the policing communication grapevine. As research literature on community policing expands, we also hope that social scientists achieve a better understanding of how police organizations work: how they implement reforms, how they orchestrate change, and how they evolve. Most important, however, we hope that we have helped translate that knowledge into useful information for the police practitioners who are struggling to improve their own organizations—the police agencies and personnel pursuing the meaning and the realization of community policing locally. This volume represents a single step in that direction.

What is community policing?

The community policing philosophy has several dimensions; as a reform movement, it naturally brings together different strands of innovation. As the movement evolves, it continues to gather new elements, new practices, and new approaches. This makes defining its key dimensions a challenging task for both researchers and practitioners.

We view the multidimensionality and openness of community policing as positive attributes, giving police agencies the freedom to innovate and to adapt to local circumstances and contingencies. No one is expected to force a rigid model of community policing into a unique environment. Community policing is flexible, amenable to innovation, and adaptive and evolutionary in nature.

From the outset, we expected to observe wide variations in community policing practices, and we knew that not everything innovative would be attributable to community policing. We needed to clarify how we would recognize community policing within each agency. The concept has specific elements of philosophy and programming that are widely accepted as definitive by police practitioners, scholars, reformers, and funding agencies. We elected to focused our study on the three dimensions of reform most widely associated with community policing: problem solving, community engagement (both external dimensions), and organizational adaptation (an internal dimension).

Each of these dimensions can be developed differently by an agency implementing community policing, to adapt to local circumstances. Some agencies adopt new problem-solving practices in incremental steps, involving only a handful of officers. Others make broad, sweeping changes and involve personnel throughout the department. Such differences could complicate our task, right from the beginning. Considering the alternatives, we saw that our objectives would be best served with a case study approach. To achieve the level of insight we wanted would require capturing often subtle variations in the agencies' implementation strategies and actions; mail and telephone surveys would not produce that kind of information. We elected to send two-person teams into the field, partnering academics with police practitioners. Together, they could develop a more complete understanding of community policing as it was being practiced in the 12 police agencies we would visit across the United States.

Supported by the COPS Office, the teams spent 3 or 4 days at each agency, observing community policing in action and discussing its implementation with stakeholders, including police personnel, representatives from other local agencies, politicians, and community members. We selected agencies for this study that were generally thought to be above average in their implementation of community policing. We were not trying to represent community policing as practiced by all U.S. agencies. Rather, our purpose was to understand the meaning and practice of community policing in a sample of agencies that had undertaken its implementation and that had received some measure of recognition for their efforts. We wondered, given its flexibility, to what extent community policing in these agencies would be consistent with the vision and prescriptions of the reform movement.

In the sections that follow, we outline several ways in which the agencies approached the reformers' vision as they implemented change. We note the ways in which they were only partially consistent with that vision and the ways in which they were struggling with implementation.

What are police agencies doing well?

Some of the police agencies we studied had personnel who were thinking about and implementing components of community policing with more sophistication than others. Many seemed knowledgeable about the relative advantages and disadvantages of the generalist and specialist models. Most were aware of the opportunities and challenges associated with delegating decision-making authority to lower levels in the organization. They differed, however,

in how they had approached change. Some agencies moved quickly to implement their new initiatives, while others proceeded cautiously, experimenting with small-scale efforts, learning from experience, and then either making a change permanent or trying something else.

In general, we found that the agencies had done more to adapt internal organizational features to community policing—a potpourri of changes that we call "organizational adaptations"—than they had to adopt practices from its external dimensions. We frequently saw structural changes resulting in greater reliance on civilian employees and volunteers, investments in information technology, appreciation for analysis as a tool for crime prevention and investigation, decentralization, and geographical accountability.

Given a cynical view of the recurring pattern of attending more to internal factors, one might conclude that things had not changed much in the last 3 decades. In 1979, Herman Goldstein's critique of American policing, laying the groundwork for the innovation that he called "problem-oriented policing," described police as immersing themselves in internal operations and management, and losing sight of policing results or outcomes. In the jargon of performance measurement, Goldstein believed that police were overly concerned with "inputs, processes, and outputs," and too little concerned with whether their actions were producing the desired results or "outcomes."

Some kinds of internal changes are essential to support developments in the external dimensions of community policing. For example, we found agencies working to foster collaborative relationships with business and residential communities. Several had shifted their organizational structures to promote geographic accountability and to facilitate the work of officers who specialized in problem solving. Even the agencies that had achieved a measure of success in adapting internal organizational features to community policing had a long way to go, though, if they were to realize the visions of community policing reformers. Frequently, for instance, within agencies that had granted more decision-making authority to lower-ranking personnel, those personnel seemed unable or sometimes unwilling to translate that autonomy into action on the street.

The challenge for police agencies, especially those in the earlier stages of adopting community policing, has been to remain vigilant, paying serious attention to whether proposed new organizational structures and practices would actually promote and support the two most essential external dimensions of community policing—problem solving and community engagement.

What are police agencies doing moderately well?

The process of implementing community policing is evolutionary. In many of the agencies that we visited, the evolution seemed to have stalled in the middle. Overall, the agencies understood and were implementing problem solving, but often in shallow ways. Only a handful of the command staff, specialist officers, and patrol officers whom we met seemed to have accepted this new way of doing business, and their views generally were overshadowed by greater numbers who either did not understand problem solving or rejected it. We found evidence of effort nearly everywhere, but the realities we encountered often fell well short of what reformers were envisioning.

Reformers view problem solving as a more effective approach to policing, capable of producing positive, sustained results in the form of safer and more self-reliant communities. That perspective seemed not to be widely shared in any agency that we visited, although some were embracing it more than others. In most agencies that were experiencing any kind of success, we discovered one or more problem-solving "champions"—personnel working to develop an appreciation among others of the merits of problem solving.

These champions were being challenged by some strong foes: a police culture that still viewed responding to calls for service as the primary job of "real police officers" and an older organizational structure not designed to support problem solving as the norm for conducting police business. Where it existed, problem-oriented policing still relied on largely traditional practices. We observed analytical and creative approaches being used by only a few reform champions determined to keep the idea alive. For problem solving as a policing strategy to advance and gain sophistication, proponents will need to find ways to build broader support inside police departments.

In many agencies, problem-oriented policing appeared suspended midway between acceptance and rejection. Shortcomings seemed to be rooted not in widespread rejection, but rather in an inability to resolve the tug-of-war between countervailing forces. Cultural and structural obstacles to implementation were still in place, being countered by the resilient vestiges of a powerful reform movement of scholars, government agencies, policy elites, and a handful of opinion leaders within police agencies who continued to lend POP their unflinching support.

In spite of all of this, several police agencies were achieving some measure of success, especially in the community engagement dimension. Police personnel were interacting more with the public, and e-mail, mobile telephones, and other communication technologies were giving citizens greater access to police. The agencies were approaching and collaborating with community groups, including some with a history of poor police relations. For example, a few agencies were connecting with advocates for victims of domestic violence and sexual abuse and with minority communities, soliciting their perspectives on a host of issues. In some instances, police personnel in key leadership positions personally were meeting with group members. Overall, police were doing well at including citizens in discussions of substantive policing matters where formerly they had been excluded.

The agencies also were forging more positive working relationships with businesses, other criminal justice agencies, and city departments, including code enforcement offices. Those partnerships were helping police to identify problems and generate nontraditional responses, and they were opening doors for sharing information and resources. Partnerships involving police and other law enforcement agencies were more common due to the growing recognition within the policing industry—especially after 9/11—that stronger relationships between institutions were vital to community safety.

The agencies we visited had experimented with different organizational structures and management practices to facilitate their problem-solving efforts; our observations were consistent with those found in the general research. Agencies had implemented new rank structures, adopted geographic accountability and new deployment strategies, and were trying various other forms of organizational adaptation. All were struggling with competing organizational demands, trying to achieve the proper balance between centralization and decentralization, specialization and generalization, and the employee autonomy crucial to problem solving and employee accountability. They also were trying to find the right balance between the innovative approaches that reformers were working to secure and the conventional policing approaches so firmly institutionalized in the policing industry.

We found that police agencies were doing moderately well with certain strands of reform, but they seemed uniformly to be encountering some kind of blockage in implementing community policing and problem solving. Sometimes the impediment appeared to be inconsistencies with other reforms underway, and sometimes it appeared to be internal apathy or outright resistance. There were also forces in the agencies driving community policing forward. The result: a set of reforms caught in the middle of a force field, its end state remaining uncertain.

What are police agencies *not* doing well?

In all the agencies, we found pockets in which one or more community policing dimensions were underdeveloped, in need of significant attention. Police were sometimes showcasing activities like old wine in new bottles, under the banner of problem solving, attempting to pass off traditional approaches to policing as new and innovative.[216] Similarly, steps ostensibly intended to improve community partnerships sometimes were a façade meant to improve public relations without having to invite genuine collaboration. Aspects of organizational adaptation important to advancing community policing were often neglected. In this section, we report the bad news—what police agencies are not doing well.

Problem solving. In no agency did we find problem-oriented policing to be the primary approach used by officers going about their day-to-day business. We did not encounter widespread rejection of problem solving, but its use was uneven and shallow. This finding was not unique to the agencies that we visited for this study. A natural tension has developed in the problem-oriented policing movement between two sources of knowledge: analytical and experiential. POP advocates argue that officers ought to rely on data analysis to identify problems. Within the police culture, on-the-job experience is regarded as the better guide.

With problem identification generally accepted to be a crucial element of problem-oriented policing, researchers Bichler and Gaines (2005) decided to examine problem-solving effectiveness. They conducted a series of focus groups with officers from a medium-sized southern police department. They found "little consistency between focus groups of officers working in the same district," and recommended that agencies begin collecting and analyzing data from more varied sources to use in identifying problems.[217]

Another pair of researchers (Cordner and Biebel, 2005) used interviews and surveys to assess problem-oriented policing in the San Diego Police Department, a widely acclaimed world leader in implementing problem-oriented policing.[218] They found that nonspecialist officers…

> *…tended to engage in small-scale problem solving with little formal analysis or assessment. Responses generally included enforcement plus one or two more collaborative or nontraditional initiatives.*[219]

The researchers suggested that it was time to distinguish between the everyday problem solving carried out by most officers and the more intensive forms of problem-oriented policing envisioned by reformers.

A fairly recent reflection on the current state of problem-oriented policing concluded that shallow problem-solving efforts with "weak analyses, mostly traditional responses, and limited assessments" have been the norm.[220] Yet the optimistic conclusion was that even shallow problem-oriented policing produces some crime prevention benefits. The authors urged reformers to abandon their quest for the ideal and to "embrace the reality of … ad hoc shallow problem-solving efforts." [221]

Problem-solving processes in the agencies we observed often seemed hampered by the shortcomings of informal problem analysis. We saw virtually no movement toward the "evidence cop" model proposed by criminologist Lawrence Sherman, in which officers are trained to analyze data and sort through evidence as they consider potential interventions. Perhaps this was asking too much of police officers in their current environments. If the analytical elements of problem solving are to take root, perhaps we need to invest in institutional mechanisms that will support and encourage such a fundamental shift. It simply may not be enough to convince police that problem solving is a good idea—the real challenge may be learning how to cultivate their full human resource potential.

Imagine degree and certificate programs at universities where bright young officers could learn the practical skills of problem analysis: survey research, interview methods, database querying, statistics and data analysis, geographic information systems, and research and evaluation design. The result would be a cadre of police officers with the serious analytical skills needed to bring problem analysis into play. Without this or some other kind of large-scale investment in institutional-capacity development, the problem-oriented policing movement will be unsustainable, just like team policing and other worthy policing reform movements that came before it.[222]

Problem identification was not the only neglected feature of effective problem solving. Even in agencies with a national reputation for problem-solving excellence, we saw almost no one assessing the outcomes of their responses. It appeared that the SARA element taken most seriously was "R"—response. We saw occasional evidence of scanning, and in agencies more heavily invested in POP, we saw limited forms of analysis. Responses, on the other hand, were evident everywhere, whether or not directed at well-defined problems. Across the board, assessment was being given a brief nod, if that. Police personnel were not systematically learning which of their responses were more than superficially effective and which were not. At best, one could say that the agencies profiled here had abbreviated the SARA model to SAR—scanning, analysis, response.

Considered along with the findings of other researchers, our observations seemed to underscore that most police personnel would benefit from a deeper understanding of the complete problem-solving process and the nuances of its several components. They also needed better training to understand and use components such as problem analysis and assessment to achieve sustained results.

Community engagement. Community policing's community engagement dimension is based on the belief that developing social capital and collective efficacy among residents will build stronger neighborhoods and reduce crime and disorder. Community policing reforms emerged in part in reaction to the poor relationships between police and distressed urban and minority communities that featured prominently in the media in the 1960s and 1970s. For the first time, politicians began openly discussing reform. Yet in the time that had passed between then and this study, community policing had failed to evolve in policing agencies to the point that officers would routinely participate in processes that could strengthen neighborhoods and help them become more self-sufficient.

Community engagement is a complex undertaking, but it offers potential for a tremendous payoff for police and the communities they serve. One factor in its underdevelopment might have been the agencies' narrow concept of the public role in policing matters. In many, "partnership" and "community involvement" still seemed to translate as "citizens should participate by reporting crimes and identifying suspects—nothing more." Citizen police academies might be acquainting members of the public with police procedures and perspectives, but police were not soliciting the citizens' perspectives.

Engagement of citizens in discussions of police matters, inviting them to help set priorities and develop responses to problems, was rarely seen, and the efforts we did observe were inconsistent. Further, the agencies could have been making better use of information technologies to support problem solving and to give officers time to work on community engagement. In fact, commitment to this idea seemed to be missing everywhere we went.

The disconnect between police and their constituents persisted even though community-based information sources, formal and informal, have been shown to produce more comprehensive understandings of problems, a wider range of resources and responses, and improved outcomes. Instead, we found agencies continuing to rely on more traditional responses to problems such as stings and, that stock cliché of police everywhere, "increasing patrols in the area." They were missing the opportunity to respond in creative ways that held greater potential for producing lasting effects. In some cases, police had carefully cultivated new partnerships, but were not taking full advantage of them.

Organizational adaptation. Several agencies were experimenting with their structures, management, and even cultures to support the ethos of community policing and problem solving, with more or less success. Most had launched community policing using a specialist model; few had progressed to a generalized model in which personnel throughout the organization would assume responsibility for community policing. Organizational adaptations crucial to the success of any community policing initiative were notably absent from the reform landscape. Most important, nowhere did we find a majority of officers on the street taking the philosophy of community policing seriously. *Some* parts of community policing were being embraced by *some* officers in *some* places, *some* of the time.

Disregard for community policing was reinforced by performance measurements that continued to encourage older approaches rather than rewarding the skills and outcomes associated with community policing. Appraisal criteria remained largely unchanged in the police agencies, despite rhetoric about the importance of community policing.

Together, the research and our experiences shed light on a reform movement whose on-the-street practice looked very different from what reformers had envisioned. To be sure, we found community policing being conducted well by some individuals and specialist units. To our knowledge, however, no agency could claim generalist police officers who were routinely practicing community policing. Criminologists and policing scholars could initiate a fruitful line of research by testing hypotheses for overcoming the obstacles that seem to have stalled the momentum of this broad, influential movement. Such research would serve the community policing movement, and it would contribute to a deeper understanding of the policing industry, including its cultures, its structures, and its receptivity or resistance to reform.

Homeland security and community policing

Preparing with a sense of urgency for catastrophic events that have the potential for mass casualties is both compelling and overwhelming. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, police agencies have wrestled with a startling number of new roles, responsibilities, and potential reforms. Imagine the response before 9/11 if police executives had been told to invest in gamma detectors and to work with their local fire departments to establish incident-command protocols. Police agencies and the humans who staff them simply have limits in how much new information they can process at one time.

No doubt, concerns with homeland security have distracted police agencies from their focus on community policing and problem solving. Focusing on preparing for a catastrophic event with the potential for mass casualties is far more tangible and compelling than organizing around creating safe, healthy communities with high regard for police and legal authority.

Looking closely at factors that influence police reform—both those that motivate and those that constrain reform—we can foresee a fruitful blending of homeland security concerns with the concerns of community policing. Homeland security reforms are motivated by virtually everyone, opposed by few. Community policing reforms have been motivated by scholars, police reformers, government officials, and by citizens living in troubled communities. Its constraints appear to be the current police culture, lingering vestiges of traditional organizational structures, and older institutionalized assumptions about how the job of policing ought to be done.

A force-field analysis of the two reforms as competitors for agency attention would show homeland security as the clear victor.[223] Such a competitive view, however, would obscure the complexity of police attempts to blend or balance the two kinds of reforms rather than letting one displace the other. Influential police executives have publicly refused to engage in practices in the name of homeland security that would harm police-community relationships. For example, police in Dearborn, Michigan, engaged in homeland security strategies such as target hardening and opportunity reduction, but they elected not to engage in intensive surveillance. They did not want to damage hard-won working relationships with Dearborn's large Arab and Muslim community.[224] Similarly, police in Portland, Oregon, withdrew from the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force because the city council and mayor found some of its practices conflicting with state law.[225]

Many agencies will no doubt make different choices, and some may allow homeland security practices to trump community policing. Evidence from Australia, for instance, suggests that police preparations for terrorist incidents there have given rise to harsh paramilitary police practices.[226] Observers of American police started noting a trend toward increasing militarization even before 9/11, a trend that has probably gained momentum since then.[227] This trend could work in opposition to the approaches and outcomes toward which community policing reformers have worked.

Charting the future

Criminologist Graeme Newman claims that across time and place, humans have had an instinct for what he calls "the punishment response." The will to punish wrongdoers seems as reflexive as scratching an itch or pulling back when frightened. Imagine for a moment having the opportunity to conduct a whirlwind tour of the punishment response throughout the world. You might visit Singapore or the Philippines where engaging in drug trade is punishable by death. You might stop in the inner-city neighborhoods of the tiny Caribbean nation of Trinidad and Tobago where gang leaders "give licks" (corporal punishment) to young neighborhood men who violate an informal code of conduct called "the order." In Alaska, you could observe the behavior of any of several tribes that "banish" their violent members.[228]

Your tour would take you to places far and wide—across religious, ethnic, geographical, cultural, and political boundaries—and you would see that the instinct to punish, expressing itself in different ways, is a universal human phenomenon. Analysts of American policing do not often invoke philosophies of punishment, especially not in the community policing movement. Yet the punishment instinct, tightly woven as it is into the fabric of the police subculture, stands as a fundamental roadblock to implementing community policing. We would enjoy the riches of kings if we could collect a dime for each time a police officer has rejected community policing for being "easy on criminals" or for causing his or her work to be compared with that of a social worker. One could regard such perspectives as a flaw in the culture of police, and there may be some truth in that because police favor punishment more than most. However, the strong instinct to punish wrongdoers transcends occupation.

Police will reject any reform perceived to be "soft on crime." Clearly community policing as a movement bumps up against the punishment instinct. The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) in the U.S. Department of Justice (sponsor of this study) encountered this issue when former Baltimore Police Commissioner Tom Frazier was appointed as the COPS Office's new director in 1999. The COPS Office definition of community policing had been similar to the one used by the authors of this volume. Frazier insisted upon modifying the original COPS Office definition, making "arresting offenders" one of community policing's explicit components.

Many members of the police reform community, for whom arrest was a tool rather than an end in itself, viewed the move as inconsistent with their understanding of community policing. Herman Goldstein, writing about his vision of problem-oriented policing, was explicit about arrest not being a primary policing goal.[229] Still, Frazier's motives were understandable. A lifelong police officer, he likely understood the challenge of making community policing palatable within the police culture, accommodating the punishment instinct. Underscoring the explicit use of arrest was one way to do that.

The most substantive problem with the altered definition was its endorsement of the very mindset that community policing reformers were seeking to change—the idea that *arrest was the principal policing tool* for improving the safety and quality of community life. Preoccupation with arrest has been a major obstacle to the acceptance of community policing. In our experience, the punishment instinct is so strong among police that it outweighs their broader concerns for effectiveness.

Based on experience, we suspect that given a choice between two practices—one that has proven effective at reducing crime but is characterized in the policing environment as "soft on crime," or one shown to be ineffective but appearing to be "tough on crime"—most police would take the latter. We are not aware of any direct scientific evidence to support this claim. It is an admittedly unsupported case built on a mountain of circumstantial evidence gleaned during more than a decade of visiting police agencies around the world, including the 12 profiled here. To be fair, research has found that even physicians tend to continue ineffective treatment practices after being exposed to evidence that suggests more effective alternatives.[230] We acknowledge that the police are not alone in their resistance to evidence-based practices.

Conclusions

Community policing has benefited *and* suffered from its lack of a clear definition and a more structured set of programs and practices. It benefits when local agencies are free to adapt the community policing philosophy to their own needs and circumstances. It suffers when agencies are able to make symbolic reforms in the name of community policing without institutionalizing the underlying practices that truly impact risk factors for crime, disorder, fear, and community dissatisfaction with police.

The future of community policing is unclear in an era when so many other reform movements appear to have established a foothold in American police agencies, many of them antithetical to community policing. A set of reforms variously referred to as quality-of-life policing, broken-windows policing, or zero-tolerance policing is sometimes placed under the banner of community policing. Yet depending on how these are implemented, they can harm police-community relations and plant seeds for long-term *increases* in crime.[231]

Similarly, CompStat is not inherently inconsistent with community policing, but as implemented in American police agencies, CompStat can engender the micromanaging and highly centralized decision-making that community policing discourages.[232] Finally, as we have shown, some reforms associated with homeland security are consistent with community policing, but others, such as unchecked surveillance practices on people not suspected of committing a crime, are more likely to undermine public trust and confidence in police.

The COPS Office has attempted to clarify what they believe to be the context of community policing within what could be seen as competing reforms. In their opinion, the field of policing is constantly going through adaptation in the strategies that are employed, as a response to emerging crime and disorder issues; these innovations and reforms result from experimentation and evolution that is not only natural, but should be encouraged. In their view, the rise of competing strategies is due to the changing nature of the issues facing society, and that the police are required to develop new methods and tools to both respond to and also prevent these crime and disorder issues. Nonetheless, COPS continues to promote community policing as an effective, overarching framework for organizing the thinking around the development and implementation of these new strategies, and by extension community policing provides the opportunity to improve upon the success of these strategies while also advancing the implementation of true partnership development and analytical problem solving.[233]

Not so long ago, community policing was a dominant voice in the police reform environment. Now it is one among many. Several forces are working to ensure that it will continue to be heard, while other forces seem equally determined or even destined to try to drown that voice out. Whether community policing ideals continue to influence the policing industry and its constituents depends largely on whether its champions can find their collective way through the obstacles to fully implement community policing as it is intended: lasting change in how communities and police come together to make neighborhoods self-reliant—stronger and safer and less vulnerable to crime. We hope this volume helps to light the path for those who try.

ENDNOTES

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Chapter 4

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Chapter 6

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Chapter 12

203. The data on which this report is based are limited in scope because the viewpoints of non-CPOs were under-represented. Site visit observations and interviews were conducted nearly exclusively with department administrators, community policing officers, and their supervisors.

Chapter 13

204. Major Johnson's promotion to chief in summer 2000 temporarily eliminated the rank of major because he had been the only major in Greenville at that time. This caused an unintentional disruption in the layering of the department's organization chart. It was unclear at the time of our visit whether or not the department would restore the rank.

Chapter 14

205. HCSO is responsible for three jail facilities and for security for Hillsborough County Courts.

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Chapter 16

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COPS

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office)
is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing
the practice of community policing by the nation's state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies through information and grant resources. The community
policing philosophy promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic
use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the
immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social
disorder, and fear of crime. In its simplest form, community policing is about
building relationships and solving problems.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies
to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy cutting-edge
crime-fighting technologies, and develop and test innovative policing strategies. The
COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community
members and local government leaders and all levels of law enforcement.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $16 billion to add community
policing officers to the nation's streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support
crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help
advance community policing. More than 500,000 law enforcement personnel,
community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS
Office-funded training organizations.

The COPS Office has produced more than 1,000 information products—and
distributed more than 2 million publications—including Problem Oriented Policing
Guides, Grant Owner's Manuals, fact sheets, best practices, and curricula. And
in 2010, the COPS Office participated in 45 law enforcement and public-safety
conferences in 25 states in order to maximize the exposure and distribution of these
knowledge products. More than 500 of those products, along with other products
covering a wide area of community policing topics—from school and campus safety
to gang violence—are currently available, at no cost, through its online Resource
Information Center at www.cops.usdoj.gov. More than 2 million copies have been
downloaded in FY2010 alone. The easy to navigate and up to date website is also
the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.

OVER TIME, THE COMMUNITY POLICING REFORM MOVEMENT HAS COME TO MEAN MANY different things to different people. In fact, the community policing movement has wrestled with tension between philosophical ambiguity and implementation specificity for years. So what is community policing? What does it look like? What does it mean when a police agency says that it practices community policing? This report explores these questions by examining the implementation of community policing in 12 local police agencies across the nation, drawing conclusions from tangible and visible phenomena about what "community policing" means to the agencies claiming to practice it. It describes and analyzes the experiences of local law enforcement agencies and the lessons learned as they work to define, make sense of, and implement community policing, and synthesizes what was learned in eight community policing topic-specific chapters. While there is no one-size fits-all approach to implementing community policing or any other innovation, this report offers police officials at all levels, from patrol officers to police chiefs, ideas that can be used in their own organizations to help implement effective community policing throughout the United States.