

The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight

Key Principles and Practices for Effectiveness and Sustainability

Michael Vitoroulis
Cameron McElhiney
Liana Perez



COPS
Community Oriented Policing Services
U.S. Department of Justice



The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight

**Key Principles and Practices for
Effectiveness and Sustainability**

This project was supported, in whole or in part, by grant number 2016-CK-WX-K017 awarded to the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) or contributor(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific individuals, agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s), the contributor(s), or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s), the contributor(s), nor the COPS Office can vouch for their current validity.

This resource was developed under a federal award and may be subject to copyright. The U.S. Department of Justice reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use and to authorize others to use this resource for Federal Government purposes. This resource may be freely distributed and used for noncommercial and educational purposes only.

Recommended citation:

Vitoroulis, Michael, Cameron McElhiney, and Liana Perez. 2021. *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight: Key Principles and Practices for Effectiveness and Sustainability*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Published 2021

Contents

Executive Summary	v
Introduction	1
Research methodology	1
Data collection and analysis	1
Nine case studies of civilian oversight agencies	2
Report on the State of the Field and Effective Practices	4
Brief history of civilian oversight	4
Models of civilian oversight	6
Trends in contemporary civilian oversight of law enforcement	7
Effective Practices in Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement	11
The “Effective Practices” framework	11
Recommended Effective Practices	17
References	19
About the COPS Office	23



Executive Summary

In the 2010s, viral videos of seemingly routine police encounters depicting tragedy have sent shockwaves through both communities and law enforcement agencies across the country, setting off a national conversation on the relationship communities have with law enforcement. At the national level, these encounters have coincided with reduced public confidence in American policing,¹ particularly among youth and minority populations.² While low levels of trust have existed in certain communities throughout history, the most recent wave of high-profile incidents has prompted widespread calls to meaningfully address issues of community concern, such as officer-involved shootings and excessive force, discriminatory policing, aggressive crime fighting strategies, and accountability for misconduct. Across the nation, law enforcement leaders, academics, and government officials have seemingly reached a consensus that addressing such issues with a focus on public trust and legitimacy is integral to fair and effective public safety in an increasingly diverse nation.

The response by governments, law enforcement executives, community groups, and technical advisors to the challenge of mending police-community relations has been significant. In the aftermath of unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere, then President Barack Obama established the Task Force on 21st Century Policing to identify policing practices that promote public safety and build community trust in law enforcement.³ The *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing*, published in May 2015, offered several recommendations, including many relating to public trust, procedural justice, and legitimacy; accountability and transparency; community policing efforts; and the inclusion of community members in policy development, training programs, and review of force incidents.

In addition, the task force's report recommended that civilian oversight of law enforcement be established in accordance with the needs of the community and with input from local law enforcement stakeholders.⁴ Civilian oversight of law enforcement can contribute significantly to the implementation and institutionalization of many of the task force's recommendations and further the development of public trust, legitimacy, cooperation, and collaboration necessary to improve police-community relations and enhance public safety.

At its core, civilian oversight can be broadly defined as the independent, external, and ongoing review of a law enforcement agency and its operations by individuals outside of the law enforcement agency being overseen. Civilian oversight may entail, but is not limited to, the independent investigation of

1. Jones, "In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years."

2. Norman, "Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average."

3. President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report*, 1.

4. President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report*, 26.

complaints alleging officer misconduct, auditing or monitoring various aspects of the overseen law enforcement agency, analyzing patterns or trends in activity, issuing public reports, and issuing recommendations on discipline, training, policies, and procedures. Taken together, these functions can promote greater law enforcement accountability, increased transparency, positive organizational change, and improved responsiveness to community needs and concerns.

By acting as an independent and neutral body reviewing the work of the law enforcement agency and its sworn staff, civilian oversight of law enforcement offers a unique element of legitimacy that internal accountability and review mechanisms simply cannot. Similarly, a civilian oversight agency's impartiality, neutrality, and adherence to findings of fact can alleviate officer skepticism in internal systems and bolster procedural fairness within the law enforcement agency as a whole.

The organizational structure and authority of civilian oversight agencies in the United States varies widely. While civilian oversight agencies can be broadly categorized into *review-focused*, *investigation-focused*, or *auditor/monitor-focused models*, no two oversight agencies are identical. Effective civilian oversight systems will reflect the particular needs of their local partners and incorporate feedback from community members, law enforcement and their unions, and government stakeholders in order to achieve the most sustainable and appropriate structure. As the field of civilian oversight grows in sophistication, cities are frequently combining various aspects of traditional oversight models to produce hybrid forms best suited for their local context.

As a whole, this report, the nine case studies, and the online toolkit are part of NACOLE's work to expand, improve, and assist civilian oversight of law enforcement efforts throughout the country. This work provides comprehensive guidance for oversight practitioners, law enforcement, community organizations, and local officials to further develop effective civilian oversight. Additional research, guidance, and understanding will be necessary as the field of oversight continues to evolve and grow.

Introduction

In 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) awarded a Community Policing Development (CPD) grant to the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE). NACOLE sought to provide comprehensive guidance on civilian oversight for oversight practitioners, law enforcement, community organizations, and local officials in order to further develop effective civilian oversight throughout the United States. With support and funding from the COPS Office, NACOLE has developed nine in-depth case studies of civilian oversight agencies throughout the United States; a searchable, online database of civilian oversight agencies and their characteristics; and a report on the state of the field and effective practices.

Research methodology

In determining the most relevant trends and developments in contemporary civilian oversight, the authors considered the history of civilian oversight, the evolution of oversight models in the United States, and several other primary and secondary sources, including the following:

- Academic articles, books, and industry publications
- NACOLE's nine case studies of civilian oversight agencies
- NACOLE's report *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, published in 2016 with support from the DOJ Office of Justice Programs (OJP)⁵
- Newspaper and periodical articles pertaining to civilian oversight of law enforcement, law enforcement and criminal justice reform, and law enforcement accountability
- Oversight agency reports, data, and other materials
- Discussions with oversight practitioners and stakeholders in various jurisdictions

Data collection and analysis

Researchers have documented the absence of comprehensive and systematic data on civilian oversight of law enforcement.⁶ Such data could produce insight regarding how civilian oversight functions and lay the groundwork for developing a robust framework for evaluating its impact and performance. With this

5. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*.

6. Prentler and Lewis, "Performance Indicators for Police Oversight Agencies;" Alpert et al., "Citizen Oversight in the United States and Canada;" De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*.

in mind, NACOLE has embarked on two attempts to gather comprehensive data on civilian oversight in the United States. This work draws heavily from two initiatives: the NACOLE/OJP survey of 2016 and the COAD survey beginning in 2017.

NACOLE/OJP survey (2016)

NACOLE's report *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence* drew insights from data gathered by an electronic survey completed by 97 civilian oversight agencies.⁷ This survey captured agency organizational information as well as information pertaining oversight directors' attitudes toward and perceptions of their agencies.

Civilian Oversight Agency Directory (COAD) survey (2017–present)

NACOLE's *Civilian Oversight Agency Directory* survey was developed, with support from the COPS Office as part of this research grant, to provide oversight practitioners, researchers, and community members with a comprehensive and up-to-date database of civilian oversight agencies. Since 2017, NACOLE has issued survey questions to capture additional information on oversight agency authority, functions, processes, resources, and enabling legislation.

The COAD is an ongoing survey that will be updated regularly. The database includes a front-end interface that permits users to filter, search, and sort through the 69 organizational variables the survey captures. The web application, survey, and database can be accessed at <http://directory.nacole.org>.

Throughout this report, data from each survey will refer to the "NACOLE/OJP" survey and "COAD," respectively.

Nine case studies of civilian oversight agencies

As part of this research project, NACOLE, with assistance from the Police Foundation, conducted nine site visits to various jurisdictions throughout the United States with established civilian oversight agencies. The purpose of these site visits was to hold semi-structured interviews with oversight agency staff, local law enforcement representatives, community groups interested in law enforcement accountability, government officials, and union representatives; collect written information and data; and to understand how each oversight agency operates on a day-to-day basis.

These site visits resulted in nine in-depth case studies, detailing the history and evolution of each oversight agency; their organizational structure and interface with both local government and the overseen law enforcement agencies; the scope of their authority and jurisdiction; their resources and staffing; and their procedures for undertaking the various oversight responsibilities.

7. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 18.

In selecting the nine oversight agencies to be studied, NACOLE sought a diverse cross-section of oversight agencies representing various oversight models, geographies, populations, law enforcement department sizes, and histories. The resulting case studies offer practical insights that can be useful to oversight practitioners, community groups, law enforcement members, and other stakeholders in different contexts throughout the country. The cities visited for these case studies are presented in table 1.

Table 1. Characteristics of case study organizations

City	Agency Name	Oversight Model	Year Created	Population
Atlanta, GA	Atlanta Citizen Review Board	Investigation-focused	2007	472,522
Cambridge, MA	Police Review & Advisory Board	Review-focused	1984	113,000
Denver, CO	Office of the Independent Monitor	Auditor/monitor-focused	2004	693,060
Indianapolis, IN	Citizens' Police Complaint Office	Review-focused	1989	864,771
Los Angeles, CA	LAPD Office of the Inspector General	Auditor/monitor-focused	1995	3,976,000
Miami, FL	Civilian Investigative Panel	Investigation-focused	2001	453,579
New Orleans, LA	Independent Police Monitor	Auditor/monitor-focused	2008	391,495
Philadelphia, PA	Police Advisory Commission	Review-focused	1993	1,568,000
Washington, DC	Office of Police Complaints	Investigation-focused	1998	693,972

Report on the State of the Field and Effective Practices

The first half of the *Report on the State of the Field and Effective Practices* provides a brief overview of the history of civilian oversight, the features of traditional oversight models, and original insights on trends and developments on the current state of the field. It includes information on the geography of civilian oversight; patterns in oversight agency functions, authority, staffing, and resources; oversight agency access to department records and information; and developments in community outreach functions performed by oversight agencies across the country. This information is intended to fill existing gaps in the literature on civilian oversight and provide stakeholders with a broader understanding of the contemporary civilian oversight landscape.

Brief history of civilian oversight

Early forms of civilian oversight of law enforcement emerged during the Progressive Era amid calls for eliminating municipal corruption and disentangling the police from such corruption. In some cities, volunteer civilian police commissions were appointed by the mayor or city council to act as the board of directors for the police department, often with the authority to hire and fire the police chief and set department policy.⁸ Ultimately, however, these early police commissions proved ineffective due to the political entrenchment of the appointed commissioners⁹ and their frequent deference to the police chief.¹⁰

A more formalized concept of civilian oversight emerged amid tensions between police and minority communities in the late 1920s. In 1928, the Los Angeles Bar Association established a Committee on Constitutional Rights to record complaints of police misconduct.¹¹ As a nongovernmental body, the commission had no authority to act on complaints received.¹²

From the 1930s to 1950s, riots over race relations and police violence in urban areas gave way to strengthened movements for police accountability and improved civilian complaint processes.¹³ A breakthrough came about in Washington, D.C., in 1948, when the nation's first civilian review board (CRB) was established in response to community concerns over police using excessive force against African Americans and

8. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 18; Police Assessment Resource Center, "Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission," 7.

9. Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, 1–2.

10. Police Assessment Resource Center, "Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission," 8.

11. Alpert et al., "Citizen Oversight in the United States and Canada," 181.

12. Walker, "Chapter 1. The History of Citizen Oversight," 3.

13. Walker, "Chapter 1. The History of Citizen Oversight," 3; Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*, 21.

to lobbying efforts by the Urban League and National Conference of Christians and Jews.¹⁴ This first CRB had limited visibility and effectiveness, reviewing just 54 cases in its first 16 years.¹⁵ The board was eventually abolished in 1995 amid a fiscal crisis and an unmanageable backlog of cases.¹⁶

In 1973, a group of community organizations in Berkeley, California, mounted a successful campaign prompting the city council to pass an ordinance establishing the Police Review Commission—the first civilian oversight agency specifically authorized to independently investigate police complaints.¹⁷ That same year, voters in Detroit approved a city charter amendment creating the all-civilian Detroit Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC), authorized to set department policy and independently investigate and resolve complaints.¹⁸

Less than a decade later, the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC), now known as the Department of Police Accountability, was incorporated into the city's charter in 1982. The OCC signaled a unique development, in that the agency replaced the civilian complaint investigation functions of the San Francisco Police Department.¹⁹

The 1990s brought about significant changes to American policing, reform efforts, and civilian oversight of law enforcement. This decade experienced sharp increases in police recruitment and resources,²⁰ as well as a 41 percent spike in drug-related arrests²¹ and a focus on quality-of-life policing that contributed to the dramatic expansion of practices such as stop-and-frisk.²² Racial disparities in such enforcement,²³ as well as national media coverage of police misconduct and corruption, markedly increased unfavorable public perceptions of police, particularly within minority communities.²⁴ Concurrently, a new wave of civilian oversight agencies with expanded powers emerged, as did new efforts by the DOJ to reform police departments engaging in patterns of unconstitutional policing.

During this period, a new model of civilian oversight focused on systemic issues in law enforcement policies and procedures began to take shape. In 1991, the Seattle city council passed an ordinance establishing an independent civilian auditor to audit and review civilian complaint investigations completed by the Seat-

-
14. Miller, *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature*, 36; De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 19.
 15. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 19; Miller, *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature*, 10.
 16. The Office of Police Complaints (OPC) now provides civilian oversight in Washington, D.C. For more on the history and evolution of civilian oversight in Washington, D.C., see NACOLE's case study on the Office of Police Complaints.
 17. Andi, "Berkeley's Establishment of a Police Review Commission;" Walker, "Chapter 1. The History of Citizen Oversight," 4.
 18. City of Detroit, "Police Commissioners History;" Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*, 34.
 19. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 20.
 20. Koper, Moore, and Roth, *Putting 100,000 Officers on the Street: A Survey-Based Assessment of the Federal COPS Program*.
 21. King and Mauer, "The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s," 3.
 22. Fagan and Davies, "Street Stops and Broken Windows;" Fagan et al., "Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City."
 23. King and Mauer, "The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s," 3; Fagan et al., "Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City," 2–3; Mitchell and Caudy, "Examining Racial Disparities in Drug Arrests."
 24. Lasley, "The Impact of the Rodney King Incident on Citizen Attitudes toward Police;" Tuch and Weitzer, "Trends: Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police;" Weitzer, "Incidents of Police Misconduct and Public Opinion;" Tyler and Fagan, "The Impact of Stop and Frisk Policies."

to lobbying efforts by the Urban League and National Conference of Christians and Jews.¹⁴ This first CRB had limited visibility and effectiveness, reviewing just 54 cases in its first 16 years.¹⁵ The board was eventually abolished in 1995 amid a fiscal crisis and an unmanageable backlog of cases.¹⁶

In 1973, a group of community organizations in Berkeley, California, mounted a successful campaign prompting the city council to pass an ordinance establishing the Police Review Commission—the first civilian oversight agency specifically authorized to independently investigate police complaints.¹⁷ That same year, voters in Detroit approved a city charter amendment creating the all-civilian Detroit Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC), authorized to set department policy and independently investigate and resolve complaints.¹⁸

Less than a decade later, the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC), now known as the Department of Police Accountability, was incorporated into the city's charter in 1982. The OCC signaled a unique development, in that the agency replaced the civilian complaint investigation functions of the San Francisco Police Department.¹⁹

The 1990s brought about significant changes to American policing, reform efforts, and civilian oversight of law enforcement. This decade experienced sharp increases in police recruitment and resources,²⁰ as well as a 41 percent spike in drug-related arrests²¹ and a focus on quality-of-life policing that contributed to the dramatic expansion of practices such as stop-and-frisk.²² Racial disparities in such enforcement,²³ as well as national media coverage of police misconduct and corruption, markedly increased unfavorable public perceptions of police, particularly within minority communities.²⁴ Concurrently, a new wave of civilian oversight agencies with expanded powers emerged, as did new efforts by the DOJ to reform police departments engaging in patterns of unconstitutional policing.

During this period, a new model of civilian oversight focused on systemic issues in law enforcement policies and procedures began to take shape. In 1991, the Seattle city council passed an ordinance establishing an independent civilian auditor to audit and review civilian complaint investigations completed by the Seat-

-
14. Miller, *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature*, 36; De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 19.
 15. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 19; Miller, *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature*, 10.
 16. The Office of Police Complaints (OPC) now provides civilian oversight in Washington, D.C. For more on the history and evolution of civilian oversight in Washington, D.C., see NACOLE's case study on the Office of Police Complaints.
 17. Andi, "Berkeley's Establishment of a Police Review Commission;" Walker, "Chapter 1. The History of Citizen Oversight," 4.
 18. City of Detroit, "Police Commissioners History;" Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*, 34.
 19. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 20.
 20. Koper, Moore, and Roth, *Putting 100,000 Officers on the Street: A Survey-Based Assessment of the Federal COPS Program*.
 21. King and Mauer, "The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s," 3.
 22. Fagan and Davies, "Street Stops and Broken Windows;" Fagan et al., "Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City."
 23. King and Mauer, "The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s," 3; Fagan et al., "Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City," 2–3; Mitchell and Caudy, "Examining Racial Disparities in Drug Arrests."
 24. Lasley, "The Impact of the Rodney King Incident on Citizen Attitudes toward Police;" Tuch and Weitzer, "Trends: Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police;" Weitzer, "Incidents of Police Misconduct and Public Opinion;" Tyler and Fagan, "The Impact of Stop and Frisk Policies."

the Police Department's Internal Investigations Section.²⁵ Two years later, city councilmembers in San Jose, California, proactively approved an ordinance creating an Independent Police Auditor (IPA). While modeled after Seattle's civilian auditor,²⁶ the San Jose IPA was given a broader mandate and was authorized to review the complaint investigations completed by the San Jose Police Department (SJPD), analyze complaint trends and statistics, and review and recommend improvements to SJPD policies and procedures.²⁷

The turn of the century has brought renewed attention to issues surrounding law enforcement misconduct. Several violent and sometimes fatal encounters captured on video and widely circulated through social media have yielded coalitions of community groups and campaigns organizing for police accountability and racial justice nationwide.²⁸ In addition, the growing sophistication of data-based, investigative journalism has brought attention to these issues in many local contexts.²⁹

One of the most notable expansions of civilian oversight has been in the field of corrections. While NACOLE has been able to identify at least two agencies that were performing correctional oversight before 1990,³⁰ there are currently an estimated 15 oversight agencies with jurisdiction over the county sheriff, which in most jurisdictions is responsible for managing local jails.³¹

Models of civilian oversight

There is a general consensus that American civilian oversight agencies broadly follow the three models of review-focused, investigation-focused, or auditor/monitor-focused oversight, with relatively minor organizational differences distinguishing each model type.³² The review-focused model is the most prevalent form of civilian oversight in the United States, while the auditor/monitor-focused model has become increasingly common since 2000.

25. ACLU of Washington, "Seattle: A Call for an Independent Office for Police Accountability."

26. ACLU of Washington, "Seattle: A Call for an Independent Office for Police Accountability."

27. Walker, "Chapter 1. The History of Citizen Oversight," 5; Ferdik, Rojek, and Alpert, "Citizen Oversight in the United States and Canada," 112–13.

28. For an overview of some of the organizing work sparked by these events, see Lowery, *They Can't Kill Us All*.

29. See, for example, Kelly, Lower, and Rich, "Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers Fired for Misconduct Back on the Streets;" NJ Advance Media, "The Force Report;" Taggart, Hayes, and Pham, "Here are the Secret Records on Thousands of New York Police Misconduct Cases."

30. This includes the New York City Board of Correction, incorporated in the New York City charter in 1977 to perform oversight of the city's Department of Correction, and the San Diego Citizen's Law Enforcement Review Board, established in 1990.

31. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 64. Note: This number assumes that civilian oversight agencies with jurisdiction over the county sheriff perform correctional oversight. This is because sheriffs in the United States typically manage jails within the county or municipality in the majority of jurisdictions. This number does not include correctional oversight where county or municipal jails are managed by a law enforcement agency other than the sheriff, such as a Department of Corrections or similar. Similarly, it is possible that some of the agencies in this figure oversee a sheriff's department's patrol function and are thus not involved in overseeing activities and conditions within county jails.

32. Police Assessment Resource Center, "Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission;" Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*; De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*; Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*.

An emerging trend in contemporary civilian oversight is hybrid models of oversight. Many newer civilian oversight agencies perform functions or are organized in ways that go beyond the traditional definitions of the review-focused, investigation-focused, or auditor/monitor-focused models, combining several oversight functions in an effort to create an oversight system that is both proactive and reactive.³³

1. **Review-focused models** typically assess the quality of finalized complaint investigations undertaken by the police or sheriff department's internal affairs unit or conduct reviews of the overseen law enforcement agency's policies, procedures, and disciplinary activities. Review-focused models typically consist of volunteer boards and commissions and may be involved in hearing appeals, holding public forums, and making recommendations for further investigation of complaints.
2. **Investigation-focused models** employ professionally trained staff to investigate complaints of alleged misconduct independently and separately from the police or sheriff's department they are responsible for overseeing. Investigation-focused agencies are typically authorized to receive complaints. These agencies are increasingly being endowed with the authority to mediate complaints, analyze department policies and procedures, and issue recommendations to the overseen department.
3. **Auditor/monitor-focused** models take a variety of organizational forms, yet are all focused on large-scale, systemic law enforcement reform. Auditor/monitor agencies may review internal complaint investigation processes, evaluate police policies, practices, and training, actively participate in open investigations, and conduct wide-scale analyses of patterns in complaints and communicate their findings to the public.
4. **Hybrid civilian oversight exists in two ways:** hybrid agencies and hybrid systems. In the first case, an agency may primarily focus on one oversight function while also performing other functions (such as reviewing internal investigations and auditing policy compliance). In the latter case, a single jurisdiction may have multiple agencies overseeing the same department, such as an independent investigative agency and an inspector general, or a monitor agency and a civilian board acting in an advisory capacity to the law enforcement agency or other civilian oversight agency. Individual agencies assuming hybrid forms are increasingly common, but several jurisdictions have also created multiple agencies responsible for performing different oversight functions of the same law enforcement department.

Trends in contemporary civilian oversight of law enforcement

NACOLE drew from the COAD survey, NACOLE/OJP survey, oversight agency reports and written materials, and conversations with oversight practitioners to understand trends in oversight models, authority, organizational structure, resources, and functions. The most significant findings are presented here.

33. Harris, "Holding Police Accountability Theory to Account."

Growth and geography of civilian oversight in the United States

The NACOLE/OJP report found that civilian oversight is now more stable than it was in its earlier stages. While early resistance from politicians and law enforcement unions resulted in the failure and elimination of many of the nation's early civilian oversight agencies, those established more recently have been more likely to survive. Over half of the oversight agencies that responded to the NACOLE/OJP survey indicated that their agency has been in existence for over 16 years.³⁴

In mid-2005, an estimated 100 civilian oversight agencies were in existence.³⁵ By 2010, this had only increased to 102. After 2010, however, the rate of civilian oversight growth began to increase significantly; by 2016, NACOLE was able to identify 144 civilian oversight agencies.³⁶ As of late 2019, researchers had identified approximately 166 civilian oversight agencies operating in 140 jurisdictions: a 39 percent increase in the total number of civilian oversight agencies in just nine years.

The compiled data similarly show that the auditor/monitor-focused model of oversight has expanded rapidly over the past decade. While review-focused models of oversight remain by far the most common, the auditor/monitor-focused model has recently surpassed the investigation-focused model as the second most common form of oversight. From 2010 to 2019, the auditor/monitor-focused model grew 42 percent, compared to the investigation-focused model's 38 percent growth during the same period.

Although the geography of civilian oversight remains uneven, municipalities with oversight have become increasingly diverse in size. Among the 140 jurisdictions identified to have some form of civilian oversight, a large share of them are concentrated on the western and eastern coasts of the United States. A handful of states, largely in the Midwest, do not have any form of civilian oversight.

Law enforcement agencies subject to civilian oversight

Responses to the NACOLE/OJP survey revealed that municipal police departments account for 82 percent of the law enforcement agencies subject to civilian oversight; county sheriffs constitute 15 percent. Other types of law enforcement agencies are gradually being subjected to civilian oversight as well. Beginning in 2011, the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Police Department was subject to oversight from the BART Office of the Independent Police Auditor (OIPA) and the BART Police Citizen Review Board (PCRB) created in 2011. Oversight agencies are also being established for university police, such as the University of California, Davis Police Accountability Board (PAB) which oversees the university's police force.

34. Harris, "Holding Police Accountability Theory to Account," 35.

35. Walker, "Chapter 1. The History of Citizen Oversight," 1.

36. Compilation of civilian oversight agencies produced by Jillian Aldebron, JD, Howard University, for the National Institute of Justice W.E.B. DuBois Program of Research on Race and Crime, Grant No. 2016-R2-CX-0055, "Do DOJ Intervention and Citizen Oversight Improve Police Accountability."

Civilian oversight in federal- and state-level consent decrees

Federal pattern-or-practice investigations into the constitutionality of local police practices by the Civil Rights Division (CRD) of the DOJ, under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,³⁷ have been strong impetuses for reform, including establishing or strengthening pre-existing civilian oversight systems.³⁸ Jurisdictions where federal intervention has led to the development or strengthening of civilian oversight include Albuquerque, New Mexico; Baltimore, Maryland; Cincinnati, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; Ferguson, Missouri; New Orleans, Louisiana; Newark, New Jersey; Portland, Oregon; and Washington, D.C. In Chicago, Illinois, and Riverside, California, state attorneys general have initiated pattern-or-practice investigations and the jurisdiction entered a consent decree at the state level.

Recommendation authority

A core function of civilian oversight includes the issuance of recommendations to the overseen law enforcement agency. These recommendations may concern findings on individual misconduct investigations, discipline for sustained misconduct, training, and department policies and procedures.

The COAD survey revealed that policy and procedure recommendations are the most common form of recommendation that oversight agencies are authorized to issue: nearly all survey respondents indicated such authority. Less than half—44.5 percent—of the COAD respondents reported having the authority to recommend discipline on misconduct cases.

Legislation establishing civilian oversight is increasingly adopting language requiring that the overseen law enforcement agency issue a written response to all recommendations made by the oversight agency.

Oversight budgets

The type of oversight model appears to be a strong determinant of oversight agency budgets. As noted in the NACOLE/OJP report, investigation-focused models are generally the most expensive forms of oversight because they are staffed by full-time professional investigators.³⁹ Conversely, review-focused models tend to be the least expensive because they rely on volunteer civilian boards or commissions to review completed internal investigations.⁴⁰

One trait shared by a majority of oversight agencies is that their budgets rarely exceed 0.5 percent of the budget of the law enforcement agencies they oversee. Nearly 70 percent of COAD respondents reported budgets less than or equal to 0.5 percent of the subject law enforcement agency. Nine percent of agencies reported budgets exceeding 1 percent of the overseen law enforcement agency's budget, most of which are investigation-focused models.

37. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a).

38. For an overview of the Civil Rights Division's work on police reform, see: Civil Rights Division, *The Civil Rights Division's Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994–Present*.

39. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 24–26.

40. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 28.

Effective Practices in Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement

The second half of the *Report on the State of the Field and Effective Practices* focuses on the principles that underlie effective civilian oversight and recommended practices that bolster an oversight agency's ability to adhere to these principles. In total, this report offers 73 recommendations across 16 core areas of civilian oversight, such as independence, access to information, processing and managing complaints, analyzing law enforcement policies and data, issuing public reports, evaluating a civilian oversight agency, and performing community outreach. These recommendations have been developed with input from oversight professionals throughout the country and include commentary as well as additional references to assist in their implementation. While these recommendations do not cover all aspects of civilian oversight, they should be taken into consideration to determine their propriety in local contexts.

The “Effective Practices” framework

The surging growth and expansion of civilian oversight over the past decade has spurred conversations among practitioners, government officials, law enforcement, and other stakeholders regarding the application of “best practices” in the field. As part of its recommendations on policy and oversight, the *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* included an action item directing the COPS Office to “provide technical assistance and collect best practices from existing civilian oversight efforts.”⁴¹

Stakeholders seek information on practices proven to work, methods to strengthen or improve civilian oversight, and ways that desired outcomes can be achieved most effectively and efficiently. In the field of civilian oversight, however, there are important limitations that must be taken into consideration regarding the propriety and applicability of what are commonly understood as “best practice” approaches. As such, NACOLE proposes an “effective practices” framework that takes into consideration the core values and the thirteen principles that are the foundation for successful and effective oversight.

These effective practices value the diverse perspectives and wisdom of experienced practitioners while acknowledging that, within the field of civilian oversight, there are several possible paths to success. Furthermore, they are consistent with the “best fit” approach to structuring civilian oversight and prioritizing stakeholder input and dialogue, rather than merely prescribing the “best” in all contexts.

41. President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report*, 26.

Thirteen principles for effective civilian oversight of law enforcement

Based largely on NACOLE’s “Core Elements of Successful Oversight,”⁴² the following set of 13 principles takes into consideration findings that have emerged from the research undertaken for this project. They reflect information gleaned from scholars and oversight professionals, who have worked to identify the most important aspects of effective civilian oversight,⁴³ as well as conversations this report’s authors have had with experienced oversight practitioners. Together, these 13 principles form the preconditions for effective civilian oversight of law enforcement.

In many ways, these principles are interrelated. An oversight agency cannot be successful by emphasizing one principle while de-emphasizing another. Building effective oversight requires balancing and prioritizing these principles, based on what stakeholders determine to be most important for the community the agency serves.

1. Independence

In its broadest sense, independence refers to an absence of real or perceived influence from law enforcement, political actors, and other special interests looking to affect the operations of the civilian oversight. Independence is widely understood to be imperative to an oversight agency’s success and legitimacy.⁴⁴ An oversight agency must be able to act impartially, fairly, and in a manner that maintains community and stakeholder trust. In order to maintain legitimacy, an agency must be able to demonstrate the extent and impact of its independence from the overseen law enforcement agency—especially in the face of high-profile issues or incidents.

2. Clearly defined and adequate jurisdiction and authority

An oversight agency’s jurisdiction and scope of authority are crucial to its success and effectiveness. While expectations regarding civilian oversight can vary significantly, having adequate jurisdiction and authority are fundamental in achieving organizational goals and ensuring the oversight agency can be responsive to communities.⁴⁵ To be effective, an agency’s jurisdiction and authority must be both adequate and clearly defined in order to prevent confusion and differing interpretations of the oversight agency’s authority.

42. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 36–44.

43. Perez, Common Sense About Police Review; Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*; Walker, “Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor’s Office;” Bobb, “Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States;” Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*; King, “Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards to Ensure Police Accountability and Strengthen Police-Community Relations;” De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*.

44. Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*; Walker, “Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor’s Office;” Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*; Anderson et al., *Law Enforcement Oversight: Limited Independence, Authority & Access to Information Impede Effectiveness*.

45. De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 37; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, 7.

3. Unfettered access to records and facilities

The ability to review all records relevant to an investigation or other matters within the scope of a civilian oversight agency's authority in a timely manner is essential to providing effective, informed, and fact-driven oversight. Similarly, agencies performing correctional oversight must have unfettered access to facilities and staff. Without timely and reliable access to department records, information, and facilities, oversight practitioners and volunteers cannot make decisions that meaningfully address areas of concern.

4. Access to law enforcement executives and internal affairs staff

The effectiveness of civilian oversight can hinge on an agency's ability to effectively communicate with law enforcement officials regarding matters of concern identified throughout the course of the oversight agency's work. Whether to discuss policy, discipline, an individual misconduct investigation, or any other matter within the agency's purview, oversight must be structured so that the appropriate law enforcement officials are directly accessible and responsive to issues raised by the civilian oversight agency.⁴⁶ This sustained dialogue and communication between law enforcement and oversight stakeholders promotes cooperation and ensures that those involved can develop mutual understanding and support for each other's role in promoting greater accountability.

5. Full cooperation

In addition to having access to relevant records and department executives, effective civilian oversight requires the full cooperation of all officers and department staff throughout the course of its work.⁴⁷ Full cooperation is necessary for conducting thorough investigations and obtaining sufficient information for any work performed by the civilian oversight agency. The conditions of such cooperation must respect due process rights and an individual's constitutional right against self-incrimination.

6. Sustained stakeholder support

An otherwise well-designed civilian oversight mechanism can be undermined over time by a lack of meaningful and sustained support from those who can contribute to an agency's success.⁴⁸ This lack of support can take many forms, such as failing to provide the agency with adequate authority or resources, selecting ineffective managers or leaving board appointments vacant for prolonged periods of time, disregarding recommendations or findings, or remaining unwilling to address outstanding issues relating to the effective functioning of the civilian oversight agency. While establishing and supporting civilian oversight may be politically expedient in times of crisis, successful oversight requires the sustained support and interest of stakeholders who value independence, accountability, and transparency.⁴⁹

46. Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, 7.

47. Walker, "Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office."

48. Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, 7.

49. Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, 6.

7. Adequate funding and operational resources

To ensure that work performed is thorough, timely, and skillful, adequate resources are necessary. In several jurisdictions, budgetary and staffing constraints have presented significant barriers to the civilian oversight agency's ability to perform critical oversight functions in a manner that is adequate, efficient, and meets the needs and expectations of community stakeholders.⁵⁰ Political stakeholders must ensure that their support for civilian oversight includes a sustained commitment to providing adequate and necessary resources.

8. Public reporting and transparency

Law enforcement agencies and their internal investigations have typically been shrouded in secrecy and public suspicion.⁵¹ The fundamental goal of civilian oversight is to have an independent entity bring transparency to this historically opaque process. Civilian oversight provides a unique opportunity for the public to learn about misconduct complaints and other areas of the law enforcement agency that serves the community. As such, issuing regular public reports is critical to an agency's credibility.⁵² Public reports should in no way be censored or modified by law enforcement or political stakeholders.⁵³ Such a practice may undermine public confidence in the agency's independence and ability to meaningfully address matters of interest to the community.

9. Policy patterns in practice analysis

Performing analyses of law enforcement policies and patterns in practice may be among the most critical functions a civilian oversight agency can perform.⁵⁴ Such analyses have great potential to advance the goals of effective civilian oversight by addressing systemic problems of law enforcement agencies and by formulating recommendations that will improve relations with communities. By performing data-driven and evidence-based analyses of specific issues, oversight agencies can pinpoint areas of concern and formulate recommendations for improvement. To hold the overseen law enforcement agency's executives accountable, timely written responses to the oversight agency's recommendations should be required and made public.

10. Community outreach

A civilian oversight body is an institution representing the interests of the local community; conducting outreach to the community and local stakeholders is essential to its effectiveness.⁵⁵ Outreach enables an oversight agency to build awareness of its existence, share reports and findings with the public, build relationships with stakeholders, recruit volunteers, solicit community input and involvement, facilitate

50. King, "Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards to Ensure Police Accountability and Strengthen Police-Community Relations," 118; Olson, *Citizens Advisory/Review Board Spokane County Sheriff's Office Oversight Review*, 6.

51. Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, 10.

52. Jerome, "Chapter 3. Credibility, Impartiality, and Independence in Citizen Oversight," 38.

53. Walker, "Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office," 6.

54. Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability*.

55. Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*, De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 42–43.

learning and greater understanding, broker improved relationships, build coalitions, and develop a greater capacity for problem-solving.⁵⁶ These functions are crucial to an agency's overall transparency, credibility, responsiveness, accountability, accessibility, and overall ability to successfully maintain public support and legitimacy.⁵⁷

11. Community involvement

Community and stakeholder input regarding how civilian oversight should function and which accountability issues it should address will result in the creation of a "best fit" oversight system that can meet community needs and expectations. Without sufficient involvement of those most interested in and impacted by local issues regarding law enforcement, it is unlikely that civilian oversight will be able to successfully accomplish its goals.⁵⁸

12. Confidentiality, anonymity, and protection from retaliation

Civilian oversight must function with the same integrity, professionalism, and ethical standards it expects from and promotes for law enforcement. Stakeholders and the community must remain confident that civilian oversight will protect sensitive information as well as those who disclose it. An oversight agency cannot maintain credibility, legitimacy, and public trust if it does not or cannot respect confidentiality agreements, maintain the anonymity of those who wish to share information anonymously, and work towards creating an environment where those involved with or contacting the oversight agency can do so without fear of retaliation or retribution.

13. Procedural justice and legitimacy

Rooted in behavioral psychology, procedural justice typically centers on *how* authority is exercised. For entities whose authority is established by law, the recognition of their right to that authority and perceptions of how fairly that authority is exercised are crucial components of legitimacy.⁵⁹

Research has shown that procedurally just interactions between law enforcement and the community positively impact the public's compliance with laws⁶⁰ and willingness to assist in crime control efforts.⁶¹ The literature has also shown that officer perceptions of a procedurally just work environment are associated with reduced misconduct and corruption,⁶² as well as greater endorsement of policing reforms, reduced mistrust of and cynicism about the community, willingness to obey supervisors, and increased officer well-being.⁶³

56. Stewart, "Chapter 11. Community Outreach and Public Education in Citizen Oversight," 149–51.

57. Stewart, "Chapter 11. Community Outreach and Public Education in Citizen Oversight;" Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*.

58. McDevitt, Farrell, and Andresen, *Enhancing Citizen Participation in the Review of Complaints and Use of Force in the Boston Police Department*, 7–8; De Angelis, Rosenthal, and Buchner, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*, 43–44.

59. Sunshine and Tyler, "The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing;" Jackson et al., "Why Do People Comply with the Law?;" Mazerolle et al., *Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Policing*.

60. Sunshine and Tyler, "The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing."

61. Murphy, Hinds, and Fleming, "Encouraging Public Cooperation and Support for Police."

62. Wolfe and Piquero, "Organizational Justice and Police Misconduct."

63. Trinkner, Tyler, and Goff, "Justice from Within."

Successful civilian oversight leverages the principles of procedural justice to bolster legitimacy with all members of the community. There is research supporting the notion that a procedurally just complaint processes—where complainants report being satisfied with the quality of communication and the process⁶⁴—increases complainant satisfaction.⁶⁵ It is equally important that civilian oversight establish legitimacy with law enforcement and law enforcement unions by operating in accordance with the principles of procedural justice. Effective civilian oversight must work to overcome an “us versus them” mindset by proceeding with respect, trustworthy and unbiased motives, genuine interest in the concerns of law enforcement, and clear communication of the processes and decisions pursuant to the oversight agency’s official duties.

64. De Angelis, “Assessing the Impact of Oversight and Procedural Justice on the Attitudes of Individuals Who File Police Complaints.”

65. Worden, Bonner, and McLean, “Procedural Justice and Citizen Review of Complaints Against the Police.”

Recommended Effective Practices

The remainder of the report focuses on certain key areas in civilian oversight and presents recommendations for practitioners to consider in their own work. Each recommendation focuses on strengthening an agency's practices in relation to the thirteen principles for effective civilian oversight and includes a brief commentary with additional information, resources, and examples from the field. While the authors of this report have attempted to develop an extensive list of effective practices, it should not be considered exhaustive. This report focuses largely on addressing recurring themes or concerns identified by practitioners and stakeholders throughout the course of this research.

The recommendations for effective practices, described in this section, are meant to offer guidance, not concrete solutions. As discussed earlier, the challenges associated with civilian oversight can rarely be boiled down to technical problems with technical solutions. When considering a particular practice, oversight practitioners should ensure that the new practice can be implemented sustainably, with the resources, staff, cooperation, and political support necessary to continue a practice into the future. An agency unable to deliver a level or type of service that it once did risks losing public confidence and legitimacy.

Oversight practitioners must consider each recommendation with a mindset oriented towards a "best fit" approach, and consider the following questions with all relevant stakeholders prior to implementing a particular practice:

1. **Is this practice an appropriate fit for our local context?**

Not all recommended practices will be appropriate for every jurisdiction or oversight system. Oversight practitioners must carefully discuss recommendations under consideration with local stakeholders and gather feedback concerning each recommendation. It is important for stakeholders and community members to fully understand what a particular recommendation seeks to accomplish and how it can be implemented within their local context.

2. **How will this practice strengthen civilian oversight in relation to the thirteen principles for effective oversight?**

Before establishing or revising an existing civilian oversight system, stakeholders must evaluate its strengths and weaknesses in relation to the 13 principles of effectiveness. While each recommendation is framed in a way that focuses on satisfying or maximizing a particular principle, stakeholders

should consider whether adopting a particular recommendation will achieve its intended outcome in their jurisdiction. Implementing one recommendation that strengthens a principle may not sufficiently address a particular weakness or other related shortcomings of the agency. Additional changes may be necessary to achieve the civilian oversight agency's goals.

3. **What are the potential unintended consequences of implementing this practice?**

Stakeholders should consider and discuss the potential unintended consequences associated with a particular practice. While a practice may strengthen the oversight system in one area, it may have the unintended consequence of undermining the oversight system in another. For example, the implementation of certain practices could have significant impacts on the existing or proposed resources of the agency.

References

- ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) of Washington. "Seattle: A Call for an Independent Office for Police Accountability." American Civil Liberties Union of Washington. Last modified June 11, 1999. <https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/seattle-call-independent-office-police-accountability>.
- Alpert, Geoffrey P., Tyler Cawthray, Jeff Rojek, and Frank Ferdik. "Citizen Oversight in the United States and Canada: Applying Outcome Measures and Evidence-Based Concepts." In *Civilian Oversight of Police: Advancing Accountability in Law Enforcement*, edited by Tim Prenzler and Garth den Heyer, 179–204. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016.
- Anderson, Justin, Larry Brubaker, Sean DeBlicek, Brooke Leary, and David Dean. *Law Enforcement Oversight: Limited Independence, Authority & Access to Information Impede Effectiveness*. Seattle: King County Auditor's Office, 2015. <https://kingcounty.gov/~media/depts/auditor/new-web-docs/2015/kcso-oleo-2015/kcso-oleo-2015.ashx?la=en>.
- Andi, Jennifer. "Berkeley's Establishment of a Police Review Commission." Accessed December 3, 2018. https://www.foundsf.org/index.php?title=Berkeley%E2%80%99s_Establishment_of_a_Police_Review_Commission.
- Attard, Barbara, and Kathryn Olson. *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*. San Francisco: Accountability Associates, 2013. <https://accountabilityassociates.org/wp-content/uploads/Oversight-in-the-US-%E2%80%A6FINAL.pdf>.
- Bobb, Merrick J. "Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States." *Saint Louis University Public Law Review* 22, no. 1 (2003), 151–166. <https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1360&context=plr>.
- City of Detroit. "Police Commissioners History." Accessed December 3, 2018. <https://detroitmi.gov/government/boards/board-police-commissioners/police-commissioners-history>.
- Civil Rights Division. *The Civil Rights Division's Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 1994–Present*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2017. <https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/922421/download>.
- De Angelis, Joseph, Richard Rosenthal, and Brian Buchner. *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence*. Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, 2016. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/nacole/pages/159/attachments/original/1476745119/NACOLE_AssessingtheEvidence_Final.pdf?1476745119.
- De Angelis, Joseph. "Assessing the Impact of Oversight and Procedural Justice on the Attitudes of Individuals Who File Police Complaints." *Police Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (2009), 214–236. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611109332425>.

- Fagan, Jeffrey, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies, and Valerie West. "Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City." In *Race, Ethnicity, and Policing: New and Essential Readings*, edited by Stephen Rice K. and Michael D. White, 59. New York: New York University Press, 2010.
- Fagan, Jeffrey, and Garth Davies. "Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race and Disorder in New York City." *Fordham Urban Law Review Journal* XXVIII (2001), 458–504. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.257813>.
- Ferdik, Frank V., Jeff Rojek, and Geoffrey P. Alpert. "Citizen Oversight in the United States and Canada: An Overview." *Police Practice and Research* 14, no. 2 (2013), 104–116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2013.767089>.
- Harris, F. "Holding Police Accountability Theory to Account." *Policing* 6, no. 3 (2012), 240–249. <https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pas003>.
- Jackson, Jonathan, Ben Bradford, Mike Hough, Andy Myhill, Paul Quinton, and Tom Tyler. "Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions." *British Journal of Criminology* 52, no. 6 (2012), 1051–1071. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1994490>.
- Jerome, Richard. "Chapter 3. Credibility, Impartiality, and Independence in Citizen Oversight." In *Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement*, edited by Justina Cintrón Perino, 21–45. Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2006.
- Jones, Jeffrey M. "In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years." Gallup.com, June 19, 2015. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx>.
- Kelly, Kimbriell, Wesley Lower, and Steven Rich. "Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers Fired for Misconduct Back on the Streets." *Washington Post*, August 3, 2017. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/>.
- King, Kevin. "Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards to Ensure Police Accountability and Strengthen Police-Community Relations." *Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal* 12, no. 1 (2015), 91–120. https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=hastings_race_poverty_law_journal.
- King, Ryan S, and Marc Mauer. "The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War on Drugs in the 1990s." *Harm Reduction Journal* 3, no. 1 (2006). <https://doi.org/10.1186/1477-7517-3-6>.
- Koper, Christopher K., Gretchen E. Moore, and Jeffrey A. Roth. *Putting 100,000 Officers on the Street: A Survey-Based Assessment of the Federal COPS Program*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2003. <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/200521.pdf>.
- Lasley, J. R. "The Impact of the Rodney King Incident on Citizen Attitudes toward Police." *Policing and Society* 3, no. 4 (1994), 245–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.1994.9964673>.
- Lowery, Wesley. *They Can't Kill Us All: Ferguson, Baltimore, and a New Era in America's Racial Justice Movement*. First edition. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2016.

- Mazerolle, Lorraine Green, Elise Sargeant, Adrian Cherney, Sarah Bennett, Kristina Murphy, Emma Antrobus, and Peter Martin. *Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Policing*. SpringerBriefs in Criminology. New York: Springer, 2014.
- McDevitt, Dean Jack, Amy Farrell, and W. Carsten Andresen. *Enhancing Citizen Participation in the Review of Complaints and Use of Force in the Boston Police Department*. Boston: Northeastern University Institute on Race and Justice, 2005.
- Miller, Joel. *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature*. Report from the Global Meeting on Civilian Oversight of Police, 2001. <https://www.vera.org/publications/civilian-oversight-of-policing-lessons-from-the-literature>.
- Mitchell, Ojmarrh, and Michael S. Caudy. "Examining Racial Disparities in Drug Arrests." *Justice Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2015), 288–313. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.761721>.
- Murphy, Kristina, Lyn Hinds, and Jenny Fleming. "Encouraging Public Cooperation and Support for Police." *Policing and Society* 18, no. 2 (2008), 136–155. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460802008660>.
- NJ Advance Media. "The Force Report." NJ.com. Accessed June 21, 2021. <https://force.nj.com/>.
- Norman, Jim. "Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average." Gallup.com, July 10, 2017. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/213869/confidence-police-back-historical-average.aspx>.
- Olson, Kathryn. *Citizens Advisory/Review Board Spokane County Sheriff's Office: Oversight Review*. Gig Harbor, WA: Change Integration Consulting, 2016. https://media.spokesman.com/documents/2016/05/Spokane_Citizens_Advisory_Board_report_Kathryn_Olson_May_5_2016.pdf.
- Perez, Douglas W. *Common Sense About Police Review*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994.
- Police Assessment Resource Center. *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*. Los Angeles: Police Assessment Resource Center, 2005. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5498b74ce4b01fe317ef2575/t/54caf3abe4b04c8e2a3b6691/1422586795583/Review+of+National+Police+Oversight+Models+%20Feb.+2005%20.pdf>.
- Prenzler, Tim, and Colleen Lewis. "Performance Indicators for Police Oversight Agencies." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 64, no. 2 (2005), 77–83. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.2005.00443.x>.
- President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015. https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.
- Stewart, Lauri K. "Chapter 11. Community Outreach and Public Education in Citizen Oversight." In *Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement*, edited by Justina Cintrón Perino, 147–167. Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2006.
- Sunshine, Jason, and Tom R. Tyler. "The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing." *Law & Society Review* 37, no. 3 (2003), 513–548. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5893.3703002>.

- Taggart, Kendall, Mike Hayes, and Scott Pham. "Here are the Secret Records on Thousands of New York Police Misconduct Cases." BuzzFeed News. Last modified April 16, 2018. <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kendalltaggart/nypd-police-misconduct-database>.
- Trinkner, Rick, Tom R. Tyler, and Phillip Atiba Goff. "Justice from Within: The Relations Between a Procedurally Just Organizational Climate and Police Organizational Efficiency, Endorsement of Democratic Policing, and Officer Well-Being." *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law* 22, no. 2 (2016), 158–172. <https://doi.org/10.1037/law0000085>.
- Tuch, Steven A., and Ronald Weitzer. "Trends: Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 61, no. 4 (1997), 642–663.
- Tyler, Tom R., and Jeffrey Fagan. "The Impact of Stop and Frisk Policies Upon Police Legitimacy." *Key Issues in the Police Use of Pedestrian Stops and Searches: Discussion Papers from an Urban Institute Roundtable*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, 2012. <https://doi.org/10.1037/e527872013-001>.
- Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 § (1994). <https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/103-322.pdf>.
- Walker, Samuel, and Carol Archbold. *The New World of Police Accountability*. Second edition. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014.
- Walker, Samuel. "Chapter 1. The History of Citizen Oversight." In *Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement*, edited by Justina Cintrón Perino, 1–10. Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2006.
- . "Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office." Omaha, NE: Report of the First National Police Auditors Conference, March 2003. <https://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/core-principles.pdf>.
- . *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight*. Houston: Wadsworth Thompson Learning, 2001.
- Weitzer, Ronald. "Incidents of Police Misconduct and Public Opinion." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 30, no. 5 (2002), 397–408. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2352\(02\)00150-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2352(02)00150-2).
- Wolfe, Scott E., and Alex R. Piquero. "Organizational Justice and Police Misconduct." *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 38, no. 4 (2011), 332–353. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854810397739>.
- Worden, Robert E., Heidi S. Bonner, and Sarah J. McLean. "Procedural Justice and Citizen Review of Complaints Against the Police: Structure, Outcomes, and Complainants' Subjective Experiences." *Police Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (2018), 77–108. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611117739812>.

About the COPS Office

The **Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office)** is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation's state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.


Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual respect between police and communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address our nation's crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources.

Rather than simply responding to crime, community policing focuses on preventing it through strategic problem-solving approaches based on collaboration. The COPS Office awards grants to hire community policing officers and support the development and testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than \$14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation's streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing. Other achievements include the following:

- To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of approximately 130,000 additional officers by more than 13,000 of the nation's 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- Almost 500 agencies have received customized advice and peer-led technical assistance through the COPS Office Collaborative Reform Initiative Technical Assistance Center.
- To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than eight million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs and flash drives.
- The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, round tables, and other forums focused on issues critical to law enforcement.

COPS Office information resources, covering a wide range of community policing topics such as school and campus safety, violent crime, and officer safety and wellness, can be downloaded via the COPS Office's home page, <https://cops.usdoj.gov>.



The wave of high-profile incidents in 2020 between police and community members has prompted widespread calls for greater community oversight of law enforcement agencies. This is an executive summary of *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field and Effective Oversight Practices*, a white paper by the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) that combines survey data, case studies of oversight bodies nationwide, and a literature review to outline the history of civilian oversight and its spread; define three standard oversight models and discuss their implementation; propose 13 principles for effective oversight; and provide recommendations for each within an effective practices framework.



COPS

Community Oriented Policing Services
U.S. Department of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
145 N Street NE
Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details about COPS Office programs,
call the COPS Office Response Center at 800-421-6770.

Visit the COPS Office online at cops.usdoj.gov.



National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement

P.O. Box 20851
Indianapolis, IN 46220-0851